

Chis THE *Bills*
POLITICAL STATE
OF
EUROPE

AT THE BEGINNING OF 1796:

OR,

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE MOST EFFECTUAL MEANS OF PROCURING
A SOLID AND PERMANENT PEACE.

WITH AN APPENDIX,

In which several important Questions are considered.

BY MONS. DE CALONNE,

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ADVERTISEMENT.

I thought it my duty not to resist the several pressing demands by delaying the publication of this work till the Appendix that completes it (the Contents of which are indicated in the following table) was printed. The importance of the subject considered in the Appendix, No. 1, and the necessary labour and researches which its accuracy required, have taken up much more time than what was expected.

This Appendix, the numbers of which are relative to different questions independent of the work, is now printing and will be published separately.

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THE
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

WHEN in the month of November last I began to write a few articles that were successively inserted in the *Courier de Londres*, under the title of *Tableau de l'Europe*, I was very far from forming the design of composing a regular work. I only wished to assist the Editor of that paper, who has every just claim to my most tender interest*. Soon, however, the variety and importance of the subjects which fell under my consideration, the different questions that arose from the circumstances of the moment, and the deep attention which, from the impression they made on my mind, I was induced to bestow upon them, carried me much beyond my original intentions. The horizon widened by degrees, and as I wished to be wholly directed by the course of the different events, which then followed each other, with so varied and rapid a succession, it became impossible to adopt a regular plan, and I was obliged to give way to digressions, which demanded more or less illustration, according to the importance of the occurrences of the day, and the peculiar interests of the moment.

B

A work,

* My brother is among the number of emigrants who derive their present subsistence from their own industry. He has devoted himself to a very fastidious labour, that he might not become a burden to any body. This hard necessity is not a subject of shame, but a matter of triumph to every good Frenchman.

A work, undertaken under these circumstances, could not possess the same order, precision and regularity, as if the plan had been properly digested, carefully observed, and uniformly followed up in its execution.

Yet, as I flattered myself that some of the observations might be of some utility, I did not prevent the printer from making a collection of these detached articles, and presenting them to the Public under the form of an anonymous pamphlet. When I discovered afterwards that I was generally known to be the author, I regretted, not to have revised the edition with greater accuracy, as it was found to be full of faults, incorrect in every respect, and of a disagreeable type. To repair these defects, I thought it my duty to publish another, more correct in the typography and text, without however changing the original plan, though I had an unquestionable right to do it*. I have added a few notes to point out the connection between the different parts, and to shew their application to the last occurrences: I have subjoined, by way of appendix, some observations to serve as an answer to the different critiques that have been so industriously obtruded upon the Public; and to elucidate, as well as prove, different facts and calculations that have been called into question.

There is more courage than self-love in prefixing my name to this production: For the indulgence which I expected, and to which I thought myself fully entitled, in favour of my intentions at least, particularly from my own countrymen, I know full well

* A periodical author, who is well acquainted with the French language, has announced in his weekly publication, that I was printing a new edition of my work, *with some important alterations*. I imagine that his stay in London has accustomed him to the use of the word in the same sense it has in English, where it may be applied to the least alteration.



well that I have not obtained; not one of them, whose opinions I have contradicted, or whose expectations I have defeated, has deigned to shew me any forbearance. Very far from it, either because I have not been able to explain myself sufficiently, or that they would not understand my meaning, that small publication has been so egregiously misrepresented, such partial and mutilated extracts have been so illiberally thrown out against me, if compared to the original ground upon which they are founded, and to those circumstances which should really have preserved me from them, must appear truly ridiculous.

Thus, because I maintained it to have been my constant opinion, that there never existed in France a Constitution properly so called, I am stigmatized with the opprobrious appellation of *Constitutionalist*; an appellation on which the Royalists have bestowed their eternal anathemas.

Because I deplored the too fatal and real mischief which some parts of the proclamation of Lewis XVIII. have produced, parts which are generally acknowledged to be impolitic, and which I attributed to the imprudence of some inconsiderate advisers, a malicious intention is evinced to brand me as *a deserter of the cause of the Bourbon Princes!*

Because, whilst I endeavoured to prove the necessity of an established religious worship in every well organized empire, I have excluded every kind of barbarous intolerance, and have not mentioned the doctrines of revelation in a discussion merely political, I am called a *Deist*.

Lastly, because, at the same time, I maintained, what indeed is the chief position of a most respectable administration, that it is not possible yet to conclude a peace, I have endeavoured to defeat exaggerated opinions which, representing France as being totally unable to continue the war, might lead

to a false and dangerous security ; because I cannot place an implicit belief in the willingness of treating with the present rulers of France, nor in the possibility of doing it without danger, and that I do not give any credit to the pretended amelioration of the principles that are held forth in the new Constitution, I am supposed, on this account, to be *anti-ministerial* ; I who have, on every occasion, shewn myself as much penetrated with the sentiments due to the British Government, as any of my fellow-countrymen can be, even of those who, in their misfortune, have experienced the effects of its generosity and beneficence.

In answer to these absurd imputations, which indeed carry their own refutation along with them, I only desire that this Edition, the only one which appears with my name, and the only one for the contents of which I am at all responsible, may be read with some degree of attention*.

But that my sentiments, views, and the real motives which have guided my pen, may not be wholly misconstrued, I shall openly and frankly explain them.

I have had two principal objects in view : the one relating to that part of the French, as well within as without the kingdom, that is well-intentioned ; the other relating to all the Powers of Europe, but especially England.

FIRST

* Not that I disown the articles inserted in the *Courier de Londres*. It is easily perceived that I have made but few alterations : but who does not know what a different impression may be made, particularly in the mind of those who are not the most favourably disposed in my favour, from a mere word added or omitted, an article transposed, an expression intended to be erased, but which from negligence has remained in the text, and several other excusable inadvertencies, resulting from the precipitancy with which those articles were inserted ?

FIRST OBJECT. I am firmly convinced that the re-establishment of order in France, which is no longer to be expected from the mere force of arms, can only be effected by a general *impulse* and unanimous resolution of the whole nation.

I am convinced that the nation exasperated by the numerous and accumulated evils which it experiences, is very well disposed to receive this impulse.

I am convinced, that what chiefly obstructs this favourable disposition, proceeds from this circumstance, that the nation, being in general desirous of a change, does not precisely know what kind of change it would be for its interest to adopt, and has no fixed rallying point to which it can direct its views.

I am convinced, that in order to give every degree of decision and activity to this disposition of the people, it becomes indispensable, that every party, every power that is an enemy to the present government of demagogues, which oppresses France under the specious name of a Republic, should unite in one desire, be animated by one spirit, and concur in one plan; and that they should unanimously agree in presenting to the eyes of the nation one single object, that might command the general approbation, and gain an universal concurrence.

I am convinced, that this object should not be to compel the people to resume what they have rejected with so much violence, what they evince such an unconquerable repugnance to re-adopt, what, in short, is incompatible with their present prepossessions: for, instead of tempering the phrenzy of their mind, instead of reclaiming their wild and bewildered imaginations, it would be a measure the most repulsive to their feelings, and would only replunge them into their former errors, to announce to them, that they can find no other issue out of
 Republican

Republican anarchy, but by entering into that situation which they have been led to consider as the cause of all their evils, and from which they have forced themselves by the most terrible convulsion. It will not conciliate their minds to say to them, Re-animate what you have so completely deprived of all existence, re-establish what you view with such dread and horror, and expect nothing of what you so ardently desire.

I am convinced, on the contrary, that in order to induce the people to adopt a good government, it is necessary to present one which has at least the appearance of being essentially new, and totally different from that which they have destroyed ; that it is necessary to acknowledge the defects of the ancient government, in order to secure the favourable reception of that in which these imperfections should not exist ; and that, in the present moment, the only certain means of turning the tide of popular prejudices in favour of monarchy, would be to declare in a solemn manner, and to adhere to the declaration, **THAT MONARCHY SHOULD BE ERECTED ON A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS, REGULATED AND TEMPERED BY LAWS THAT SHOULD HAVE A SUFFICIENT SAFE-GUARD TO RENDER THEM FIXED AND IM-MOVEABLE.**

Lastly, I am convinced, that it is not only possible to form such a monarchy, to appropriate it to the French character, and to adapt it to the safety and prosperity of the kingdom ; but also, that, from the point where we now are, it is a much shorter way to arrive at that reformation, than it would be to turn to the ancient order of things. Besides, there is now no choice left ; one way lies open and accessible, whilst the other is obstructed by insuperable difficulties. and by obstacles that are now become insurmountable.

These

These several suggestions*, after I had bestowed an uninterrupted attention on the subject, have at last induced me to employ the *maximum* of my efforts, if I may so express myself, and the feeble powers of my writings, to excite those Frenchmen, who call themselves Royalists, and those who, under the name of Constitutionalists and Monarchists, are also the partizans of royalty; those Frenchmen who are suffering abroad all the miseries of exile, and those who, at home, are groaning under the rod of Oppression; in short, all those Frenchmen who are dissatisfied with the present order of things, to draw at last together in one general concentration of united efforts, directed to one and the same point. A consummation this, which I have at all times most devoutly wished; and a desire which I have constantly expressed.

I expressed this desire as far back as the beginning of 1782, when in my letter to the King I proposed to His Majesty, as the surest expedient to prevent the fatal schism with which the State was threatened, *the solemn establishment of a Constitution that should im-* P. 40 &
mutably fix the fundamental laws of the French Em- 41. 68 &
pire. 69.

I expressed this desire at the close of the year 1790, when in my work on the state of France I used

* These several positions, the result of the firm conviction of my mind, and which I have laid down as the grounds of the safest policy and the motives of my own views, will not, I trust, be deemed too confident and presumptuous. Besides, though these suggestions are not of much value in themselves, may I not be allowed to observe that, being founded on former and more recent means of information, which I have been in a situation to acquire; on political observations which I have had an opportunity of making in travelling through Europe; and on local informations as authentic and certain as they can ever be: May they not, I say, carry as much weight with them as those that may be opposed to them, without having the same support?

P. 295, used every means of exhortation to conciliate, or at
 296, 297, least to unite all pretensions, to suppress all subjects of
 &c. commotion, to regenerate, without destroying, France,
 by fixing a good and solid Constitution, which should
 have for its basis all those general laws which were una-
 nimously demanded by the national Cahiers.

P. 18 & I expressed this desire, still more particularly in
 20, of the 1792, when at the beginning of the Campaign I en-
 Declara- gaged the Bourbon Princes publicly to proclaim in
 tion, dat. their declaration that, *uniting with every faithful and*
 ed Aug. *good Frenchman in the desire of delivering the people*
 1792. *from their oppressors, they had no separate interests from*
any of those who were actuated by the same intention ;
that having no other wish than that manifested by the
whole nation in their Cahiers, and suggested by their
common interest in the public welfare, they had a right
to expect that all those who were not seditious, or under
the influence of a fatal phrenzy ; all those who were
not the enemies of royalty, enemies to all legitimate au-
thority, and enemies to the public tranquillity, would
hasten to join them ; and that the greatest majority of
the Inhabitants of the Kingdom, till then restrained by
the dread of popular tyranny, or by the uneasiness and
uncertainty of what should succeed it, would, now that
both these apprehensions are removed, immediately rally
round the Royal standard.

What I said then, what I have always thought
 and advised, I now say, I now think and advise
 with a redoubled earnestness and from additional
 considerations. The re-union of all parties, and
 their rallying around the constitutional establishment
 of a Monarchy judiciously limited, which, at those
 different epochs, I merely considered as a most de-
 sirable object, is now become so essentially necessary,
 that there is no other resource, no other medium
 left : Every prejudice, every interest must either be
 conciliated and directed to the adoption of such a
 Government, or we must perish.

If

If by this explicit declaration I lose for ever the favourable opinion of those, who pique themselves on an inflexible pertinacity in their principles, and shudder with horror at the mere mention of the word reconciliation, I pity their blindness more than I regret their alienation from me, and in this respect my moderation is more conspicuous than theirs: for if I am subjected to the bitterness of their invective, because I am not as exaggerated as they are, and do not go every length with them, I have a much better right to be equally exasperated at their obstinate perseverance in opinions and declamations which so cruelly hurt the individual interest of every Emigrant. I am not an Emigrant myself: but my zeal having associated my fate to their destiny, which is also become that of all my family, I include myself in the number of those who suffer, and as a common sufferer I have an equal right to be grieved, to feel an impatience, and to complain of that which so evidently tends to prolong our sufferings to an unlimited duration, and to precipitate us into a still more horrible abyss of misfortunes, if that unparalleled generosity which grants us hospitality, accompanied with relief, should at length grow weary at the unbounded prospect of its undefined continuance.

Let those then, who are continually employing every weapon of calumny and abuse against me, whilst I am more anxious for their welfare than they are themselves, declare what other resources they perceive which may justify them in opposing this expedient of a *national coalition* which I have recommended, and such as it forms the great object of my wishes.

Do they expect those resources from the eventual military successes, which the continuation of the war may produce?—But do they perceive what would be the real consequences of those successes,
which

which are more to be hoped, than reduced to a certainty? Can they mention one of the Belligerent Powers that has solely in view the re-establishment of the ancient French Monarchy, the restoration of the Bourbon family to the throne of their ancestors, and the re-instatement of the exiled and emigrated Landholders in the possession of their former property?

Or, do they build their expectations on the disposition of the nation?—But can they flatter themselves to see her departing, all at once, from sentiments and opinions which for these seven years have been so fondly fostered? Can they believe that she will go from one extreme to the other, without allowing herself time to stop and to deliberate, and unless she is excited to it by some very powerful and imposing attraction? Is it probable, that she will make an unconditional surrender of the usurped powers of Sovereignty to the Heir of the Monarch whom she has dethroned and beheaded? Will she recall and reinstate the Emigrants into their possessions, without the least attempt on their part to remove that prejudice which represents them as her most irreconcilable enemies, obstinately bent on her ruin? To entertain such an idea is the excess of infatuation. If those who in the sincerity of their heart cherish their error, were to consider more attentively every circumstance, and endeavour to procure impartial and undistorted accounts of the different opinions that prevail in the interior of the kingdom, they would not lull themselves into a false security; and far from taking umbrage at whatever is proposed or written with a view to reanimate and to rouse them into action; *if they knew their business or interest, they would cry-out as I do:*

———S'ils favoient leur affaire,
Ils crieroient comme moi.

I am

I am not, however, precisely in the case of the animal in whose mouth La Fontaine puts these words, and do not justify my loud and incessant cries by saying: *My death is certain, farewell my roof and my house.*

——Ma mort est certaine ;
Adieu mon toit et ma maison.

No, it is not for the poor remains of a life that is become indifferent to me, it is not for my house and property to which I have, without regret, bidden an eternal farewell, that *I cry out* against obstinate and irreconcilable zealots ; but it is for the welfare of a State which they ruin by their blind infatuation ; it is for the Princes whom they remove to an immeasurable distance from the throne by their Councils ; it is for a million of citizens whom they sacrifice to their stubbornness ; it is for the public tranquillity which they expose to be for ever banished from their country, by thus destroying the means which can alone promote its re-establishment ; it is for a combination of such weighty considerations that I raise my voice and endeavour to be heard.

I cry out against them, because they are not intentionally, but in fact, the enemies of our country which I love, and the friends of despotism which I abhor.

I cry out against them, because they shew no readiness to divest themselves of the appearances of a resentment of which we are all the victims.

I cry out against them, because they aspire after bloody trophies which I no longer desire, since I no longer see that they can be salutary.

I cry out against them, because they have been the cause that the most favourable opportunity for re-establishing Monarchy has been suffered to escape, and because it is to be apprehended, that they will
equally

equally counteract every other opportunity which, to my knowledge, will still present itself.

These are my motives ; these are my objects ; these are my reasons for bewailing the fatal consequences of that manifesto which has had all the effect of a hostile declaration, when it was of so much importance to announce only pacific dispositions. These were my reasons for denying the inviolate existence of an ancient constitution, when I saw how pernicious it was to attach ourselves with enthusiasm to such an idea ; and when I saw that we were sinking fast into the frightful gulph, whilst we confined our chief efforts to catch at the dead and unsolid reed.

Those who are well informed, understand me ; those who are too short-sighted to approve my object, may calumniate my sentiments. But the dread of their unjust excommunication shall not stop my voice ; for a secret *presentiment*, which perhaps is only the illusion of my heart, induces me to hope, that I shall not always be the voice of one crying in the desert,

I have explained what my views were with regard to the French ; I shall be as explicit with regard to the object of the remarks found in this book relative to the Belligerent powers.

2. OBJECT. To appreciate with justice and impartiality whatever I have permitted myself to observe in the course of this work on the conduct of the Coalesced Powers, on the political state of Europe at the present moment, and on the proper means to obtain a speedy and a solid pacification, it becomes necessary to recall to mind what was the origin of this war, with what spirit the Powers declared they entered into it, and what still should be the real object of it, relative to the general interest of all civil society.

It

It is incontestible that the French were the aggressors: their real motive was that the revolutionary chiefs were in need of a war to keep the nation employed, and stood in need of armies the better to enslave the people: but their ostensible motive, expressed in their declaration, was to defend their liberty and their new constitution against the supposed intention of the sovereigns to deprive them of both.

On the other hand, the Powers considered that the French Revolutionists, acting on a system founded on anti-social doctrines, had become the enemies of all nations and of all public tranquillity. For this reason, at the very time they armed to repel their attacks, they formed a confederacy with a view to destroy the focus of a contagion which threatened every empire; and they announced it to be their principal object, *to consolidate in France the basis of a Monarchical Government, equally suitable to the rights of Sovereigns and to the welfare of the French Nation.*

These were the terms of the declaration signed at Pilnitz, August 27, 1791, between the Emperor and the King of Prussia.

That which was published in the name of the same sovereigns by the Duke of Brunswick, as Generalissimo of their armies, at the opening of the campaign of 1792, equally expresses that *Their Majesties had no other object in view but the happiness of France, without pretending to enrich themselves, at her expence, by conquests.*

It is the full assurance of these intentions, said the Bourbon Princes at that time, which justifies us in uniting our standards with those of the foreign Powers. By publishing their intentions, they have legitimated their proceedings; and our wishes for their success are conformable with those which we have never ceased to express for the good of our country.

When,

Declaration of
the Princes,
August 1792.

When, afterwards, England joined the Confederation, she manifested, still more plainly, the same sentiments. His Britannic Majesty, in his declaration dated October 29, 1793, far from shewing a desire of taking any advantage of the disorders of France, exhorted all Frenchmen to rally, immediately, round a *Monarchical Government, reserving it for another opportunity to discuss the necessary modifications.* He invited them to unite under the empire of the law, of morality, and religion, in order to insure a permanent peace with their neighbours, the internal tranquillity of the country, a just and true liberty, a wise, moderate and beneficent government, and the enjoyment of all the advantages which may secure the happiness of a great and flourishing nation.

These words, which Wisdom herself seems to have uttered by the mouth of George the Third, are the text of the whole political part of my work. My continual efforts are to demonstrate that now, more than ever, every plan and every step should be directed towards the establishment of that *wise, moderate, and beneficent government, which alone can insure a just and true liberty, can re-establish the empire of the law, of religion and morality, and restore peace to France as well as to her neighbours.*

By insisting on the execution of such noble resolutions, I only refer to intentions announced by all the Powers, and by combating every departure from this line of conduct, I only continue to pay homage to those same intentions too worthy of the Allies not to be durable. If I express in this writing an unwillingness to believe, that the cabinet of London has abandoned them, and that whatever appearances may be, it is effectually determined to acknowledge the chimerical and momentary government which now exists in France; I rest solely on the very principles of His Britannic Majesty inculcated in that declaration: and no subsequent circumstance

stance could have been an inducement to abandon them, since there exists the same indispensable necessity for all Europe to destroy that which will destroy the tranquillity of all Europe, if it is suffered to subsist.

Besides, it may easily be imagined that it is impossible for me to think, or express myself otherwise than as a Frenchman; and it would be unjustifiable in any Frenchman to desire the success of a war against France, if he did not expect that the success would re-establish order; and if it appeared indubitable to him, that it would for the future have no tendency towards substituting a legitimate government to seditious anarchy.

I grant that our interest, if it was separate from that of the English nation, could not counterbalance it in the eyes of the British government; I likewise agree that practicability ought to regulate the extent of the most generous exertions.

At the same time, however, I firmly believe, and it cannot be denied, that the doctrine which still is, as I shall prove it, the basis of the pretended French government, having subverted the foundations of all society; the existence of that government is a danger that threatens all other states; that this danger increases in the inverse ratio of its distance, and consequently that it is the interest of England, as much and more so than that of other empires, to effectuate its annihilation and the re-establishment of a different order of things.

I likewise think that it is very possible to realize such a change at an epoch that is not very distant; and that to prepare and adopt every necessary means to take advantage of that important period would contribute, more than any thing else, to accelerate a good and desirable pacification.

It is possible; for it is only requisite to lend a hand to the total overthrow of that which is undermined
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in every part, and which is on the point of falling to pieces; it is only necessary to promote the means which I have endeavoured to indicate, in order to be in a situation, when the opportunity offers, of assisting the impulsion, which is at once to determine the fall of what is already tottering, and the erection of that which is to succeed it.

It will contribute more than any thing else to accelerate a good peace. For, on the one side, such a peace would be unattainable with the present rulers; I think I have demonstrated it: on the other, such a peace will be no longer doubtful as soon as a regular government is established in France; the reason is obvious. A regular government, such as I understand it, and such as the declaration of His Britannic Majesty has designed it, will wish for peace, because it will be its first and essential interest to obtain it, and because it will have no interest incompatible with it: it will wish for peace from necessity, because it will not possess the resources of revolutionary expedients; it will wish for peace from prudence, because it will be its very essence to respect the RIGHTS OF PROPERTY, and to establish A REAL AND REGULAR SYSTEM OF FINANCE, two points incompatible with the unnatural efforts to which the oppressors of the nation have driven, and to which they may still drive, the people. It will wish for peace from the most urgent of duties, because it will strenuously endeavour to heal the wounds of the state, whilst those who daily multiply them are in no ways concerned about it,

Let there be a regular government established in France, and the conditions of peace will no longer be a matter of uneasiness; they will be reasonable, they will extend to whatever object it will be just to embrace; they will be more advantageous perhaps, and certainly more permanent, than those which some men flatter themselves may be extorted by force.

force. Upon these grounds I thought myself authorized to conclude, that if a willingness was evinced to seize every opportunity that offered itself, to use all kinds of influence which may so easily be imagined and obtained to induce the nation, in an indirect manner, to adopt a regular government, it would be the shortest and least expensive way, to arrive at an honourable and permanent peace, whilst every other expedient is only calculated to remove us farther from this desirable object: I have likewise concluded, that by using every art of persuasion to enforce this, by dispelling every illusion which might divert from it, I should serve England and the other Powers as much as my own country; that I should serve the cause of humanity. I have the most intimate conviction of this. Is it a crime?

Among the reasons which I have adduced in my work in support of my opinion, I have not alledged the protestations solemnly made on both sides, to reject every design of conquests. The French were the first to deck themselves with this cloak of disinterestedness, and all the other Powers have taken the same costume. It is pretty well known, what those protestations mean in politics, where the power of executing, is commonly what directs the will of undertaking, a project.

But in admitting into the balance no other weight than that of interest and conveniency, it has been my opinion, and I have endeavoured to demonstrate, that it would be more advantageous to promote the speedy establishment of a government in France with which it would be honourable to negotiate on an honourable footing, than to aim at conquests, which must be doubtful and cannot be immediate, since much is to be recovered first; conquests difficult to be made, and still more difficult to be kept; conquests, which being made with a view of dis-

membering, would exasperate rather than subjugate a nation which it is of so much importance to induce to re-enter under the *Empire of the law and of reason*.

Full of these ideas, and of the desire that the private notions on which they are founded, should not remain entirely buried, and not having an opportunity to confer with those who hold the reins of government, I wished at least to do every thing in my power to attract the public attention to my propositions, and perhaps to raise a desire of having them discussed with more skilful persons, who command the public confidence.

By this explanation of my views, which lends a key to whatever is contained in my work, and which, if there is occasion for one, may be its apology, it may be easily conceived for what reason, and in what spirit I have attacked certain exaggerated opinions, to which I saw so much implicit confidence given, that it might have been considered as useless to adopt other means which I thought should be preferred, or at least should be considered with equal attention.

This induced me to contest, not the evident depreciation of the assignats, nor the probability of their approaching annihilation, which I never called in question, but the exaggerated consequences that were drawn from it, by which *even all the military power of the French Republic was made to consist, exclusively, in the assignats*, and it was concluded that *the near and inevitable epoch of their annihilation, would render it impossible for the revolutionists to prolong the war, and must incessantly insure a glorious peace to the confederates*.

This also induced me not to deny the calamities of France, the frightful picture of which I have myself so often drawn, much less *to wish to terrify the coalesced Powers by the pompous enumeration of the resources*

resources of the French Republic, to which idiots and madmen only can suspect me of being a well wisher; but to represent the danger of relying too securely on the effects of its exhaustion, so far even as to believe that nothing else was to be done *than quietly to expect those effects, and merely to remain in an armed posture*. I likewise dreaded the exaggerated consequences drawn by those who, mistaking an intense suffering for an absolute inability of continuing the war, suppose France reduced to an entire nullity of resources. I thought I might safely observe, without offending any one, that France still possessed her territorial productions for her own subsistence, her iron to supply her youth with arms, her wool to furnish them with cloathing, her men to recruit her armies, her horses to remount her cavalry, her fanaticism to give a new elastic spring to her courage, and even that she had more specie than was generally imagined. I thought I might be allowed to observe, that the revolutionary means which throw THE TOTALITY of the national productions into the hands of the present rulers, give them infinite and incalculable resources, much superior to those derived from the regular means to which alone legitimate governments can resort.

But all the inference I have drawn from this is, that we must not repose too implicit a confidence on those who do not possess sufficient means of information, or form our judgment of the real situation of France from the distorted speeches and party representations of Republican orators. France is indeed experiencing an unexampled degree of misery, but we must not suppose her, on that account, reduced to that extremity as to find herself compelled to disband her armies, and reduced, immediately, to sue for peace.

Those who so injudiciously countenance these errors, ought rather to be considered as the detractors

of Ministers, since those opinions, if adopted, would expose them to the reproach of inconsistency. For it might be observed to them: If France is unable to continue the war, what can prevent the accomplishment of an instantaneous peace? Can there be any difficulty whatever about the conditions, if the enemy is so exhausted as to be unable to dispute the terms?

I enter more effectually into the true spirit of the British principle of action, when I say: No, France is not sufficiently exhausted to discontinue her obstinate resistance, she is still too much agitated and convulsed to be reduced to a state of total debility. Her actual government is not desirous of peace, since it is not its interest to obtain it; it is still in a condition to continue the war, since it does continue it. It is founded on such principles, that there would be neither safety, nor solidity, nor honour to treat with it. It will be of so short duration, that it is reasonable to turn our whole attention to that which is to succeed it.

This is in substance what I have maintained and developed: it will soon be seen whether I was deceived: but even now it may be determined whether this opinion, well or ill founded, deserved the contumelious imputations, and the invenomed sarcasms which have been so liberally bestowed upon me, and a few instances of which I shall introduce in the Appendix at the end of my work: as I am merely speaking here of the general principle by which I was influenced in writing these sheets, I may be allowed to ask, whether a solemn and well-meant admonition on my part to mistrust the enemy, and not to hold him in too much contempt, can deserve the scandalous reproach of an intention to serve him?

Actuated by the same purity of intention, and the laudable desire of preventing others from bewildering

wildering themselves in the regions of probability and wild conjectures, without being too great an *alarmist* myself, I have maintained in the face of the English, French and Genevese *Tranquillizers*, that the contagion of the revolutionary doctrine is not become less dangerous and alarming, though the Revolution has assumed a different mask; that the new French constitution is like the others, founded on principles subversive of all social order, and threatening the tranquillity of all Europe; that the dangerous chimera of equality is still the idol of the present government; that the hatred of Kings and of royalty is its profession of faith; and that if it has abandoned the system of *open propagandism*, it still preserves the same intention. It appeared to me therefore, that to acknowledge the present government, by treating with it, and thus virtually to approve its constitution, its principles and its doctrine, was to make success the sole criterion of example and principles, and to abandon the general interests of order and society. This opinion perhaps is not consonant with the present sentiments which are attempted to be introduced. But is this a motive for me to use dissimulation? Is it not rather an additional inducement to use all my efforts in pointing out and enforcing the true salutary opinion? I have not had the happiness to convince a Genevese, who seems to speak in the name of the Powers. He has answered me, *I am perfectly easy on this account.* An English author, who writes with warmth and energy, is not content with manifesting the same degree of security with respect to French principles, but is very indignant against those who maintain that by *acknowledging the French Republic, her principles would be triumphant*; he pronounces such a doctrine to be contemptible as well as absurd; he severely censures the intention, and employs his eloquence to prove, that the principles of
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the revolution have no longer any partisans in France. He says, that *they are so far from having triumphed in France, that they are disavowed and execrated by all parties and descriptions in that country.* He even enters into particulars. I shall add nothing more to what I have said on this subject. The Public is in possession of both sides of the argument, and may decide. In the mean while facts speak for themselves. A solemn oath not only to exclude Royalty from France, *but to hold Royalty in general* in utter abhorrence, has been required of all Frenchmen, on the abominable anniversary of the most lamentable of regicides. And that the real signification of this oath may not be mistaken, it has been manifested by every other corroborating circumstance. A cantata with a grand chorus executed at the opening of this barbarous festivity, has for its burthen,

Jurons le glaive en main, jurons à la patrie,
De conserver toujours l'égalité chérie,
De vivre et de spirer pour elle, et pour nos droits,
De venger l'univers opprimé par les Rois,

By these good swords, we to our country swear,
The rights of *equal order* to revere ;
To struggle for the blessings freedom brings,
And vindicate the world oppress'd by Kings.

If the President, a lawyer of some repute, who formerly appeared to me to be a man of sense, in his public speech, confines to the means of persuasion and the lessons of example, the propagation of *an inextinguishable hatred to royalty*, and of the inherent principle *that there cannot exist true happiness for any nation but through liberty and equality*, he soon afterwards abandons himself to a violent declamation against Kings, the enemies of the Republic, and exclaims, *Defenders of Kings, tell us what crime was*
ever

ever foreign to Royalty? From what perfidy, from what baseness did it ever abstain? And he finishes his great Philippic by this general sentiment: a nation, once a prey to Royalty, cannot save itself but by a violent and often a mortal crisis. . . .

I would wish to know on what more striking and more recent occasion it is possible to take a standard from which the spirit of the present Government in France may be appreciated? Other Legislators, more violent than Treillard, have expressed themselves in their speeches with much less circumspection; and lately Louvet, whilst insisting on the resolution of taking the Rhine for the limits of the French Empire, said in support of this opinion, that it was a plan of an indispensable necessity *in order to advance the civilization of Germany*, which, as the Editor of a Morning Paper very judiciously observes, means, in the revolutionary jargon, neither more nor less, than to *revolutionize Germany*.

After this, if such is the fashionable language of the day, let an imposing stress be laid on the moderation of the present rulers of France, and their renunciation of the system of propagating their baneful doctrines. But at the same time I wish to be forgiven, if I do not implicitly believe this sudden amelioration of principles; I wish not to have malicious imputations thrown out against me, because I used every argument of dissuasion to prevent the British Ministry from placing too much confidence in the actual government of France, from treating with the ruling faction, and from believing it indifferent, for the welfare of England, whether there is, or is not, a better order of things established in France.

I cannot withstand the temptation of pointing out, in this respect, two very striking singularities:

The one; that those who think no inconvenience can result from the recognition of the French Republic,

public, are the same who accuse me of being its partisan, at the same time that I protest with all my force against the danger of acknowledging and treating with that very republic.

The other ; that the same persons who seem no longer concerned about the contagion of French principles, alledge however the danger of that same contagion as a motive for taking possession of all the Antilles and all the Colonies in the West-Indies ; because, *the French having transplanted the disastrous seeds of their system of liberty, equality and fraternity, into the Archipelago of America, even among the negroes employed in cultivation, the British possessions there will be in an imminent danger, if those systems are not radically destroyed in that quarter.* Thus the new constitution of the French republic no longer threatens Europe, in the centre of which it is established, and where its dreadful principles are disseminated ; but it eminently threatens America, to which it only extends by the extremity of its roots.

To reconcile all this, I must confess, is to me as difficult as to understand *the system of equilibrium and indemnity* upon which several writers, who have lately delivered their sentiments about the method of terminating the war, wish to found the basis of a general pacification. The reflections which the perusal of their publications have suggested to me, would be misplaced in a Preface ; I shall just introduce a few observations upon them in the Appendix, and satisfy myself with shewing, in this place, how the same intentions, which are applicable to every part of my work, are equally demonstrable in what I have said respecting conquests, and what may be expected from military successes.

My intention was not to damp the just expectations which may be formed from the intrepid courage of the Austrian troops, from the valour of the
English

English nation, and particularly from the superiority of her maritime power: but on one side, I thought it was necessary not to separate from these just expectations, the consideration of the difficulties from which they are not exempt, whatever those, who only study to please, may alledge to the contrary. On the other, I have maintained, and my whole work tends to prove, that the force of arms alone is not, and would not be, sufficient to attain the end proposed; that it is not even the most expeditious way of insuring beneficial conditions; that a change of government in France, such as is desirable and probable, would much sooner lead to a solid and honourable peace than any military successes, however brilliant and uninterrupted they may be imagined; and that to announce, or allow indiscreet writers to announce, views of conquests, views that go beyond the *status quo* of 1789, and which are construed in France into views of dismemberment, is not paving the way to that pacification which is, indubitably, the general object of the most sanguine expectation. Is this an exaggerated, is it a malevolent opinion?

Some English writers, and particularly the one I have already quoted, have very skilfully examined what the interest of Great Britain seems to require, not only as an indemnity for the expences of the war, but likewise as a security for her colonial possessions, which, they maintain, would not be sufficiently preserved by an analogy of the respective governments in the Archipelago of America. They have likewise considered the separate interest of her allies, whom England will never abandon, and who are likewise entitled to claim *indemnities* for their expences, and *barriers* for their safety, besides the restitution of all the conquests. These they maintain

tain to be the only conditions which the British Government can admit, and though the Chiefs of the French Government are obstinately bent on rejecting them, it is but just to look forward to a more favourable time, when they will be obliged *to yield to the current of events and the necessities of the Republic*.*.

My object is by no means to contest the justice of those claims to *indemnity* and to the *security* of their several possessions. I do not examine, to what extent those indemnities should be carried, and to what they may lead. Undoubtedly each power will be desirous of obtaining, as far as is allowed by the law of events, whatever will appear conducive to increase the prosperity of its subjects, and necessary to incapacitate France from being hurtful; and this is not from a spirit of conquest, but *in order to maintain*, it might be more properly said, *to perfect the equilibrium of Europe*. But I repeat again, that this is not what I have engaged to consider. I refer every thing to the object of a general pacification, and to my favourite argument, that whatever depends solely on the fate of arms is not the most efficacious expedient to render it speedy and permanent.

It is from this intimate persuasion that I have allowed myself the liberty of observing that, whatever is entertained of the extreme debility of France, if the distance is measured between retaking, by open force, what has been lost, and conquering what is desired, it is difficult to conceive how the one and the other of these objects can be effected in a short space of time: But that, on the contrary, by pursuing the grand plan of healing and restorative

* Considerations upon the State of public Affairs, p. 93.

tive measures, which had been announced at first, and to which we Frenchmen are, for the satisfaction of our consciences, bound to believe that the Powers still virtually adhere, every desirable object would be more easily and more speedily obtained: a permanent peace, reasonable indemnities, an effectual security, better guaranteed by the well understood agreement of the reciprocal interests, than it could possibly be by the acquisition of fortresses, or increase of dominion.

I endeavoured to develope and to strengthen this idea by associating it with the first principles of civil order. Upon these principles I have demonstrated, that the real means, I think even I said the *only* means, to secure a permanent peace in Europe, and to preserve public tranquillity from a series of immeasurable calamities, troubles and commotions, was to use every possible endeavour to induce France to re-enter under the general laws of nations, by adopting a regular Government; that is, a Government founded, not on the chimerical rights of man in his ideal state, but on his essential rights in the state of society; on the inviolability of the right of property which must form its basis; on the reciprocal duties which connect man with man, and which constitute the right of nations; lastly, on the establishment of a real plan of finance which, from a regard to public faith and to the rights of the citizens, must be circumscribed within the limits of the resources of every legitimate government. Those limits those duties, those primordial rights, those bonds of society are the only preservers of the true equilibrium between the Powers; the only guarantees of the tranquillity of nations. And if the war, which is now necessary, is not accompanied with those political expedients which lead to this desirable end, it will always be indispensable, because its principal cause will always subsist; it will not lead to a true peace, however favourable events
may

may be, since it will not destroy that which renders peace impossible.


I shall add here a very plain argument, deduced from what is advanced by an English politician whose energetic pamphlet I have perused, and I here avail myself of an observation of his, *that the obstacle to peace is nothing more than the personal obstinacy of the individuals in power. They are, says he, so well convinced of the compulsion that awaits them, and of the necessity not only of renouncing the conquests, but of paying an indemnity to the Powers at war, if it were to come to a negotiation, that they artfully throw all the conditions of peace into preliminaries, and exact a previous assent, which would take away all occasion of discussion.**

Since such are the dispositions of those who now govern France, since, in spite of public distress, *their personal and individual obstinacy is an obstacle to peace*; since they put an impediment to the first step towards a negotiation, by the demand of inadmissible preliminaries, does it not follow, that a change of government is most desirable, and that every means should be employed to produce the downfall of those demagogues, and to promote the establishment of a legitimate authority, which is essentially necessary to render peace possible, solid and permanent?

How glorious for England, how favourable to humanity would be a peace procured in this manner! ! Let others pant after bloody trophies, let them exult in the roaring of the cannon, let them build their expectations of peace on the exhaustion, the ruin and the destruction of the country of their enemy. For my part I shall never

* Considerations upon the State of public Affairs. p. 93 & 94.

ver cease to think and to say, that a safer, nobler and speedier peace might be obtained by endeavouring to instruct and to change, rather than to crush, the nation. I believe, and indulge with pleasure the fond idea, that Europe must be saved by the salvation of France, in order that the ruin of France may not occasion the ruin of Europe. And when I have seen an English writer entitling his work *pax in bello*, I have felt some regret in not having given to mine the title of PAX IN SUBLATA BELLI CAUSA.



THE
POLITICAL STATE
OF
EUROPE

IN JANUARY, 1796.

CHAP. I.

*Review of the principal Events from the Beginning of
the War to the present Time.*

THE aspect of Europe, at this critical juncture opens, to the Members of the British Senate, the most extensive field for speculation ; it presents, to their consideration, objects the most interesting, and scenes the most extraordinary : it offers a boundless perspective, and an horizon, on all sides, clouded and obscured. Never was it more important to dive into futurity, and never did any futurity seem more impenetrable ; never therefore was it more excusable to be lost in conjectures. When every occurrence is probable, it can excite no great surprise that its consequences cannot be anticipated.

But if we are not allowed to read in the book of destiny, it falls to our lot, at least, to observe the course of events, to calculate their different chances,

cès, and from the whole to draw salutary and instructive inferences. Divination is forbidden to man, but experience is his privilege; its lessons are to guide his conduct; and from what he has suffered, he ought to guard against what he has to fear. Let us then open our eyes to conviction, and endeavour to improve by it.

How many mistaken notions with respect to the affairs of France? How many decisive opportunities lost? How many faults committed? Faults—that have brought along with them those inconceivable consequences which have disconcerted all ideas, confounded all calculation, and frustrated the most sanguine hopes!

When Austria, the Germanic Empire, Prussia, England, Russia, Holland, Spain and the Italian States were confederated against France single and alone, against France stript of its alliances, torn by civil commotions; against France disorganized, abandoned to anarchy, and overwhelmed with every species of calamity; who could have believed that it would have been possible for her to resist so many conflicts, and not to have sunk under the weight of such a pressure? Who could have foreseen that France, attacked on all its frontiers, discomposed in all its parts, would, not only have preserved its own territory unimpaired, but even have extended its limits; and that it should become a conquering, when every thing foreboded that it would have been a dismembered nation.

Let us recall to our mind the beginning of this memorable war, in which all the Powers of Europe were combined against one; when no difficulty seemed to occur but that of marking out the portion of each conqueror—Yet this circumstance alone has insured to France all its triumphs. The pressure from without gave strength to the springs of resistance within; the necessity of defending their country,

try awakened the patriotism of the French; the destruction of all the branches of industry produced swarms of combatants; necessity made them soldiers; fanaticism rendered them intrepid, and success transformed them into heroes: so that what should have crushed, emboldened rebellion; a foreign war, undertaken too late, and conducted without energy, became rather prejudicial than conducive to the re-establishment of order; and therefore nothing has been more favourable to the revolution than the discordant coalition of its numerous enemies, and the mistaken views of an interested policy.

SOVEREIGNS of Europe forgive an impartial and independent writer if he does not respect your political conduct as much as he venerates your supreme authority! How is it possible to relate public calamities and conceal their causes? How is it possible to account for the actual state of affairs without recurring to its source? How is it possible to dissemble what history will proclaim? It was an ancient saying, that the errors of Kings, created the misfortunes of their Subjects*; the inverse maxim is not less striking. All Europe is now making the fatal experiment; and God only knows when it will extricate itself from that dreadful abyss into which its rulers have suffered it to fall. Nothing, hitherto, has been done to prevent, but every thing to aggravate these calamities.

From its very beginning, an universal inactivity, a fatal tardiness, and a blind unaccountable stupor, ^{1st Period} ^{Inaction,} afforded sufficient time to the political and moral infection, which threatened Europe with the most alarming symptoms, to ferment, to extend its ravages, and to become irremediable in its effects. In vain did the august chief of the Bourbon family, who have sat so many ages on the throne of France,

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* Quidquid delirant Reges, plectuntur Achivi. HOR.

exhibit to his royal colleagues a spectacle so affecting, calculated to rouse them from their lethargy; in vain did the brothers of the oppressed monarch repeat to all the courts of Europe these memorable expressions: "Our enemies are yours; we fly from them, and they threaten you; whilst they are breaking the sceptre of the Bourbons, their aim is to destroy that of all the other sovereigns; you see them endeavouring to propagate every where their principles, destructive of monarchy and society; they do not even conceal their views, but loudly proclaim their determination to overturn every throne, and to shake every empire." Neither the self-evidence of these assertions, nor the danger of seeing a doctrine take root which established *revolt* as a principle, and *insurrection* as the most sacred of duties; neither the establishment of an association of regicides in the heart of Europe, nor the example of a king wantonly mocked and insulted by his subjects; insulted and loaded with abuse merely because he was a King; none of these considerations could rouse Europe from its lethargic slumber.....

During the two first years of a revolution, which attacked at once all governments, nothing could remove their inconceivable apathy. Foreign Powers saw nothing in the disorders of France but the downfall of an empire that had been, for so many ages, the object of their jealousy; they saw its calamities, if not with a secret joy, at least without any solicitude for their own safety; they viewed, with a certain complacency, all the advantages they expected to derive from its fall, and were not intimidated by the awful example which threatened them also. The succours, which the Bourbon Princes received, were derived from the charitable impulse of humanity, rather than from the wise intention of enabling them to carry on their operations

tions with effect. And when, by the help of these succours, they had collected, armed and organized 23,000 Emigrants, the greatest part of them men of family, all inspired with a zealous desire of flying to the defence of their Sovereign, and of breaking his chains; so little were they supported in their designs of penetrating into the kingdom, at the head of these faithful nobles, the flower of the nation, that, on the contrary, a thousand difficulties were started; the smallest assemblage of an armed force forbidden; all their movements obstructed; and the only answer to their reiterated expostulations was, that they should WAIT and TEMPORIZE.

Thus were whole years wasted away, when not one moment should have been lost. It is thus that the project miscarried of invading Alsace, and of establishing the centre of the counter-revolution in that province, so easy then in its execution; it is thus that the French Princes were deprived of the possibility of being joined by many corps of troops of the line, fully disposed to rally round the royal standard.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the unhappy and ever-timorous Monarch, allured by the most deceitful illusions, and the sport of the most pernicious counsels, connived, or seemed to connive at the inactivity which hastened his ruin. Either from constraint or credulity, he obstructed or counteracted whatever might have saved him. He even appeared fearful of being succoured: but he was a captive, under the knife of ruffians; sometimes frightened, and sometimes misled. Was it not obvious that it became necessary to force his repugnance, and to serve him against his will?

After that first period, which may be called the 2d Period. period of *procrastination*, the factious themselves The War. compelled the foreign powers to have recourse to action: for they perceived, that they were in need

of a war in order to accomplish the destruction of royalty; to give occupation to the irresolute, and to fire them with enthusiasm; to break off all external connections, in order more easily to deceive the people thus insulated, and to animate them more and more against Kings. They endeavoured to persuade them, that their only safety was in a Republic, and thus acquired the means of tyrannising over them, by instilling into their minds the flattering idea, that the exercise of sovereignty originated in themselves. The chiefs of the democratic party found in the war the certain means of consolidating their power, of having immense armies at their command, and of imbruing with impunity, their sacrilegious hands in the blood of their Sovereign. War offered them the opportunity of establishing a revolutionary government, of exercising absolute power, of seizing upon every species of property, of sacrificing all their antagonists, and of making a whole nation crouch under the yoke of terror.

Thus they had as many reasons for declaring war, as the Powers formerly had for anticipating them. And though it appeared to be the height of madness to provoke and insult all Europe, when their edifice was tottering on all sides; to challenge disciplined troops, when they had only raw soldiers, without Officers and Generals, to oppose them; to supply six grand armies, when they had not a sixpence in the Treasury, yet the event has proved that they were but too well grounded in their diabolical policy.

But how has this war been carried on?—How was it planned?—How executed?—And what were its motives?—Let us briefly examine these several points.

What
Plan
should
have been
pursued.

THE PLAN to be pursued in a war, which may be called *a war of opinion*, was to join persuasion to force; to enlighten with arguments those we were
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to fight with weapons; to subdue the public mind by dint of persuasion, as well as to conquer cities by force of arms; to put all loyal Frenchmen, commanded by their Princes, in the van of the armies, in order to bring over to their cause all the well-affected among the French troops of the line; to have proclamations issued by the French Princes, that they would not reject the weak and the deluded, who should return to a sense of their duty; to take a seasonable advantage of all the party dissensions, in order to detach the less obdurate; to spare no expence in getting useful intelligence from the interior; to support, by all possible means, the commotions in favour of royalty which had already burst forth in the southern and western parts of the kingdom. Thus to oppose France to France, in order to save it; and to become the auxiliaries of the faithful part of the nation, rather than the enemies of the whole kingdom.

It became necessary also, in support of this plan, to have the cause of Royalty countenanced and respected; consequently to protect and to concentrate its firmest adherents; to encourage its timid partizans; to honour and assist its suffering victims; to favour and succour its zealous defenders; with open arms to receive its new proselytes, and to guard them from all danger. In short, to shew to the universe, that every man devoted to his duty and his King, was sure to meet with encouragement and protection.

If such a plan had been adopted, how much blood would have been spared! — How many millions might have been saved, if the twentieth part of what has been sacrificed to the vain project of subduing a warlike nation of twenty-seven millions of people, had been applied to the support and encouragement of the good cause!

But

But either no regular plan has been followed, or a quite different one adopted; not one instructive pamphlet has been circulated through the kingdom; no attractions held out; no arts of persuasion used with dexterity and adroitness. The supporters of the good cause were not encouraged by any prof-
 fers of favour; while the favourers of the pernicious doctrines were emboldened by indecorous and degrading attentions. We have seen some Courts—(will posterity believe it?) give a more flattering reception to the emissaries of the regicides, than to the defenders of royalty! Other nations indeed, and the English particularly, have been more generous and benevolent towards the Emigrants; but many others have shewn quite different dispositions: there are some, who not only refuse an asylum to those unhappy wanderers, but even forbid them to set foot on their territories*. The body of the French nobility, assembled under the banners of their Princes, instead of being rendered useful, and supplied with all the requisites for acting vigorously, was enervated, and divided into three remote divisions; neglected and unnoticed, without artillery, without money, and often without provisions. Individuals were obliged to come forward with their property, and to sacrifice their fortunes in the cause
 of

* We shall suppress the particulars of the inhuman treatment which the French have experienced from several Courts, where they naturally had a right to look up for succour and protection: it must be acknowledged, however, that the Emigrants cannot be wholly exculpated; as, where they should have mutually supported, they often excited little animosities and distressed each other: some of them, however, suffered with a noble and becoming fortitude, the unremitted rigour of their destiny. Besides, it was not the individual, but their situation, and the cause for which they were persecuted, that ought to have been considered. They were faithful to their King; they were unfortunate: the voice of humanity and true policy spoke to all Courts of Europe in their favour, and yet——!

of Sovereigns. At last, the strange eagerness manifested in ordering the disbanding of this army of the French nobility, was a convincing proof of the unaccountable reluctance shewn by the combined Powers, to employ a body of men from which they might have derived so many signal advantages *.

Such impolitic principles were not calculated to inspire confidence, or to multiply counter revolutionary movements. There followed, however, several of importance; but they and their authors were miserably crushed for want of support. The brave Lyonnese, whose anti-republican insurrection might have determined all the southern provinces to follow their example, have been shamefully abandoned, and wantonly sacrificed. The loyal inhabitants of La Vendée, who dared solemnly to set up, in the western departments, the standard of religion with that of royalty, performed prodigies of valour for two successive years, before they received any assistance. Every town, that voluntarily opened its gates to the confederates, has been abandoned; and, by its melancholy destiny, has afforded a warning to others, not to imitate its fatal example. How many traits, like these, seem to whisper to the well-affected, *that they had nothing to expect*; and to the wicked, *that they might dare every thing*!

In the meanwhile, how many favourable opportunities offered themselves to change the public disposition and to form leagues of religion, reason and humanity, which would have proved more numerous

* The services rendered by the small corps under the command of the Prince de Condé, and the several regiments of Emigrants, which some of the combined Powers have employed, either to form the van of their armies when they advanced, or the rear in their retrograde movements, are convincing proofs of what might have been expected from them, had they been united under their own proper banners.

ous than those of impiety, plunder and cruelty! Have any such means been tried? Have those, who might have pointed them out, been consulted? Have their proffered plans ever been considered and discussed?

The only aim of the coalesced Powers was to conquer, when it was evident, that by conquering they would not subdue. Their only effort was directed to military operations, in which they could agree no better than in their political views. There was neither union in their projects, uniformity in their ideas, or a general direction to the same point. Thus much may be said of the general plans of the war: let us now see how they were executed.

What
Mea-
sures?

The measures to be pursued against a revolted, agitated, and convulsed nation, ought naturally to have been those which were attended with the most terrific appearances. It was a general opinion, that terror alone could destroy what had been effected by terror. It required a bold, rapid and commanding movement; a movement immediately directed to the center of the revolution. It was, therefore, necessary to march straight to the Capital*.

The Plan
adopted.
First
Cam-
paign.

This seems to have been the intention; but after having surmounted the first difficulties; after having penetrated beyond the defensive lines of the principal frontier towns, when the combined army, commanded by one of the first Generals of Europe, was but forty-five leagues from Paris; when the hearts of the rebels were already struck with terror and dismay; when the chiefs of the factious had no other

* How much soever this project has been, and may still be ridiculed, it is nevertheless very notorious, that the plan was then not only intended, but practicable. The idea of conquering France is, indeed, *Cervantick*; but the great object would have been to march to Paris, and to crush rebellion in its very focus.

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Wurmser, underwent the same unhappy fate. This General had entered Alsace, forced in one day the famous lines of Weissembourg, and dispersed the Republican army. He had taken Lauterbourg, Haguenau, Fort-Louis, and was only three leagues from Strasbourg; when all at once, struck with an unaccountable lethargy, he remained a whole month in inactivity; suffered himself to be harrassed during another month by continual attacks, and exhausted by incessant fatigue, was forced from the formidable lines of the Motter, in spite of the intrepid resistance of the little army of Emigrants, who, proud of their chiefs, and defying the superiority of numbers, faced inevitable death under the banners of three generations of heroes, whose names are synonymous with valour and glory. The Austrians, not less valiant, but obliged to retreat, gave up to the barbarous fury of an implacable enemy all the towns which had opened their gates at their approach. It required all the skilful conduct of the Prince of Brunswick to enable them to effect their retreat, leaving the Palatinate and part of Germany a prey to the most shocking devastation. Such was the melancholy conclusion of the campaign of 1793.

Third
Cam-
paign.

It was much worse the following year; though the beginning was again so favourable as to induce the hope, that what was attempted in 1792 might be executed in 1794. The young Emperor, after taking Landrecy, at the head of numerous armies which his presence inspired with the most ardent zeal, found himself, in the month of May, in the identical situation which the Duke of Brunswick, two years before, could only secure in September. Like him, after having defeated all those who opposed him, he found himself within forty-five leagues of Paris; like him, he had in his route no towns to besiege, no strong holds to storm, no difficult posts
to

to carry ; like him, he had troops enough to detach a sufficient number for covering the fortified towns he left behind ; like him, he could after a march of eight or ten days arrive with his victorious armies at the central point, when he might have given laws to France, and peace to Europe ;—but, like him, he suffered the precious moment to elapse which would have led him to immortal glory.

He was first persuaded that it was necessary to turn his arms to the defence of his own frontiers, which the French had then no other view in attacking but to create this important diversion ; and afterwards, that the interests of the Empire required his immediate presence. Had he been better advised, he would have perceived that it was at Paris only that he could recover what he might have lost in Flanders ; that it was at Paris he could more easily obtain the indemnities he had a right to expect after having re-established the monarchy ; and that every subordinate interest must yield to the grand object of pursuing his march to Paris. If these considerations had been maturely weighed ; if instead of complying with the restless and dark policy of the Court of Vienna, which infused mistrust, or of following the old military routine of tactics obstinately pursued in a war which had no resemblance with any former, he had consulted his noble ardour alone, and precipitated rather than changed his march ; if he had opposed boldness to boldness, and excited terror at the moment when he seemed to follow its impulse, what glory might he not have acquired !—What have they not to reproach themselves, who, from false prudence, made him abandon the road to glory, and withered, by their chilly breath, the laurels he was beginning to reap.—Of what moment is it not for Princes to be well advised ! FAME FLIES FROM THEM THE INSTANT

STANT THEY GIVE WAY TO PUSILLANIMOUS
COUNSELS.

The third retrograde movement made the campaign of 1794 miscarry in the same manner as those of 1792 and of 1793; the fate of the coalition being always to have its greatest successes followed by the most unaccountable retreats*. The same year that had witnessed the signal victories of the combined Powers, and their progress in French Hainault, saw them make a precipitate retreat from all the Austrian Low-Countries; and Belgium, conquered in ten months by Pichegru, is still amazed to find itself under the dominion of the Republic.

Fourth
Cam-
paign.

Winter, formerly a time of rest for the armies, did not afford the least suspension of disasters between the preceding campaign and that which followed at the commencement of 1795. The marshes of Holland, and the rivers which defend its frontiers, could not preserve it from the victorious invasion of the French, who were favoured by the elements as much as by the dispositions of a great part of the inhabitants. A most intense frost, and the Anti-Stadholderian party facilitated their entrance into the heart of a country which hitherto had been deemed impenetrable; fortune every where seconded the efforts of the enemy; the impregnable fortresses of Luxemburgh surrendered to their perseverance; and they extended their conquests into Germany so far that they were at length inspired with the hope of realizing the ambitious project of making the course of the Rhine the boundary of the French empire; a project that would not long have appeared chimerical, if the successes of Clairfayt, in the latter part of the season, had not given a sudden check to their

* Each succeeding year, except 1795, recalls this well known verse of Horace to our memory,

Definit in piscem mulier formosa superne.

rapid

rapid progress. This skilful General has forced them, after several defeats, to re-cross the Rhine, to raise the siege of Mentz, to evacuate Manheim and the Palatinate, and to retreat to the banks of the Moselle: yet it is very remarkable, that those armies which had been formerly discouraged by one disaster, which, after a single defeat often dispersed in all directions, and fled for several hundred miles, have, on this occasion, suffered immense losses without disbanding, experienced repeated defeats without being dispirited, and disputed, at last, every inch of ground with so much obstinate perseverance, that their exhausted conquerors have found themselves compelled to grant them a cessation of hostilities; a cessation which appears to have been negotiated under the sole mediation of the badness of the weather, and the unparalleled fatigues of the respective armies.

The combined Powers experienced nothing but disasters in the South. Spain, obliged to evacuate the province it had expected to conquer, and driven back beyond the Pyrenees, could not prevent the Republicans from descending into its own Provinces; the terror of their arms reached as far as Madrid; and this Monarchy, formerly so imperious, thought itself reduced to the necessity of seeking its safety in the disgrace of treating with the assassins of the head of its royal house.

The Alps themselves could not oppose a barrier to the too fortunate regicides; masters of Savoy and the County of Nice; and having lately defeated the Austrians and Piedmontese, they now threaten the Milanese and all Italy.

England alone has obtained some real and important advantages. Her NAVIES have rode triumphant on that element of which she has so long maintained the undisputed empire. Though England has incurred immense expences; though her commerce,
having

having covered the ocean with its numerous vessels, must necessarily have experienced some losses; yet it is beyond all doubt, that from the number of French line of battle ships she has either taken or destroyed; by the conquest of Corsica, and the most important of the West-Indian Islands; by the acquisition of all the French possessions in the East-Indies; and principally by the late capture of the Cape of Good Hope and Trincomale, the war has proved most beneficial to her; so that it has been very justly observed, that *if from the beginning she had marked out on the map every place which it was her interest and inclination to possess, she would now find them all, with the exception of a very few, subjected to her dominion.*

But it is notorious also, that how profitable soever those successes have been to the English nation, none have been obtained yet which might be deemed decisive with respect to the general interest of the coalition; none which directly promoted the end proposed. The expeditions on the coast of France have been as unsuccessful as they were dilatory; the terrible disaster at Quiberon has not been repaired by the fruitless attempt to secure to MONSIEUR an opening into France by la Vendée; and this Prince, whose magnanimity was always counteracted by his misfortunes, is returned to England, despairing ever to find an opportunity to signalize his valour*.

We

* Without venturing to give our ideas on the manner with which those expeditions have been combined and executed; or on the projects of the same kind which may be still in agitation, we may be allowed in general terms to observe:

1. That such attempts ought only to be made when there is a moral certainty of success; because, whenever they do not answer the end proposed, they draw after them incalculable calamities.

2. That

We do not pretend, in this cursory sketch of four ruinous, bloody, and useless campaigns, to decide how far misfortune and incapacity have influenced each transaction; we only wish to enable the reader to judge whether the plans that have been formed, and the steps that have been taken, were the best calculated to answer their end. We shall now investigate the same point with respect to the INTENTIONS that were manifested.

To UNITE in a general confederacy for the glorious cause of justice and humanity; to form an association for the great purpose of repressing the effects, and preventing the consequences of a pestilential doctrine, subversive of all public peace; generously to assist, before it became too late, a Monarch wantonly

Intentions that should have been manifested.

2. That in order to insure success, it is necessary to obtain every local information from which the political effect of such an expedition may be estimated, and consequently not to rest the whole dependance on military calculations.

3. That for want of such an information it may happen that troops might be sent where pecuniary assistance was only required; and that reinforcements should be given to small armed parties which have sufficient means to maintain themselves in their inaccessible fastnesses; but which are not strong enough to march forward with a regular force, and to carrying on their operations to the very center of the enemy.

4. That it is, however, in the very focus of the revolution that great effects may be operated, and that it is from that point that every movement susceptible of becoming general must originate; every other collateral movement can only be secondary to this primary object.

5. That as to the provinces, the only advantage to be expected from that quarter, is to foment such a disposition as may concur with that of the capital; rather than to attempt to organize, at a great expence, a regular body of troops, to whom organization is neither necessary nor convenient.

6. In short, that any effectual succours that may be sent, either to the Vendéens or the Chouans, require as much secrecy in their preparation, as promptitude in execution. As what is too early announced, or executed with too much tardiness, can only occasion the ruin of that party which is to be succoured.

wantonly oppressed, a Monarch whose excessive lenity, joined to a characteristic good-nature, must be his only reproach; to avenge, after his cruel death, the Majesty of Kings, and teach nations that they cannot, with impunity, lead their Sovereign from restraint to infamy, and from infamy to the scaffold; to shield and protect the French nobility, who were persecuted, plundered and proscribed, because they would not encourage rebellion; to preserve the rights of property from a violation which had been established as a principle; to prevent a great empire from tearing its vitals with its own hands; sincerely to desire the re-establishment of order, and to desire nothing more—Great God! How noble and honourable would such intentions have been! How glorious for the Powers to have embraced this cause without any shade of a disguised policy! How conformable would such a design have been with their own interest! Would not this alone have been sufficient to reclaim the people from their errors, and to rivet the respect due to Sovereigns? How laudable had been views so pure, so noble, so much deserving the favour of Heaven, and veneration of the world? They must have been attended with all the success they deserved.

Ministers of the coalesced Powers!—Were these the motives by which you were actuated in the counsels you gave to your Sovereigns? Was it round this grand and common interest that you rallied all the forces of Europe? Was it only, nay chiefly, to effectuate this great purpose, that the kingdom which carried in its bosom the pestilential seeds of a general disorganization, which it endeavoured to disseminate over the whole world, has been attacked and invested on every side? Answer—Answer this important question to the universe, truly alarmed at the fate you have prepared for it.

We

We shall not hesitate to disclose what no pains^{Intenti-} have been taken to conceal: a throne was to be re-^{ons that} established, and its fall has diffused an apparent sa-^{were ma-} tisfaction; an ostentatious desire was shewn of re-^{nifested.} trieval, but soon was evinced the manifest purpose of dismembering the empire; those who announced themselves as auxiliaries, soon behaved as invaders; oppression was to be opposed, and unblushing examples of it were given; the world was scandalized by a ferocious rapacity, when it was of so much importance that it should be edified by singular acts of justice; and a war, which ought to have been a war of general interest, of honour and generosity, is become a war of aggrandizement, selfishness, and illiberal views.

We cannot be accused of exaggerating what we should wish to palliate; or of arraigning, by rash suppositions, the various intentions of the cabinets of Europe: we only speak of appearances: of appearances that have manifested themselves to every understanding by facts of public notoriety; first, by equivocal proclamations, whose ever-varying complexion betrayed a purpose very different from their ostensible spirit; and where the words of *pledge* and *indemnity* but imperfectly veiled more extended views; afterwards, by the taking of Valenciennes in the name of the Emperor, and by the union of Corsica to the British Empire, which, in whatever manner it was effected, has rendered the disinterestedness of England as suspicious as that of the other Powers.

Hence arose, among the wavering and undecided, the dread of trusting to invitations which might prove perfidious, and of declaring themselves without knowing for what purpose, or in whose favor: hence, the mutual distrust among the combined Powers, the misunderstanding among their respective Generals, and the want of harmony in their military operations: hence the exasperation of a numerous

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people

people driven to an excess of an unexampled turbulence, electrified by the idea of having at once their country, their possessions, and their liberties to defend: hence the exertion of the greatest energies in the midst of a total decay; their pertinacity in attacks; their presumption in victory, and their undaunted perseverance in defeat: hence, by a consequence, which for having been unforeseen is not the less obvious, that succession of disasters which have astonished the world; those continual advantages gained by disorderly over the best disciplined armies: hence, Kingdoms stript of their own possessions, that only dreamt of the subjection of other countries: hence, as the last result, an humiliating discouragement succeeding a contemptuous arrogance, faithless defections, separate treaties, and the dissolution of that wise confederacy which a general interest, in preference to all other private views, should have cemented and consolidated among all the Powers of Europe.

Let us draw a veil over the too fatal consequences of plans badly conceived, and operations worse executed; of intentions, if not dishonest, at least ill understood. To finish the sketch, which from the importance of the subject is far above our powers to delineate in its true colours, let us consider what the actual state of affairs seems to require for the present, and allows us to hope for the future.

What
may be
expected.

IS IT THEN POSSIBLE that, in so short a time, all the Powers should have submitted to a faction the avowed and declared enemy of all crowned heads? Shall it be recorded in the Annals of Mankind, that the most powerful Sovereigns of Europe, having successively deserted the grand and just cause for which they coalesced, have, at last, made a tame compromise with factious regicides?—While the world beholds the dreadful experiment of a system destructive of all property, religion and social order, shall we see this very system functioned, acknowledged, and consecrated by the authority of all these

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these Powers, whose very existence depends on its overthrow?—Every appearance portends this awful conclusion of the most horrid tragedy that has ever been performed on the stage of human life.

We do not pretend to scrutinize the secrets of Cabinets: But when we consider that the King of Prussia, yielding to the wishes of his subjects, has hastened the conclusion of a separate peace; when the Bourbon Prince, who reigns in Spain, could desert the coalition, whilst so many sacred motives should have induced him to be at the head of it; when several Italian States, in consideration of their weakness, have thought themselves compelled to follow the same example; when already several Members of the Germanic body have been influenced through fear, and that all the others are inclined to yield to an imaginary and exaggerated necessity; and lastly, when the Emperor himself seems discouraged; and that the prevailing sentiments of Vienna, which are even manifested in his armies, appear to dissuade this Monarch from pursuing the war, though it is to him the daughter of the Cæsars cries for the vengeance of her noble blood: how many reasons are there not for apprehending that soon, be the consequences what they may, the conclusion of this unfortunate war will be precipitated; a war, which it would have been much better never to have undertaken, than to desist from it before the end proposed had been attained. And England !..... England, if she remains alone* in the midst of this general wreck of political principles and revolutions; England, having then for its support nothing but the goodness of its cause, the energy of its character, and the deranged circumstances of its enemy; what will it, what should it determine?

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This

* *Alone*, is saying too much; for the illustrious Catharine will, certainly, never vary nor slacken in her principles: but, unfortunately, it is not within her reach to act as efficaciously as it is her inclination to do.

This will be, and already is, the object of the most interesting debates of her Parliament; this question will be agitated by the most skilful, the most enlightened, and the most eloquent of its members; this is what fixes the attention of the world, and what will determine the fate, tranquillity and glory of the British empire, at the same time that it decides the destiny of Europe.

Whilst the question, however, of a subject so important in itself, so vast in its consequences, and so much deserving the most serious consideration, is agitating; the English, who though less frivolous than other nations, are not, as a people less inconsiderate, call loudly for a speedy peace; they demand it with a tumultuous impatience, and forget themselves so far as to insult the best of Kings; they are clamorous for peace without considering whether it be attainable; how it is to be procured, and how lasting it would be if it were at this moment concluded.

The opposition derive their most popular arguments from this popular out-cry; they give it additional fuel by their speeches, and increase the flame by imputing to the war alone the dearness of provisions. The Ministry, harassed by this growing evil of popular clamour; and thinking it prudent perhaps to imitate the sailor who furls his sails at the approach of the hurricane, seem now to abandon a part of their original intentions. They no longer insinuate that their object is to re-establish the Bourbon family and the French Monarchy; they shew themselves disposed to treat with the present Government in France, as soon as reasonable terms may be expected. The new fabricated constitutional code seems to them constructed on more moderate and regular principles than its ephemeral predecessors, and they look upon its establishment

as a kind of improvement in the present state of things.

To overturn arguments founded on this pretended amelioration, the opposition are compelled to avow some suspicion, at least, of the permanency of the newly adopted constitution; so that in this field of oratorical warfare, the face of the combat appears to the spectator totally changed. The partisans of the modern doctrine must be driven to the necessity of condemning the effects of those opinions which, in other circumstances, they would have extolled; and the advocates for Government are obliged, in appearance, to approve what they despise, and what their true principles proscribe. This is the consequence of that dereliction of former opinions which both sides have manifested.

For, on the one hand, to raise the hope of a *solid* and *permanent* peace on the new constitution, is to suppose the constitution itself to be *solid* and *permanent*, or at least susceptible of stability To acknowledge the practicability of entering into a negotiation, founded upon that constitution, is to suppose that that constitution is deserving of confidence To say, that "As soon as it had been accepted and put in activity with the acquiescence of the nation, it would no longer contain in its form and principles any obstacles to negotiation," is to confess that its form and principles contain nothing incompatible with the tranquillity of nations; nothing offensive to other powers; nothing that leaves room for apprehension that a government, established upon such basis, might be of the most dangerous consequences to other nations; nothing which ought to compel them to oppose the success and establishment of so contagious an example We are not in a situation, we must confess, to conceive how those, who had inveighed with so much vehemence and argumentative force against

against the pretended French Republic, can have been induced to assume, at this moment, so different a tone, and how they can find no longer any objections to a reconciliation with the same Republic, though still constituted on the same principles, still governed by the same men?

On the other hand, those who, as the opposition, are driven to the necessity of receding from their own opinions, in the same proportion as the Ministry seem to be less distant from them, are now obliged to maintain that the new constitution has not altered the former situation of affairs with respect to France, and that the general cause has derived no advantage from it. Pursuing now a contrary tract, they call forth all the powers of eloquence to prove, that the new constitution cannot claim any superiority over those that preceded it on the short stage of their existence; that the principle of equality still being its leading feature, it cannot be viewed in a more favorable light than the others; that it is founded on the same basis, aiming at the same point; that its permanency is as dubious; and that this monstrous production, begotten like the others in the hour of public effervescence, will be annihilated in another moment of tumult and commotion.

Nothing appears to be left for consideration, but to see what a degree of consistency the new government will assume; therefore, on one side, they will maintain that its stability is sufficiently authenticated; on the other, that it requires time and experience to judge whether so complicated a machine can regularly proceed.

But is it then so difficult to prognosticate the probable destiny of this amphibious constitution, which
the

the authors of its birth have already violated * ; of that mixt democracy faintly suspended between oligarchy and ochlocracy ? Is it even necessary to analyse its elements in order to foretel its impending fate ? Cannot our judgment of it be derived from the opinion that is entertained of its authors and of those who are to be entrusted with its administration ? Is it not more than probable that these unmasked accomplices of the ferocious Robespierre, these merciless oppressors, abhorred by the people whose blood they lately caused to flow in torrents, will soon be precipitated from that high station in which they have fixed themselves by cruelty and violence ; and that in their inevitable fall will be involved the destruction of their monstrous fabric and its incoherent appendages ?

We shall not, for the present, proceed any farther in the investigation of several other arguments

* A very remarkable instance of that violation may be found in what the legislative body have done at the very beginning of their sittings, with respect to the choice of those judges and administrators which had not been appointed either by the primary or electoral assemblies. The shortness of the fatal period fixed for the operations of those assemblies did not allow them time sufficient for electing the third part of their judges and administrators. The legislative body, deliberating on the means of supplying this deficiency, have given to the members of the Directory the appointment of the two other thirds ; a right which, according to the letter of the constitution, solely belonged to the popular elections.

They have likewise given to the Directory the *choice of the municipal officers, till the month of Germinal* ; in open violation of the constitutional law which allotted this choice to the electoral assemblies.

We see therefore the constitution already violated in two very essential points, and the people deprived of some of their most important privileges, which had been insured to them by that very constitution.

The forced loan may be likewise looked upon as another transgression of the same kind ; for it imposes on certain individuals only a public burden, which the constitution expressly ordered to be divided among all the citizens.

guments which derive their force from the very construction of the constitutional code, and which demonstrate that it is utterly impossible that such a government should subsist for any length of time.

We shall venture to give our ideas on the two important questions which, at this moment, agitate the public mind.

1. Whether peace can be concluded at present?
2. What measures are to be pursued, in order to obtain a solid and permanent peace?

C H A P. II.

Can peace be concluded at present ?

LET us begin by fixing the meaning of the word.—What is peace? According to the most celebrated politicians, it is defined *a negociation between two belligerent Powers to terminate and remove the causes of the war.* Every part of this definition is essential and remarkable.

If there be no negociation, but only a cessation of hostilities ; it is an armistice, like that which has been agreed upon between the armies, and not a peace.

If the negociation is not concluded by the same authorities which had declared the war, the declaration is not revoked, and it is not a peace.

If the principal causes of the war are not removed, its termination is not arrived, and it is not a peace.

And, if the duration of the agreement is limited it cannot be considered as permanent ; it is but a truce, and not a peace.

Now, in the present case, no negociation whatever could possess any of these distinguishing characters of a real peace.

There is no possibility of coming to an agreement, because on neither side is there the inclination.

No recall of the declaration of war, since the authority whence it issued exists no more, and has not been legally replaced.

No

No extinction of the principal causes of the war, since the seat of the infection and the danger of the example would not be removed.

No appearance of permanency in the determinations of an unsettled government, whose downfall its very founders seem to prognosticate*.

Let us confine ourselves to the most decisive points, and demonstrate,

1. That neither England nor France, have at present, any inclination to negotiate.

2. That if they really had, nothing that would be settled between them could be of any duration, and deserve the qualification of PERMANENCY, which is the distinctive character of all treaties.

Neither
England
nor
France
wish for
Peace.

NEITHER OF THE POWERS HAS ANY DESIRE FOR PEACE. That no false construction may be given to our meaning by the interpretation of the misinformed, who, in almost all controversies, occasion the diversity of opinions; it becomes necessary to observe that what may be called the *will* or desire of England; the *will* of France, is not what appears the inclination of the multitude. The people are without doubt always eager to see a termination of the war; because as soon as they suffer they are impatient to change their situation. But it belongs to their rulers and their guides; it belongs to the guardians of their honor and interest, to judge for the conveniency and to watch for the opportunity. Therefore, whatever we shall maintain to be, or not to be the will of England or of France, must be referred to the wisdom that guides the one, and the delirium that impels the other. After this position, I shall ask, why, in the present state of affairs, England should wish for peace?

It

* See the speeches of Tallien, Louvet and Bентаbole, in the 22d No. of Mr. Peltier's *Tableau de l'Europe*, page 378.

Is it because she has not attained the end for which she took up arms, that she should refuse to take one step more towards the attainment of the desired success?—It would be an absurdity to suppose it. Why should England wish for Peace?

Is it because her present situation is not yet commanding enough for negotiating, that she should not, the better to dictate her own terms, endeavour to improve it?—Nothing would be more impolitic.

Is it because the subjection of Holland and the union of the Low-Countries to the empire of her rival destroy the political equilibrium, attack her prosperity and threaten her safety, that she should desist from pursuing the means of remedying this double calamity?—This would be a total disregard for her dearest interests.

Is it in consideration of the losses sustained by her commerce that England should conclude a precipitate peace?—But where is the nation whose commerce is more flourishing? Does she not, in the midst of war, and the inevitable losses she has suffered, rank the first of all her competitors in the flourishing state of her trade?

Should England yield, from the exhaustion of her resources?—But are not those of her enemy, from her own confession, exhausted and almost annihilated?

Can despair drive England to the abandonment of her resolutions?—But will her honor, will her national character, will the maintenance of her political importance justify such a step?

Will the English government be influenced by a motive still more striking and impressive, the dearth of bread and the fear of entailing on the nation a scarcity of provisions, partly, it must be confessed, occasioned by the war?—But will a bad peace act as a preservative against a general scarcity?

Will

Will it re-assure us against any monopoly which may be supposed to exist? Will it, as it were by some cabalistical power, open those sources which a general devastation has totally dried up? Supposing even, that the English commerce, freed from the impediments occasioned by the war, should gain an easy superiority over the competition of other countries, whose necessities, being more urgent, would hold out a greater lure for importation, and whose transports would be equally favoured by a general peace; could distant countries afford an early and sufficient supply? And whence could that be procured, which no where does exist—plenty and abundance.

To suppose, therefore, that the British government wishes for an immediate peace, is to suppose that it shews neither consistency in its principles, nor wisdom in its policy; that it does not watch over its real interests with true sagacity, nor avails itself of the superiority of its commerce; that it is neither attentive to the exhausted state of France, jealous of its political importance, or well-informed on the general state of provisions.

We are far from intimating so unjust, so injurious a supposition, and without explaining further what we have but indirectly insinuated, we do not hesitate boldly to assert, that what is incompatible with the interest, is contrary to the wishes of England. But should even England be inclined to peace, half the difficulty would only be removed, as long as there is room for presuming that France is not actuated by the same desire.

Why
should
France
wish for
Peace?

For what inducement is there to suppose that France is really desirous of peace?

Is our reliance founded upon a few popular clamours in the Capital, or upon a few petitions from the Provinces, that seem to express such a wish?—

wish?—We have already observed that the will of a nation, and the resolutions of its government, do not depend on these vague emissions of the desires of a wavering multitude. Besides, enquire of those who have lived among the French since the revolution, and particularly at Paris, whether the public attention is much attracted by politics, by the war, or by their relative situation with foreign powers: they will tell you, that those questions are scarcely ever agitated, and that except in those moments, when the intelligence of some great event gives an electrical shock to the public mind, their external concerns seem to form but a small part of their solicitude. What passes on the banks of the Seine engrosses too much of their thoughts to suffer the operations on the banks of the Rhine to occupy much of their attention. Can it excite any surprise, that what touches them so nearly, should affect them most sensibly? Tumultuary commotions, complicated plots, the rapid vicissitudes of divers factions, which rule by turns, and by turns arrogate to themselves the right of oppressing the nation, are so many rapid whirlpools that absorb every thought, and bury every reflexion in their vortex.

Ask the same observers, whether, in the midst of so many internal commotions and external attacks, of so much innovation in principles, and confusion in ideas, they have not remarked the ancient national character ever to predominate: in so much that the most frivolous distractions seem to prevail over the most serious concerns, and to float on the surface of the most agitated waves: They will tell you, that they have seen this extraordinary people passing, in one moment, from transports of fury to expressions of the most lively joy; from revolt to
hilarity;

hilarity; from dances to massacres; taking up arms one moment, and running to play-houses the next; pinched with misery and displaying unbounded magnificence; groaning under their sufferings and multiplying their diversions; feeling the utmost detestation for their oppressors, and -consoling themselves with the tame revenge of epigrammatic ridicule.

What inference can be drawn from the clamours of such a people either for peace or war?.... It is not the interest of the French nation, but that of their leaders, which is to be considered: This interest indeed cannot be mistaken; we have already observed, how indispensable it was for them to have armies at their command in order to inspire terror; and to employ them on the frontiers, that they might not be overawed by them. War was absolutely necessary to them: it served as a pretence for establishing their terrible dictatorship; as a cloak to conceal their dilapidations; as a barrier to exclude every external communication from an insulated people thus more easily deluded. It would be superfluous to expatiate upon truths which carry conviction along with them. We shall add another motive which will compel the popular leaders to prolong the war as long as there is not a stable and regular government established: It is the uneasiness they must feel at the dangerous consequences of recalling their numerous armies into the kingdom, and of disbanding the greatest part of them. The reflux of such a torrent would alarm the usurpers of the government; and the expedient of disbanding the forces, still more dangerous, would deluge the Provinces with hordes of banditti, men of blood, unable to work and habituated to plunder, whom it would be very difficult to disarm, or to gratify.

tify to the utmost of their expectations*, and impossible to restrain. How should those who foresee these necessary consequences of a peace, wish for the immediate conclusion of it?

Will they be influenced by the recent defeats of their armies in Germany, and by the impression these unexpected disasters must have made on the French nation?

If it is difficult to estimate, with accuracy, the importance of the victories just obtained by the Austrians, it will be still more so to calculate the extent of their consequences.

It is to be expected, that a nation, till this moment flushed with success, elevated to a height of enthusiasm by the pompous display of its trophies; and so infatuated by its superiority in battle, as proudly to think itself invincible because it is a Republic, could not have seen without dismay the total defeat of the troops that had crossed the Rhine with so much confidence, and the entire overthrow of their lofty pretensions. But is it not to be expected also, that a paroxysm of patriotic fervor will succeed the first moment of terror and discouragement? Will not the present leaders represent the advantages gained in Italy as a just compensation, and shew the Austrians defeated in the plains of Genoa at the same moment they were victorious in the Palatinate? Will they not, with an inflammatory eloquence and from the same tribune from which they so often roused their enthusiasm, compare them to the Romans, and exhibit to their view those fierce Republicans in the moments of their adversity? Will they not tell them that the Romans never appeared in a
more

* Lands have been promised to the soldiers; they cannot be given, and therefore they will seize upon them.

more glorious light than after the battle of Cannæ, which cost them fifty thousand citizens; when the young Scipio, having sworn upon his sword, never to despair of the Republic, forced the victorious Hannibal to abandon the laurels he had gathered in the plains of Rome, and to fly to the assistance of his country, where he was defeated in his turn in the plains of Zama, under the very walls of Carthage? Will not the members of the new Directory, such as a Barras and a Carnot, who have more to dread from a calm than a storm, and who will not fail to display the most daring intrepidity where their interests are so deeply concerned, confidently promise to repair with *éclat* what they will call a momentary check; and announce that another campaign, more vigorous and better directed, will incontestibly fix to the Rhine the limits of the Republic? Will they not induce the seven hundred and fifty modern conscript fathers to decree, amidst the reiterated applauses of the boisterous galleries, that far from laying down its arms in the moment of a temporary check, the French Republic will not abandon them till a compleat triumph shall have shewn them deserving of a safe and honorable peace?

We shall readily admit, that this is nothing more than the vain boasting of State Mountebanks; but it must be granted at the same time, that this will be their most probable resource; and this is enough to conclude, that all the blood spilt during the last two months cannot be considered as the forerunner of a sure and speedy peace.

Is it impossible for France to continue the War?

But it will be said: Is not peace visibly marked out in that imperious necessity which must force it upon the French; in that absolute and hopeless derangement which must paralyse all their operations, and in the total discredit of their paper-money, *which*

which was their only resource? The assignats provided for every emergency; they paid the fourteen armies*; hired a million of functionaries; and supported the whole corruptive profusion. Their total depreciation, which reduces them to nothing, equally destroys the prodigious resources they afforded; and thus is the spring itself dried up by the excess of the abuse. Nothing remains to supply their deficiency; nothing that will enable the present rulers to continue their vast and unnatural efforts. Frederic could resist the combined attacks of three great Powers only because his coffers were better filled than theirs. So true it is that money is the sinew of war. Now, in France, this sinew is entirely unbraced, broken and destroyed; France is therefore driven to the necessity of suing for peace, since it is no longer in its power to continue the war.

This is the fashionable language of the day; these are the favourite arguments advanced by several writers; they are the same that were held forth before the opening of the campaign†; and we readily confess that what had some appearance then, carries a still greater degree of it at present. But shall we never be taught not to lay so great a dependance on appearances, after having been so often and so cruelly deceived by them ever since the beginning of the revolution? Shall we always apply old maxims, old methods, old probabilities to an order of things entirely new? Can an example be applied to a situa-
F
tion

* We say *fourteen armies*, to be in unison with all the periodical writers, who continue to repeat what they have read two years ago in a statement of the French armies, given by Mallet du Pan; as they repeat after others, that France contains only twenty-five millions of inhabitants, and has but 2000 millions currency in circulation. These statements are far from being correct: but this is not the place to investigate this subject.

† See *Reflections on the War*, published by Mr. d'Ivernois in the beginning of the year, and his *Coup-d'oeil sur les Assignats*.

tion that has no precedent? Has the lesson of experience not yet convinced us that the worse manner of reasoning to-day is to reason as we formerly did?

However, let us oppose a few doubts to the too confident assertions of those, who are pleased to represent France, in the midst of its triumphs and conquests, as falling exhausted and humiliated at the feet of its enemies, imploring for peace, and obtaining it on the sole condition of restituting all her conquests *without being able to retain the smallest village of foreign territory**.

False inferences drawn from the discredit of assignats.

They maintain that the discredit alone of the assignats is sufficient to produce this catastrophe. Wishing to enforce this conviction, and to court the favor of so popular a doctrine, they lay it down as a fixed principle that *the whole power of the French Republic, and even its military existence depends exclusively on the assignats that its momentary conquests are wholly owing to the profusion of their paper currency That the assignats alone have worked every miracle, and attached the interests of every individual to the success of the revolution In short, that their prolific copper-plates have produced those prodigies which amaze and afflict the universe*†.

It is, certainly, impossible to extol in a more eminent degree, the efficacy of the assignats and the genius of their inventors. It is, without doubt, a most sublime discovery to find, in an engraved copper-plate, every resource requisite to resist the formidable confederation of the most powerful monarchs; it is a most marvellous and mysterious secret, that of being able to fight all Europe with paper, and to obtain the most signal successes with a few arithmetical characters. But will those who have

* *Coup-d'œil sur les Assignats*, by M. d'Ivernois, page 33.

† Mr. d'Ivernois' *Coup-d'œil sur les Assignats*.

have had the supernatural privilege of using such a magical power, all at once, lose the practical exercise of it? After having, for four successive years, created immense riches by their summary decrees; after having multiplied them at their command, and increased their enormous mass without bounds, without obstacle, without any difficulty whatever, will they at once be incapacitated, whilst they still can wave the same enchanted, terrific and all-powerful wand, from continuing their own, or substituting a different plan of operations; from supplying its imperfections, or regulating it upon different principles; from preserving the existence of that which with one word they brought into being; or from replacing it by a similar all-powerful creation? Is it not a received adage, that the major includes the minor? Is it not an eternal truth that the preservative is inherent in the creative power?

M. d'Ivernois, however, has formed a different opinion. Sitting in judgment on a subject he never had it in his power fully to examine, and arguing from the authority of incoherent speeches of conventional oracles, as enlightened as himself, he has decided that the French Republic must indubitably perish with the discredit of the assignats; that *the approaching and inevitable crisis of their annihilation will render it impossible for the revolutionists to prolong the war; that it would dash their trophies to the ground; or tear away their laurels from their brow, and insure to the confederates a glorious and speedy peace.* Only wait, he tells them, *Let Europe have the patience to wait but a little longer, and to remain in arms; and soon, the mine of metallic paper being exhausted, the charm will disappear; every one will be struck with horror at the catastrophe; and the French Republic, destitute of every thing, will have no other resource left but to disband the armies before they revolt, to restore their conquests before they are compelled to evacuate them, and to propose a*

speedy peace before they are driven to the necessity of receiving it as a favor.

This is the language, these are the assertions of M. d'Ivernois; and yet he is a man of talents. But what he repeats to-day is precisely what he said nine months ago; and there has been no dissolution of armies, no evacuation of conquests, no supplication for peace. This little miscalculation, however, on the epoch of the accomplishment of his prediction does not perplex him; on the contrary, *he repeats his assertions with increased presumption, and always appeals to events* *. May they correspond with

* See *Coup-d'oeil sur les Assignats*, page 91, where the two following assertions are emphatically repeated; namely, *that the fall of the assignats would produce a peace in the same manner as their invention had created the war*;—the other, *that the Republic would perish, as the Monarchy, BY ITS FINANCES*. Upon which we beg leave to observe—1st. That the assignats had been decreed in April, 1790, whilst war had only been declared in April, 1792, when the assignats had already been depreciated.—2dly, That it is not, and never will appear true, to the well-informed, that the French Monarchy perished by its finances: It is, on the contrary, proved by incontrovertible facts, that the French finances had been much more deranged at former periods than at the beginning of the revolution; and that the royal treasury was never less incumbered with unfunded debts, never so punctual in its payments, so powerful in its credit, as at that epoch, when the proposed reforms that were intended to produce a better order of things excited the clamours of the interested, and the expectations of the turbulent.

I am inclined to believe, that it was not the intention of Mr. d'Ivernois to give his countenance to the daring assertion which my calumniators have so industriously advanced, that the French Monarchy owes its ruin to the deranged state into which the finances were brought during my administration: but if after fairly avowing my unwillingness to believe him capable of this presumptuous accusation, I still found him persisting in his unjust and erroneous statement, or manifesting an affected doubt of the facts I have brought forward, I would strike him dumb with proofs which cannot be contested; and instead of that esteem which I have hitherto felt for him, I would deliver him up to that shame and contempt which the
man

with his prophetic voice! We wish it more than we expect it : and it is, because we think it wrong to form favourable conjectures without sufficient foundation ; because we have cruelly experienced, that illusive hopes make us often neglect salutary precautions ; that we think it highly necessary to moderate the lofty suggestions of minds heated by imaginary expectations, and infatuated by the deceitful persuasion that the fall of the assignats alone must put an end to all their calamities.

We are far from wishing to oppose sinister pre-
 sages to favorable predictions. Faithful and unfor-
 tunate Frenchmen, who are martyrs for the best of
 causes, God forbid that I should endeavour to de-
 press your hopes ! It would be cruel indeed to tear
 from you the only comfort you have left in your
 misfortune. We would not even wish to destroy
 those flattering illusions which, for a moment, alle-
 viate your sufferings, if it were not to be appre-
 hended that they would make you lose sight of other
 truly efficacious means of relief DOES THERE
 THEN EXIST NO REMEDY BUT IN THE FALL OF OUR
 COUNTRY ? Is it by destruction alone that order can
 be restored ? Is it only over its ruins that you can
 expect to return into your country ? Whatever
 weakens the strength without doubt diminishes the
 violence of the frenzy ; BUT WHAT OUGHT TO BE
 THE SOLE OBJECT OF OUR WISHES, IS TO SEE THE
 FRENCH NATION ONCE MORE SUBJECT TO THE EM-
 PIRE OF DUTY AND REASON. And we will prove
 that to bring it back to this sense ought to be our
 only and constant aim. How rapid soever the de-
 preciation

man fully deserves, who can have the effrontery to vilify a
 character with reproaches which he knows to be unjust ; who
 can thus injure without a motive, and who feels a gratification,
 which I do not envy him, in violating the respect due to mis-
 fortune.

preciation of assignats, how great soever their degradation; yet no other beneficial effect can be derived from this circumstance, but in as much as it contributes to increase the general discontent. It is straining the point a little too much to assert that France must receive its death-blow from their fall.

Inferences to be drawn from the depreciation of the assignats.

Much, indeed, has been said on this very great depreciation of assignats: the Louis d'ors were, with respect to paper-money, as 24 are to 2,000. Suddenly they fell to 2,400; to 3000, to 3,600, to 4,800, and even to 5000 livres; and in one day the differences of the rise and fall were as much as between one and two thousand livres. These convulsive starts of the assignats, are thought to indicate symptoms of an expiring power!

But what inference can be drawn from this?—that what had been said at the beginning of the year is become more striking and more certain to-day?—This may be true, as far as calculation goes; but, as to its political consequences, there is no great difference. The value of assignats has been for this long while beyond all proportion, and it has been very judiciously observed*, that where that is the case there can be neither a rise nor a fall.

Will it be said, that where there is so rapid a depression, an absolute annihilation cannot be far distant? . . . It may be so; but it must be acknowledged also, that if this rapid depression is in no ways gradual, and that there is an excessive irregularity in its motions, it is a proof rather that there exists an immoderate stock-jobbing, which it would seem not to be impossible to check.

Will it be said, that the assignats, degraded as they are, can no longer be considered as the representative characters of real money?—This is certain,

* By Mr. Fox.

tain, and was so from the first epoch, when their emissions became excessive: for as soon as their total exceeded that of specie in circulation, they ceased to represent it; there is nothing new in this argument.

Will it be said, that from this depression proceeds so enormous a rise in the price of provisions as to disable the commonalty from purchasing them; and that in France the husbandman, the artisan, and day-labourer are starved with the salaries they receive in discredited paper-money? . . . There is no doubt whatever that an exorbitant dearness does exist; but as to the proportionate influence of the several causes that more or less contribute to it, various opinions may be entertained: without alledging the great scarcity of provisions which is universal this year, may not the present dearth, experienced in France, be imputed to a defective police as much as to a want of confidence in the assignats? With the assistance of an enlightened and careful administration, which would prohibit monopoly without laying any restraint on commerce, and proportion the wages of the labourer with impartiality and without vexation; the price of provisions would soon keep its equilibrium with the value of the representative sign of riches; and the dearness, which would only bear a relative proportion to this nominal sign, would in no ways affect the poor man, whose labour would be paid in an equal ratio with the expences of his subsistence. It is in cases of sudden variations only in the value of money or of paper-money, that an equally sudden and corresponding variation in the price of wages cannot take place; and it is in this respect that an inordinate stock-jobbing, which destroys every proportion in the course of exchange, extends its baneful effects to the lowest class of the people. The excessive dearness of provisions, however, which
compels

compels the rulers to adopt decisive and vigorous measures, at the same time facilitates the execution of them; for whatever is acknowledged to be unavoidable, never experiences an invincible resistance.

But this further conclusion is formed from the present depreciation of the assignats, that they will soon be of no service whatever; that the Republic, deprived of this resource, will no longer be able to maintain its numerous armies, and will be brought to the necessity of soliciting a peace on any conditions: in short, that the French government, by losing its assignats, will lose the sole principle of its existence, and the only support of its exertions; and that this irretrievable calamity will evidently reduce them to the last extremity.

These inferences are far from being deduced in a convincing and perspicuous manner; they are mistaken and distorted; and we shall prove that they are not drawn according to the rules of sound logic, nor founded on a notion of what is called *Course of Exchange*; a subject which in general is but little known, and imperfectly understood, even by men of abilities.

General
observations
on the
depreciation
of
public
funds.

In the examination of this subject, we must ground our arguments upon this fundamental truth, that no calculation can be formed, or argument deduced from the discredit of any currency whatever, if there exists no object of comparison. A body in motion does not appear to rise or fall but when the eye can compare it with some fixed point: In the same manner, artificial money only gains or loses when it can be exchanged with real money. If this fictitious coin, whether it is paper or metal, is legally current, and the only one in circulation; if there are no other means of exchange authorized; if it cannot be negotiated in foreign countries; the rate of exchange is, in this respect, but an empty name, and not applicable here. Such
a currency

a currency is not susceptible of melioration or depression; its multiplicity, if it be excessive, obstructs its circulation; it does not destroy the necessity of it, which overpowers every obstacle; and its pernicious influence extends only to the current price of provisions. It is on account of the provisions that this excess is felt as a calamity, in the same manner as an excessive multiplication of specie in gold and silver would be: For it is certain that, as far as this has no relation with external commerce, twenty thousand millions in gold, that should have been put at once into circulation in the kingdom, would have nearly produced as considerable a rise in the price of provisions and other merchandise as twenty thousand millions of assignats. Would it, in such a case, have been said, *that the gold had lost its credit? Would it have been said, that its fall was inevitable, and that the ruin of the State would be the immediate consequence?* It is inverting all ideas, and changing the meaning of words, to take the effects of an ill-understood superabundance for the proof of an irremediable exhaustion; and to argue from the greater or the lesser depression of paper in circulation, which is in competition with no other paper, nor with any metallic specie.

Connection between the price of provisions and the quantity of specie in circulation.

When once paper-money becomes the substitute of coined metal, and has a forced circulation, without being convertible into specie, it has so little connexion with the value of money, that it would be very possible to avoid giving it the same standard: it is evident that this new representative sign, and its subdivisions into aliquot parts, might be characterized in any other manner, so as to destroy all analogy with the former specie*. The nominal value

* By the new Constitution, the emoluments of the public functionaries are fixed at the rate of so many *septiers*; (twelve bushels

value of the assignats is only ideal; every thing depends on opinion; and opinion, which always yields to necessity, is still more predominant in France than any where else. We have seen a proof of it: Those who for these six years have so wantonly sported with the credulity of a nation, the most easily deceived in the world, have found means to seize on the whole property, not only with impunity, but even with the tame assent of the people, and to give nothing but paper in exchange, which they were suffered to multiply almost beyond calculation. Why then should they not equally succeed now, as the public necessities become more urgent, in persuading the people that a few cyphers should be taken off from the assignats, to simplify the denominator in the same manner as the decimal fractions were introduced in arithmetic to facilitate calculation? To speak more seriously, could they not persuade the people that these were the only means to establish a reasonable proportion between the paper-money and the common price of provisions; to free the assignats from the detestable *manœuvres* of stock-jobbers, by giving them a fixed value; to relieve those who are in want at the expence of those who are in affluence; to put a stop to public misery; to triumph over all their enemies; and to retrieve, by this indispensable measure, the errors of an inconsiderate and prodigal administration, and to guard against the return of the same abuses.

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(twelve bushels Paris measure) of wheat. Would it then be surprizing, if in a country where nothing resembles what exists in other countries, not even the divisions and names of time, weights, measures and distances, they were to give to the representative sign a standard relative to natural productions, so as to call the largest numerical value a quartern of wheat, and the smallest a penny or halfpenny loaf? If that be possible any where, is it not a country which can supply its own wants?

We do not pretend by any means to justify such expedients, much less should we desire to point out what might be done in such a case; we only wish to shew, that it is not demonstrated to be impossible to overcome the difficulties occasioned by the fall of the assignats. The absurdity of the expedients, proposed to the Assembly, only proves the inability of those who have contrived them; it does not follow that others more efficacious may not be planned by the new representatives. Robespierre, as contracted in knowledge as he was eminent in barbarity, whose only genius consisted in being daring, and who abounded in expedients because he never hesitated to employ the most atrocious instruments The execrable Robespierre, did he not preserve, for twelve or fifteen months together, the assignats at par, though there were already four times more than what the common circulation required? Had he been less ignorant in administration, and less inclined to give a preference to the most tyrannical means, he would not have thought it necessary to have recourse to a law so vexatious and so fatal to industry as that of the *maximum*; he would have contented himself with forcing the circulation of the assignats upon the country, and excluding that of gold and silver. Those of his conventional accomplices, who rid the world of this monster only that they might inherit his power, thought themselves obliged to adopt quite contrary measures: Instead of contenting themselves to repeal the odious law of the *maximum*, they have conceded the permission to buy gold and silver with assignats, and to sell assignats for gold and silver; not considering, that by making the latter marketable, and the assignats free, they gave them their death-blow by the revival of a competitor so incompatible with their monstrous existence. They did not perceive that a vitiated administration could only be supported

supported by vicious measures; they shewed less ingenuity without being less atrocious; and enervated the revolution by departing from revolutionary principles.

Hence have they been obliged to double and treble the mass of assignats; hence has their value been depressed even below the proportion of their multiplicity; hence, in short, the absolute and urgent necessity of adopting some measure which may either raise their value or provide for their deficiency.

But can either be done at present? Will the nation suffer it?—Why not? A nation endures every thing when it is actuated by fear and blinded by fanaticism. But supposing even that the most aggrieved among them, who would not be found the most numerous, nor the most deserving of pity, were to excite some sudden tumultuary movement against the most odious members of the new legislature, would these hesitate to expose themselves, for the public good, to the same dangers they encountered for their private interests, when they maintained their posts by violence, and in contempt of the will of a free people?

Will the
entire de-
pression
of the as-
signats
occasion
the ruin of
France?

Be that as it may, and supposing even that nothing can prevent the entire depression of assignats; supposing that soon they are to experience the same fate as the paper-money of several States of America; that their holders should throw them to the winds of heaven, *rapidis ludibria ventis*; we do not see yet how this should infallibly ruin France, or disable her from continuing the war; we do not see how the annihilation of a few scraps of paper, stamped with the effigy of Liberty, can destroy the empire which this fanatical Goddess exercises over its delirious votaries. As little do we perceive how France by losing her assignats, is to lose all her power; as if from that moment she was to lose her soil,

soil, her climate, her productions, her industry, her soldiers, her iron, her native energy elevated to so high a pitch by fanaticism, and her fanaticism increased by calamity. On the contrary, we cannot but perceive in the downfall of that monstrous edifice, the State delivered from a pressure that weighed it down, and which, after having been for a long while the support of its gigantic efforts, threatened to crush it in its ruins; as in the fable the Titans were buried under the Mountains, and the Earth heaped up over the bodies of her own children.

Will it be contended, that if the assignats are reduced to a perfect nullity, the State is not at the same time delivered from this grievous burden? That the twenty thousand millions that deluged the kingdom will not at once disappear from the surface of France; and by this spontaneous extinction, that the Republic will not find itself exonerated without even incurring the odium of bankruptcy?

It will be said, however, that this argument, though in appearance true, can only be a sophism: for else it would be likewise true to maintain, that the *total fall* of the assignats would repair the evils of their *progressive depreciation*; and that while the latter occasioned the ruin of France, the former would prove its salvation.

We answer in the affirmative. There are cases where the last period of the evil becomes its remedy; and to maintain that a gradual depression, when it has reached the last crisis of an absolute degradation becomes an acquittance, a total discharge, is not to sophisticate, but to state the truth, such as it would prove, and such as it already begins to appear. For if the Louis d'or is worth from three thousand eight hundred to five thousand eight hundred livres; which, on an average, would be four thousand eight hundred livres; we may say that at this
moment

moment (1st of January 1796) its value is as *one to two hundred*; it follows that, in supposing the assignats in circulation to amount to thirty thousand millions, (which is the utmost) it would require but one hundred and fifty millions in specie, or six millions sterling *, to take them out of circulation, to reimburse and extinguish them. This calculation cannot be contested, and a truth in calculation cannot be a sophism.

It is much more sophistical seriously to compare, as it has been done in a much-esteemed pamphlet, imputed to a statesman of great acknowledged merit, the expences of England in ready money, with those of France in assignats; and to assert that the war expences of France, for one month, are greater than those of England for one year, and that the expences of the French for one year surpass the whole national debt of England†.

Might not this argument be retorted with advantage from the simple statement we have given, by saying, that as the 30,000 millions, or 1,200 millions sterling, expended by France since the beginning of the revolution, represent now but 150 millions in specie, or six millions sterling; it follows that the four campaigns, all the profusions and dilapidations which preceded and accompanied them, have not cost France the fourth part of what England expends in one year of war? After this, what

* There were, in November, but twenty thousand millions of assignats in circulation. A first decree of the legislative body had declared that the emission of assignats should never exceed thirty thousand millions: a second decree has extended this power to forty thousand millions; but it does not follow that this quantity should be in circulation, since those that are received for the forced loan are to be burnt: it is certainly rather below than above the reality to fix to thirty thousand millions the number of assignats, at present, in circulation.

† See some Remarks on the apparent Circumstances of the War, in the fourth week of October, 1795, page 14.

what is become of the arguments on the rise or fall of the assignats!

Our original proposition, therefore, does not appear so paradoxical; and we hesitate not to affirm, that the state will be disburdened by the total depreciation of the assignats; and that what was expected to be the source of its distress will prove that of its deliverance: so much, so that if the revolutionary leaders had, through foresight and sagacity, produced what they suffered to happen through ignorance, they would have shewn themselves much more skilled in finance than those who view the ruin of the Republic in the depression of the assignats.

But what will France be able to do without them? How can she continue the war? How will she pay her troops? How can she avoid the necessity of disbanding them, of soliciting a peace in restoring all her conquests?

How will
France
be able
to go on
without
Assignats?

We are not obliged to detail with precision, and to determine what the new Republican Chiefs will do in such a case to supply the assignats. It is enough for our argument to prove, that being armed with power, and commanded by necessity, they will find it possible to employ the one in order to provide for the exigencies of the other. Far from this being impossible, it is more than probable that it will be so; and we are warranted by common sense in believing that those who found, in their printer's shop, means sufficient to resist the united attacks of all Europe, will be able to find, when it is requisite, some other similar expedient, and succeed in replacing one invention by another. Is then the source of illusions dried up? *—Perhaps it will be

* This was written before the forced loan had been adopted, and before the funded bills (*cedules hypothécaires*) had been proposed as a substitute for the assignats. Without approving of

be said that it is, and that the people will place no more confidence in such expedients—But what has confidence to do with this? Such language might have been used eight years ago. The same arguments are always applied to France which would be applied to any other country. This is a most egregious mistake—Confidence in paper-money! Did it ever possess any? Did it possess confidence the first year, when the emissions were so excessive as to excite a general uneasiness? Did it possess any the second year, when the loss upon it was no less than 28 per cent? Did it possess any confidence under Roberespierre, who enforced its circulation under pain of death? Has it possessed any afterwards?—If expedients so much abused and so much reprobated have answered their intended purpose, without the aid of the least shadow of confidence, why could not others be devised, better directed and recommended by the powerful plea of necessity? Necessity is the most convincing pleader; and when irresistible force is joined to it; when what is absolutely necessary is demanded with an absolute authority, where would be the resistance?

We have already observed, that by confounding different epochs; by perverting the meaning of words, and by the mistaken notions that were entertained about exchange and public credit, the most inconclusive inferences were continually deduced. In the same manner are the different sorts of power and riches, which constitute the strength of a state confounded: some are artificial and political, others physical and natural. The former are
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of this measure, nor of its badly combined execution, we may nevertheless alledge it as a proof, that already a part of our prediction has been fulfilled. Besides, we beg, again and again, to observe that, without wishing to indicate the means that might be adopted, we only maintain that it is not impossible to find them out.

under the influence of circumstances, and are variable according to the effects of the different combinations that intervene in a government: the latter are fixed, permanent, and independent of casual occurrences. France may be badly governed, and thus lose its artificial riches and political strength: but it does by no means follow that it will be at the same time deprived of its natural riches and physical resources. Now, if this essential part of its power, so deeply rooted in its soil, and consolidated by millions of combatants, still remains, must we put an implicit confidence in what is so boldly affirmed, that *the whole power of the French Republic, and even its military power, exclusively consists in the assignats* *.

More judicious and sensible, the author of the Remarks on the apparent Circumstances of the War observes, that if the depreciation of the assignats does not occasion the overthrow of the Republic, and the dissolution of its armies, it will be because its leaders will put in requisition the physical resources and territorial productions of the nation; but he adds, *that it is utterly impossible that this mode can be durable* †.

May we be permitted to ask, first, on what this *absolute impossibility* is founded; secondly, what extent is allowed to the word *durable*? We shall easily agree that, under any other government, the violence of requisitions in kind, far from being *durable*, would not even be practicable. But may we likewise be allowed to ask what existing or imaginable government, however despotic and arbitrary, would have attempted the tenth part of what France has done by means of the revolutionary power. Could any other, like France, have seized the whole property, stripped the altars, taken and dissipated the money,

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prohibited

* See *Reflexions sur la Guerre, par Mr. d'Ivernois*, p. 31 & 32.

† See page 15 of *Remarks on the apparent Circumstances of the War*, &c.

prohibited the circulation of specie, and given an arbitrary and unlimited extension to paper-money? Could any other have abolished all worship and justice, destroyed all prerogatives, and violated every right; overturned all customs, and broken every tie of society? Could any other have slaughtered an innumerable multitude of citizens; levied in an instant three hundred thousand soldiers; armed a whole nation; and forced into requisition men, cattle, the fruits of the earth, the products of industry, and even Victory herself, in obliging the generals to conquer under pain of death? This is what the Republic has done, and from this we may judge what it can do.

A contrast between legal and revolutionary expedients.

We readily believe, if we are still allowed to judge from appearances, that requisitions in kind cannot be continued for a long time; but can the efforts on the opposite side exceed theirs in their duration? How can the cold spectators of this bloody contest, who assign no other period to its termination but the incapacity of continuing it, insure to the confederated courts the approaching extinction of an enemy whom, in many respects, they combat with so much inequality? They carry on the war with their revenues only; the enemy with his capitals: It is not without difficulty they levy the necessary contributions; France, with one word, can command millions; they are sparing; France is lavish of the blood of her subjects; the Combined Powers repair their losses by a most laborious and difficult mode of recruiting; an universal enrolment of all her citizens perpetuates the reproduction of the Republican armies: her fanatical soldiers think themselves sovereigns, and are persuaded they are fighting their own cause; while those of the Combined Powers are actuated by obedience only, and have no motive but their pay to animate them. Is it from such a comparison, whose

whose principal outline I have but superficially sketched, that we so implicitly assure ourselves that France will be the first exhausted?

Is it from an exact balance of the respective means of the several combatants that we find her unable to make further exertions, and her enemies in force sufficient to overbear every difficulty? Is it, in short, because she has for four years successfully repelled the attacks of all the Combined Powers, that she will be unable now to maintain herself against a disunited coalition?

The calamities of France are, unquestionably, great; but they are to be attributed to persons more than to things; and we often mistake, for a total failure of resources, that which is only the necessary consequence of a vitious administration.

Thus, because dreadful extortions, and a monstrous profusion of paper-money, made the specie disappear, we conclude that there is none remaining in the kingdom; though it is evident, that of one hundred and twenty millions sterling in gold and silver specie that existed before the revolution*; supposing that there were forty millions exported either by the emigrants, or for the purpose of purchasing foreign commodities; or for the purposes of bribery, which, however, has been so extensively practised with the spoils of the throne; and even without reckoning what has been obtained by the forced contributions of the conquered countries; yet even on this supposition, there must

Is it true that there are in France no species of gold and silver—no provisions.

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still

* It had been verified by the new coinage of Louis d'ors, in 1786 and 1787, and there were fifty-six millions sterling of them in circulation; and in France, the specie in silver exceeded that in gold. Whatever, therefore, those who have not had the same opportunity I had, of verifying the fact, may assert to the contrary, it remains incontestible that, without exaggeration, the specie of gold and silver may be valued, together, at one hundred and twenty millions sterling. See a more detailed note on this subject at the end of the work.

still remain in France about eighty millions sterling in specie. We do not include in this calculation all the plate and precious ornaments possessed by so many individuals, and by fifty-two thousand churches or convents, which cannot be valued with precision, but which must have been very considerable. Whatever has been coined since the revolution, must likewise be added to it; and, every thing considered, it cannot be questioned that by reducing to eighty millions sterling all the gold and silver, of every denomination, coined or not, now existing in France, and which formerly might have been rated at almost double that sum, we are rather below than above the real mark. Such a sum would certainly be sufficient for France, since in England it is reckoned that thirty-five millions only are in circulation.

After this statement, more exact, it must be allowed, that the positive assertions of every pamphleteer that has lately appeared, we may judge whether the Republican government, if it were desirous to extinguish the assignats, could not in the plenitude of its power, find six millions sterling, which would be sufficient, as we have already observed, to call them in and reimburse them. This may, at least, serve to convince us, that whatever is alledged as a proof of an absolute want of metallic riches in France, is rather a proof of a want of skill in drawing them from their retreats, and bringing them into circulation by means, which belong more to an intelligent administration than to violent extortions.

In like manner, because Paris is not properly supplied with provisions, and local scarcities are experienced in France, it is concluded that it has not provisions sufficient to maintain its inhabitants; and that, in spite of the acknowledged abundance of the late harvest, France is threaten-
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ed with famine. Instead of paying any regard to such hackneyed arguments, constantly repeated for these four last years, would it not be more natural to believe that a dreadful system of monopoly, favoured by a general licentiousness, and innumerable other obstacles, which prevent the free conveyance of provisions from province to province, are the true causes of this excessive dearth? Is not the want of police in that unhappy kingdom much more evident than the want of provisions? They apply a remedy, whenever the case requires it, by acts of violence, the effects of which are an ample proof that there is no real want of provisions. Did not the new counsel lately decree that the department of Seine alone should furnish the Capital, within three days, with two hundred and fifty thousand quintals of corn? Did it not soon after appear that this was not a nugatory decree? Where is the country in which such summary measures could be taken and executed?

What a chimera to imagine that the inhabitants of the most fruitful country in Europe, a country of the most extensive, if not of the most improved agriculture, which in common years produces more than it consumes,* could be reduced by famine! What a folly to infer from this supposed scarcity that they will be necessitated to disband their armies; as if that measure would give bread to a million of disbanded soldiers; as if the want of provisions would not rather drive out of the kingdom than recall the armies. Great God! with what dreadful scourge would the neighbouring nations be threatened, if it were true,

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* It has been verified, at a time when there existed a careful administration, that a moderate harvest, taken on the totality of the kingdom, exceeded by one-eighth, what was necessary for the consumption of its inhabitants. Their number has been much diminished since, and many have been nourished at the expence of the enemy.

as it is inconsiderately asserted, that this warlike population had not provisions enough for its support, and consequently was obliged to seek its subsistence in invasions, plunder and devastation !....The absurdity of the conclusion proves the absurdity of the premises. As much may be said of the other suppositions, which represent France to be in that desperate situation, in which she does not find herself, in order to prove the necessity, which even that situation would not produce, of suing for a peace, when a peace would by no means remove the evil.

The principal error, and the source of every mistake on the part not only of political writers, but of several courts of Europe, proceeds from not having sufficiently calculated the full extent and power of revolutionary measures: if they were convinced that these measures surpass by far, in extent and efficacy, all regular, just and lawful expedients, they would not suffer themselves to be deluded by vain and chimerical suppositions. They would not waste away their strength in irresolute efforts, or in idle inactivity, thinking it sufficient quietly to wait, till a truly desirable peace, and such as they expect, is proposed to them.

If Peace
could be
procured
at this
moment,
it would
only be a
false and
perfidious
Peace.

It would be still more prejudicial, however, to go into the opposite extreme, and to precipitate a negotiation which, if at this moment it could have any effect, would only lead to a false security, and produce a peace of one day; a peace which, considering the nature of the government to be treated with, the interest of its rulers, and the incompatibility of a democracy in such an empire as France with the repose of Europe, would be a mere mockery, and most likely fatal to England, who, the moment she had disarmed, would be exposed to the hazard of some insidious and unexpected attack. Such a peace could only be offered as a snare to dupe that power which shewed a readiness to accept it,

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Is it to be expected that the exhausted state of France would be a sufficient guarantee for the permanency of any treaty that may be concluded with the present government? and that this government would remain peaceful from the impossibility of becoming again hostile? But is not this a consequence of the same mistaken notions, that have been invariably entertained, since the beginning of the war, on the nature and extent of those powerful means that a fanatical delirium and revolutionary violences may produce? Let the Powers pay a very particular attention to it: that fertile and very populous empire not only possesses incalculable resources within itself, but what deserves a still more serious consideration is, that from the extreme disorder which desolates France, may be produced a greater intenseness of action, and from its present debility may be derived an increased energy of execution; that the supernatural effects of its convulsed state may prevail over the natural effects of its disastrous situation.

Since I have been forced to speak in my own name, may I be allowed to ask all those who have taken the trouble of reading my works, whether I ever concealed from the public, or lightly passed over, that dreadful abyss of evils into which France has been precipitated. More than once I endeavoured to draw the frightful picture in its true and most glaring colours. I must have been very ill understood if I was accused now, to call into question the excess, and the continually encreasing excess of its calamities: but to infer from this that the revolutionary Chiefs will be brought to an immediate necessity of supplicating for peace; that they are in an absolute inability to continue the war, though war forms a part of their existence; that they would not recommence it as soon as their own interest would compel them to it: I cannot help repeatedly to observe, at the risk of displeasing Mr. d'Ivernois, that these

these consequences are mistaken and distorted, and may prove most pernicious. I do repeat and continually shall repeat, that whatever causes would reduce a regularly governed state to the last period of its military exertions, would by no means produce the same effects on a frantic and revolutionary government: I beg leave to observe, that when the whole power is in the hands of ruffians, all the existing means and resources of the country are likewise in their hands. So that to reduce them to the last extremity, there must be no land, no productions, no hands, no soldiers; in short, no resources of any kind, in the whole extent of the French territory. Lastly, it seems to me, that to rely on the encrease of public misery in France, and to expect general tranquillity from the ruined condition of that wretched kingdom, is much the same as if Nations had formerly thought themselves secure from the devastations of the Huns, Goths and Vandals, because those hordes of barbarians had neither money, nor provisions; neither order, nor discipline.

I think that I have sufficiently proved that there cannot exist, on either side, a wish of concluding a peace at present: I have likewise demonstrated, that if peace was attainable, it would only be a false, perfidious, and consequently a dangerous peace; I may therefore conclude that there exists an absolute necessity to continue the war. It is here to no purpose to consider what successes or advantages may be expected. Discussion is useless where necessity commands; and war being necessary, peace becomes unattainable.

But if it is indispensable to continue the war, it is still more essential to adopt every means requisite to obtain a speedy, solid, honourable and permanent peace, such as will insure to Europe its moral and physical tranquillity. If I did not perceive the possibility of it, all the observations I have here advanced

ed would be afflicting indeed. I should incur the just reproach of having defeated hopes which I could not revive by presenting new objects of comfort. But I have endeavoured to remove illusions capable to mislead, in order to direct the public opinion to measures which alone appear to me truly efficacious and salutary. It is for this last subject, the most essential of all, and which equally interests all the Powers, all civil associations, and human kind in general, that I take the liberty of claiming a benevolent, or, at least, an impartial attention.

I shall, without reluctance, abandon all I thought necessary to alledge against conjectures, which are too hazardous and too affirmative. If, stung by contradiction, any one should obstinately persist in repelling and distorting my arguments, I shall remain wholly silent, and no longer intrude on the patience of the Public by a discussion which is not essential to the general point. Let the Public judge between my doubts and those assertions, which at least should be distrusted. I am much more anxious to inspire, for the remainder of the discussion, the same conviction which I entertain myself. Relying on the disinterested purity of my intentions, and convinced, beyond the power of language to express, of the happy consequences that would result from them, if carried into effect, I make no difficulty in soliciting the suffrage not only of my companions in misfortune, but of all those who prefer order to destruction; who are more attached to the interests of society in general, than to any private views or interests whatever; who prefer conciliatory means to implacable animosities; and who, to preserve themselves from the effects of folly, do not think it necessary to destroy all fools.

CHAR.

C H A P. III.

What measures are to be pursued in order to obtain a solid and permanent peace.

WA R ought always to be directed to the attainment of peace. It would be iniquitous and inhuman if it had any other tendency.

Whatever therefore is necessary to obtain peace, ought to enter into the plan of the war; and military successes, that did not promote this end, would be fruitless.

If this proposition be true in general; it is more so for England, which being the most commercial country in the world, is also the most interested in a general pacification.

To promote the establishment of another government in France is the only way to arrive at a solid peace.

But neither England nor Europe will obtain peace (I mean permanent peace) by force of arms alone; it is likewise essential to adopt every measure that may tend to the re-establishment of a reasonable and solid government in France, a government compatible with the repose of other nations. As long as France has nothing but a phantom of political existence; as long as it will be a prey to discord, uncertain in her views, and continually agitated by the collision of the different ruling factions; as long as it will be subject to experiments of governments, which appear and disappear like so many fugitive shadows; so long will it be vain and nugatory to treat with her. Can a solid superstructure be laid on an unstable and a moving ground? Is it not evident, that whatever

was

was concluded with a chimerical and impracticable government, could have but a transient and a momentary existence?

This palpable truth is supposed to be controverted by examples which seem to evince, that the changes of constitutions in France have not occasioned the violation of its treaties. The neutrality of America, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland, is alledged as a proof; it has remained inviolate since the beginning of the revolution, in spite of the vicissitudes of factions; it has been equally respected by the Brissotines and by Robespierre, under the reign of the Jacobins and the Moderates. The peace with Prussia and Spain seems also to indicate the possibility of treating with the French Republic, however disorganized it may be.

But because France, at the same moment that she declared war against all its neighbours, excepted the Swiss Republic, from whom it had nothing to fear, who prostrated herself at the feet of France, at a time she received the most humiliating outrages from her haughty neighbour, and supplied her with the cattle of which she stood in need; because, in the midst of her anarchy, France has not disturbed the neutrality of very distant countries with whom she had no particular concerns, and who became useful by supplying her wants; because, by consenting to a peace with Prussia and Spain, she exonerated herself from a burden without ceasing to employ her numerous armies; because these two Powers, having ventured to negotiate with the most versatile government in the world, having had no cause as yet to repent of treaties scarcely ratified; does it follow, that other Powers, in the immediate vicinity of France, who have various and multiplied concerns with her, who still cherish a germ of ancient rivalry between them, and who must have frequent occasions of coming to a rupture, can expect a solid and permanent

Objections answered.

permanent peace before a government, susceptible of stability, can be securely established? Can a conclusion be applied from one case to another when they are so widely different? Can a country which has no particular concern with the Republic, be compared to another which affords continual subjects of uneasiness and immediate objects to gratify her rapacity? Because a nation, which had ten different enemies to contend with, has treated with two or three; is it a just inference to suppose, that it will or can discontinue the war, when it is demonstrated that war forms the most essential part of its existence? That it will and can live in peace with the surrounding monarchies, while it still is in the delirium of an anti-monarchical system, and of a constitution as essentially the enemy of all thrones, as it is irreconcilable with peace and tranquillity.

It would be in vain to pretend that France is no longer what it was eighteen months ago; that there has been a considerable change in the dispositions of the nation as well as in its constitutional principles.

An answer to the objection respecting a change of the national disposition and constitutional principles in France.

There is some truth in all this; but this truth, reduced to its real import, does not lead to the consequences drawn from it. The French nation seems greatly altered; it is altered as much as it is suffered to be so; but this is not such a change as could be compatible with the safety of the political system of Europe. France appears to have shaken off the sanguinary yoke of the Terrorists, only because this faction has been overthrown by another. But having at the same time to deliberate, in six thousand assemblies, on the choice of a Government, it has voted, almost unanimously, for the shadow of a Republic, for a mixed oligarchy which it does not understand, and which it has had no time to examine. Its new demagogues have, with great ostentation, expressed more moderate sentiments than their predecessors; because, in order to destroy their power, they could

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not do better than to adopt contrary measures. They have arrayed themselves in a different garment of morality, without being less immoral in their characters: and as interest alone was the apparent principle of their resipiscence, so it will be its termination. Have they not already shewn it?

Besides, of what advantage is it to social order that the effects of their doctrine, being less atrocious, are now less repulsive? When a sect perverted in its principles shews itself moderate in its conduct, it only becomes the more dangerous. Seduction begins where indignation ceases. That contagion which has nothing forbidding in its aspect, is much more to be dreaded than that which repels by its ghastliness, and chills with horror.

It is something, however, in favour of public tranquillity, to see, at least in appearance, the execrable institution of propagandism abolished; that there exists no longer, in the center of Europe, a tolerated association openly professing the diabolical doctrines of insurrection and regicide: but this is far from being sufficient for the security of nations. It is true, that a decree of the Convention has declared, that the French people would not excite other nations to change their government; but of what signal advantage is this, if they still continue to invite them by their example; if this example animates them with so much the greater force, as it is fixed on the firm basis of power; and if the charm of independence is more than doubled by the attractive charm of success? But let not these flattering appearances impose upon our better judgment: the propagation of democratical systems is a consequence of their own nature, more than a resolution of their sectaries. And Sovereigns ought never to forget that **THE CHIEF ESSENCE OF REPUBLICANISM, AND OF DEMOCRACY PARTICULARLY, IS AN INVENTERATE HATRED TO KINGS.**

In

In the meanwhile, we do not wish to deny *in toto*, that the general disposition of France is ameliorated. But having often seen these delusive appearances suddenly overcast with a deeper gloom, we must fairly avow our suspicions, and endeavour to take off the flimsy covering, in order to discover where this amelioration is to be found, and in what it consists.

Are we to look for it in the revolutionary chiefs? Perfidious Cameleons! they assume, by turns, the colour and form that best suits the circumstances of the moment. After having, with Roberespierre, waded through the blood of their fellow citizens; they have, with Tallien, persecuted with unrelenting fury the accomplices of their own crimes. Moderation was the pretended order of the day at a time they were perpetrating new massacres for the purpose of maintaining themselves in power. In producing their constitution, the third in name, they appeared to wish for nothing more than the return of order; and they have sown in the nation new seeds of discord and troubles. They should have enabled the French to make a choice, and they did not even offer them an alternative. They seem, by their motions, to wish for a general pacification; whilst, in their hearts, they know that war is necessary to their existence. Covered as they are with the trappings of guilt, they endeavour to assume the semblance of virtue.

Can any more reliance be placed on the general disposition of the nation?—It is answered, yes and no. Yes, if you know how to take advantage of it. No, if the nation is left to itself. What can be expected from the languid movements of a passive people, which, for these six years, has been so much fascinated, deceived, and led astray, as not to know what it ought to wish. A ship without a mast or rudder, tossed by the tempest: a light and moveable

moveable globule floating in the air, which yields to every impulse, without having any direction of its own. Become seditious by credulity, barbarous from fanaticism, and criminal through fear: how often has it not been the instrument of atrocities it abhorred? Have we not seen it an indifferent spectator of the murder of a King, on whose sacred head it was wont, at other times, to pour every blessing, the warm effusion of an undisguised loyalty? Have we not seen it manifest a furious eagerness for massacres under ferocious tyrants; and the tenderest compassion under hypocritical tyrants? And now, that this miserable nation groans because it suffers; that it complains because it is oppressed; that it wishes for a change because it is wretched; is it possible it should have any determined object in view?—Irresolute in its desires, feeble in its repentance, wavering in its resolutions, it sends forth the loudest cries for liberty, and is secretly panting for the restoration of monarchy.

We must not, therefore, set too high a value on this amelioration of the general disposition of France. That we may not draw a false inference from it, we must consider it as having a tendency susceptible of being rendered efficacious, and not as a cause efficacious in itself; and we may conclude, not that a successful negotiation can be attempted now, but that the present order of things may lead to it. Every effort should be directed to this point, and it is not by force of arms alone that it is attainable. A better conducted and more fortunate campaign than the preceding, might render the French more tractable in a negotiation for peace, but would not destroy the democratical system: **UNTIL THIS IS EXTIRPATED, THERE CAN EXIST NO PERMANENT GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE, NO PEACE FOR EUROPE.**

Those

A Com-
parison
between
the
French
Republic
and other
Repub-
lics.

Those who maintain that it is impossible for a vast empire to exist as a Republic, go perhaps too far. The example of the commonwealth of Rome seems a strong case in point against their arguments. But neither this example, nor that of any other Republic that ever existed, can be applied to the heteroclitical species of popular government which exists in France.

The mixt government, more aristocratical than democratical, which, applied to Rome alone, might be called a Republic, was out of that city, and with respect of the other parts and dependencies of the empire, a truly despotic government. Rome was the capital and the tyrant of the world; whoever was not a Roman citizen was treated as a slave. The Ottoman Baschas are not more absolute or more oppressive in their governments, than the Roman Pro-consuls were in the different provinces entrusted to their administration. The inconveniences, resulting from the deliberations of a multitude, were only felt within the walls of the city; and whenever they became alarming, the Dictatorship gave them an immediate check. The Dictator was an absolute Monarch. In the Provinces nothing impeded the quickness of execution; nothing weakened the springs of authority; and nothing prevented its operations from being immediately communicated to the extremities of the empire. To this the Roman Government owed its glory, and was enabled, notwithstanding its imperfections, to arrive at the highest pitch of power, and to support, for a time, the weight of its colossal grandeur, by which at last it was entirely crushed.

By these traits alone, and without entering into a further detail, it is easily perceived, that there is not the least resemblance between what the Roman was, and what the French Republic endeavours to be; and whether, if the first maintained itself in all
its

its splendor for a whole century*, it does follow that the second will exist a twelvemonth amid those internal disorders, which are the necessary consequence of her form of government. Can the energy of the sovereign power, concentrated in Rome, and acting without controul over the different dependencies of its dominion, be compared to a sovereignty divided into so many separate parts, and scattered through so many provincial assemblies, the necessary rivals of the capital for the glorious palm of equality? Shall we find in the absurd leveling of ranks the same advantage which the Republic derived from the respect and veneration the Plebeians entertained for the patrician families? Can the irrefragable authority of the Senate, united together in the comitial Assemblies, be represented by this confused and discordant mixture of five hundred, who propose laws without being able to enact them; of two hundred and fifty, who accept or refuse, without having it in their power to propose them; of five, who direct every thing under a controuled authority; and of six who administer and execute under the dependance of all the others? In whatever point of view this comparison may be considered, no parallel whatever can be found between that democratical oligarchy, which is attempted to be imposed on a great people accustomed for fourteen ages to be governed by a race of powerful Kings, on a people, which of all others, is the least capable of governing itself, and the Roman Republic, which from its cradle gradually encreased to its full maturity, strengthened and consolidated

* We imbibe, from our infancy, so high an idea of that famous Republic, that the reader will be astonished to find, that we limit the period of its grandeur to the short duration of a century. Yet there were but one hundred and sixteen years between the ruin of Carthage, the first epoch of Roman grandeur, and the battle of Actium, which proved the grave of the Republic.

solidated itself by time and habit, as well as by the prejudices, manners and public spirit of its inhabitants.

Of all the Republics that deserve to be noticed, there is none to which we can assimilate the French constitution. Exclusive of all distinction of birth, inheritance of power, and perpetuity of offices, it has no resemblance either with the government of Lacedemon, which had a reigning dynasty, and a senate composed of nobles *; or that of Carthage, which was monarchical in its chief Magistrates, aristocratical in its Senate, and democratical in its popular assemblies †; not even with that of Athens, where democracy was tempered by a permanent Areopagus, which, according to Cicero, was as necessary to that State as Divine Providence is to the world ‡.

A comparison with modern Republics would not be more just. That of the United States of America, from whom the French Legislators have borrowed much, essentially differs from theirs were it only on account of its being a foederal government. The

* Whatever respect Lycurgus inspired for his laws, they were altered by the establishment of the Ephori, who were much the same as the Tribunes of the People at Rome; they were chosen to counterbalance the authority of the great, and they occasioned the ruin of the Republic.

† The mixt government of Carthage was subjected to the controul of five public censors; it lasted five hundred years, and it has been observed, that it had a great affinity with the form of the British government.

‡ There existed at Athens a Council of five hundred, and Archontes, to whom the Members of the French Directory may be compared. Many similar features may likewise be discovered between the Athenians and the inhabitants of Paris, who, being their rivals in urbanity of manners, have greatly surpassed them in levity and turbulence. Besides, the laws of Solon were not respected for a long continuance. This wise man had the mortification to see, at the end of ten years, his edifice overturned, and the Republic oppressed.

The Helvetic government is only an association of small Republics, some aristocratical, others democratical, none of which can serve as a model of what is proper for a great empire.

In general, this impossibility of drawing inferences from small to greater states, sets aside every example that could be alledged in favour of the French democracy. It has been very judiciously observed, that the most celebrated Republics have found, in their aggrandizement, the principle of their ruin, and *that all of them finished their existence, when they arrived at that point from whence the French Republic commences.*

It is evident also, that the French Republic has not the least resemblance with that of Venice, which, notwithstanding its defects, is the most ancient Government of Europe. It is an aristocracy, tyrannical in appearance, but very mild in its effects, and limited by invariable laws: the religious respect that is entertained for them, forms the distinctive character and the principal support of its constitution.

In vain should we endeavour to find out an analogy between the shapeless fabric of the French Republic and the government of Great Britain, which some authors have stiled a Monarchical Republic. What a disparity in every point of view? Those marvellous politicians, who flattered themselves they could produce a monument of their wisdom, far surpassing in excellence that government which constitutes the happiness of England, could not even discover whether it might, or might not be adapted to their country. They have shewn that they were not able even to appreciate its true merit. They neither could seize its spirit, or understand its true principles; they neither knew how to imitate the admirable equilibrium of its constitutive powers; or learn from it the utility of those respectable intermediate ranks,

which unite the King to his people, and the people to their King.

Thus nothing in the present, or the past, bears the least resemblance to the French Republic, nothing that can authorize us to presume that it will long subsist: but this is saying too little, since it is easy to perceive, that it carries in its own bosom the seeds of its approaching destruction, and that its very structure pronounces the certainty of its dissolution.

Principal
defects of
the Con-
stitution
of 1795.

How can a machine so complicated in its whole, so incoherent in all its parts, so fettered in all its movements, clogged with so many wheels, subject to a continual collision, continue its regular movements without soon breaking to pieces? Must not a building of combustible materials, erected over a volcano, and entrusted to the care of beings impregnated with sulphur, continually surrounded with flying sparks, and ready to seize the torches of discord; must not such an edifice be soon involved in flames and quickly reduced to ashes? These images will not appear exaggerated to those who will take the trouble of analyzing the constitution of 1795, and of examining the defects which adhere to its very essence.

Is it not a fundamental absurdity *to allow each citizen an equal right in the formation of the law**? As if he who possesses nothing, ought to have the same influence in the legislative power, which governs him, as he who possesses much. Is it not just, on the contrary, that the right of participation in the territorial statutes, should be in proportion to territorial interest †?

Is

* Art. 20 of the Constitution.

† The constitution, it is true, requires some property to become an elector, but by a most absurd contradiction, it does not require any to become a Legislator. It is *in proportion of the*

Is it not as palpable an absurdity, to make, not only the sovereignty, but likewise the exercise of that sovereignty, reside in four millions of individuals * who, divided into six or seven thousand primary assemblies are to decree, not only the acceptance, but also the revision of the constitutional laws. They are to appoint the justices of the peace, the municipal officers, and the twenty thousand electors †, who in their turn are to nominate the members of the legislative body, those of the supreme court of justice ‡, the judges of civil and criminal causes, the grand jury, and the administrators of departments § ; so that, these four millions of citizens, having in themselves or their deputies, the power of appointing and renewing all the public functionaries and agents, it may be properly said that they govern the state, and that there are four millions of sovereigns in full exercise. Is not this in the last degree irrational and absurd?

If we consider afterwards, how the powers are delegated, how they are combined and divided among the different depositaries; we meet with nothing but contradictions, inconsistencies and disproportion; nothing but motives for cabals and disunion;

Incom-
patibility
of its ele-
ments.

the population only that every department concurs in the nomination of the members of the legislative body. Art. 49 of the Constitution.

* The twenty-seven or twenty-eight millions of inhabitants in France are reduced to four millions of individuals having, according to law, the right of citizenship: there have been lately 6,337 primary assemblies; their formation was to be regulated at the rate of 450 citizens at least, and 900 at most. Now 632, which is nearly the medium, multiplied by 6,337 make exactly four millions. But there were in reality, either from forced or voluntary absences, but 914,853 voters.

† It is said that there shall be an elector for 200 citizens; which makes twenty thousand electors for four millions.

‡ *Tribunal de Cassation.*

§ Art. 27 and 41 of the French Constitution.

disunion; nothing but seeds of continual warfare between the different agents of governments.

The legislative body is composed of seven hundred and fifty members, two hundred and fifty of which are the ancients, and five hundred the younger. To these the *exclusive* right belongs of proposing, deliberating, and resolving *, while the ancients can only accept or reject *in toto* the laws adopted by the five hundred†. So that, for the same act, deliberation and resolution are on one side, and definitive decision on the other. Is it not as if there were two souls in the same individual, the one for thought, the other for the will? Or, if in the same tribunal some of the judges were to deliberate without determining, and the others to judge without deliberating? It can easily be conceived, that two assemblies, independent of one another, may be instituted in order to counterbalance, and at the same time enlighten each other; and that objects submitted to their consideration, and passing through this double searce, may acquire a greater perfection. But can it be conceived, how two sections of one whole should be, all at once, integral and separate parts; that they should be homogeneous in their object, and heterogeneous in their proceedings; that, being equal in right, having no diversity in titles, but one and the same destination, they should be unequal in power, dissimilar in prerogatives, and antagonists in their functions? Is it possible to conceive, when the totality of the members of the same body are to vote on the same object, how the suffrages should not be taken on the totality; and the will of the majority being fixed, how it should become depending on the will of the minority, so that half the members may annul what double the

number

* Art. 76 and 77.

† Art. 86 & 95.

number has decreed. Can it be conceived how, among colleagues, the number of five hundred should continually submit to the preponderacy of the number of two hundred and fifty? and how so unequal a division among equals can subsist without discord, without conflict, without hostility? The co-operators will not be long before they come to a rupture; co-operation therefore cannot subsist*.

It is said that *the legislative body shall not exercise, by itself or its deputies, the executive power* †; yet it is stated afterwards, that *the executive power is to be delegated to a directory composed of five members nominated by the legislative body* ‡, to whom they are to be accountable and responsible, by whom they may be impeached, expelled from office, and replaced by others §. How is it possible to reconcile this dependence with that separation of powers which is the palladium of our modern legislators? Is it not exercising a power by delegates, if you appoint those delegates, and are the arbiters of their conduct?

But what energy can an executive power possess which is subject to so much subordination, and divided into so many parts? A power entrusted to five colleagues, competitors for pre-eminence, one of whom is to be king every three months, and all of whom, after the expiration of five years, are to return to their original insignificance, when they will be exposed to the danger of being denounced by the first dissatisfied citizen, and judged by those who had been their inferiors? What proportion is there between the weakness of such a lever, and the extent of the action ^{it} is to communicate? Is it likely

* The Council of Ancients is already fallen into contempt. They are ridiculed, because they employ most of their sittings in waiting for messages from the Council of Five Hundred.

† See the French Constitution, Art. 46.

‡ Art. 132.

§ Art. 159, 160, 161 and 162.

likely that these petty kings, the real clerks of the legislative body, invested with an entire authority over the army, will not employ this authority to shelter themselves from a superiority too dangerous not to induce them to shake it off? Will they hesitate, when they see no alternative left but that of oppressing, or becoming the victims of oppression? *Too high exalted not to inspire envy, too little to inspire respect*, they will find, in the insufficient portion of authority given to them by the law, a plausible pretence for usurping that which the law has refused. Not being armed with the suspensive *veto* to delay the execution of a law which to them will appear pernicious; nor having any legitimate means for proposing any law, the utility of which their situation will give them an opportunity to appreciate; nor any security whatever against the injustice of a responsibility to which they are subject, not only among themselves, but even with respect to the administrators whom they have appointed; what good will they be able to effect; and to what perils will they not be exposed if they possess that improbable, that humble disinterestedness of confining themselves within the narrow limits prescribed to them by the constitution?

What shall we say afterwards of the six ministers, who are under the controul of the five directors, and all subordinate to the legislative body? It has been observed very pleasantly, and with much good sense, that the constitution may be compared to a CAR drawn by six horses abreast, whose reins are in the hands of five coachmen, who are themselves under the whip of seven hundred and fifty masters: the coachmen seize the reins from each other's hands; the masters chastise them and throw off sometimes the one, sometimes the other, from his seat; the horses become unruly; the Car is overturned, and is dashed into pieces. Thus are the
Directory,

Directory, the Ministers, the Legislators and the whole Government, precipitated to the ground*.

But let us suppose the government not so near the verge of destruction as it appears to be; let us admit for a moment that it may have a longer duration: still it would be contrary to all reason and to sound policy to treat with its rulers; because the French Republic, in its very essence, is an *enemy to peace*; and in its principles, an *enemy to all good Government*. This we shall endeavour to prove before we conclude our original proposition. We proceed thus methodically, that we may anticipate every possible objection, and obviate every difficulty. And if we appear sometimes to digress and to go over the same ground, which we have travelled before, we do it in order to remove every obstruction from the way; as it is impossible but that in a publication written on the spur of the moment, where every thing concurs to the same point, some of the converging rays must shoot athwart each other, and unite in the same tract.

The French Republic is, by its very constitution, an General *enemy to peace.* It is a democracy in a great em- Pacifica-
pire; and a powerful democracy has never been tion.
pacific. The annals of the world attest this, and the reason is obvious. The government of the multitude, always restless, and presumptuous, rejects conciliatory measures; impelled solely by passion, it disdains formalities, and is careless of consequences. To a Republic all means appear legal; all means possible. Incapable of repose in itself, it threatens continually the tranquillity of its neighbours. What is true of Republics in general, is still more so when applied to the democracy of an armed nation, which presents the image of a vast camp, whose warlike youth, brought up in blood, accustomed to plunder

* Idea of Monf. de Marnezia.

The present French Constitution is an obstacle to a general pacification.

plunder, and breathing nothing but battles, is unfit for any other profession but that of arms. What still more increases its antipathy to peace, is the state of convulsion, effervescence and disorder in which it moves; because it is formed on principles subversive of the fundamental law which unites all nations; because it is out of the grand association which unites all empires; because it has broken every tie of common interest, and overthrown all the fences of public security, in neither respecting the right of property, nor that of nations. Whoever does not perceive that such a government, placed in the center of Europe, must be productive of incessant wars, prove an universal calamity and the scourge of mankind, would not be more forcibly convinced by any additional arguments we might adduce to corroborate this truth.

Perhaps we shall place it nearer the reach of common apprehension in observing, that whatever owes its existence to disorder, cannot preserve it but by disorder; that whatever is supported by commotion, must be an enemy to repose; and that an enfeebled and exhausted body, which nothing invigorates but the continued succession of burning fever, will receive no effectual remedy from the application of lenitives, till a radical cure can be effected. Let what we said respecting the necessity to which the Revolutionists were reduced, of having recourse to war, and of declaring it against all the Powers, be called back to our recollection. The same reasons still subsist; these reasons will compel them to continue the war, and to renew it after every momentary suspension of hostilities. War will be indispensable to France, as long as France remains without a permanent government, without a system of finance analogous to the public interest, without a chief magistrate materially concerned in the maintenance of order and tranquillity. It is written in
the

the sacred oracles, that *Righteousness and Peace have kissed each other*; the opposites of righteousness and peace are likewise inseparable. Revolution and war are both very intimate; they are two allies, whom it is very difficult to separate. Who does not know that a foreign war is a certain resource against civil commotions? To conclude, as many do, that a peace with France would be the surest means to subdue it, as she would thus be left to her own rage, and her intestine dissensions; is an implied confession, that peace cannot be obtained at present; since it is evident, that the same considerations must induce the present rulers of France to reject it; and it is not to be supposed, that they will prefer a situation which, to them particularly, will be worse than war itself.

The actual constitution of France is the avowed The French constitution is the enemy of all other constitutions. We shall not repeat what we have already observed on the irreconcilable hatred which Republics entertain against Royalty. But we think ourselves in duty bound to call the attention of Sovereigns to one point, which has not been sufficiently noticed: I mean, this declaration of the RIGHTS OF MAN, which is still the preamble and primordial basis of the constitution of 1795, as it was of that sanctioned in 1791. — Having the government of one nation only to organize, why this repeated affectation of addressing themselves to all the nations of the world? Why this studied display of general principles exhibited as being essential to all civil associations, and the pledges of public liberty? If its compilers had had in view the constitution of France only, was it necessary for them, in giving it a practical code, to begin by a vague and indeterminate theory? If their intentions had not extended much farther, would they have placed at the head of their laws, which ought to be within the reach of the most common understanding, a series

series of metaphysical axioms, of undefined truths and abstract principles, more calculated to perplex the minds of men than to regulate their conduct?

The design is manifest. They have prefixed their political catechism at the head of their laws, because they were well convinced that their revolution could take no consistency at home, unless its principles were propagated abroad; and that unless they could disseminate their pernicious doctrines among their neighbours, the French nation would soon detect their perfidious intentions and elude their grasp. Woe to governments, woe to humanity in general, if this truth is not viewed in its true colours, or if it is viewed with indifference!—If that is considered in the light of ridicule, which, though ridiculous in reality, is indeed infinitely dangerous, and may become dreadful in its consequences.

It is represented as a fortunate circumstance that the present rulers of France, the real perturbators of public tranquillity, seem to have relinquished the policy of exporting their incendiary doctrines, and of sending forth every where apostles of sedition and disseminators of anarchy: yet the assassins of their King dare to profess, in a solemn publication transmitted to the four parts of the world, and calling on the Supreme Being to witness their nefarious proceeding, the same dogmas which have led them to perpetrate crimes of the blackest die. They not only profess them in the face of the universe, but teach them to all other nations. It is not the Rights of Frenchmen only they proclaim; it is the rights of men in general; those of the English and Spaniards; the Austrians and Russians; the Piedmontese and Prussians. It was not enough to have once poisoned the world with their pestilential dogmas; they must again publish their horrible maxims; and the flimsy alterations they have made in that constitution, are nothing but a thin hypocritical disguise.

Among

Among those rights of men, which, in their opinion, are such that every individual who does not enjoy them, and does not exert his utmost endeavours to recover them, is a disgrace to his species, EQUALITY holds the first rank. This Equality, which they well know to be nothing but a chimera, is nevertheless the favorite imposture they employ to seduce the people. They well know, that its name alone has a magical effect on the multitude. It is for this reason, that their metaphysical thinkers, an Abbé Syeyes for instance, (an arrogant visionary, who, in an account of his life written by himself, has at once unmasked his pride and his designs) took great care to inscribe this precious watch-word on the prolegomena of the new constitution. Forced by a general outcry to disguise the real meaning of it in order to render it less offensive, they have represented it by a definition under the head of distributive justice; declaring, that *equality consists in the law being the same for all, either when it protects or when it punishes**. If this were the only signification of the word Equality, it would be an undeniable truth, belonging to all countries and all ages, and deserving our veneration. But if this were its only meaning, would the great authors of the revolution have made it *their rallying point, the distinguishing mark of true patriots?* Would they have called it *the Standard of the Revolution?* Would they have enjoined their disciples *to adhere firmly to it, as to the grand characteristick mark, and the most infallible distinction preferable to liberty itself†?*

But their insidious definition of Equality was only used as its passport in the new constitution; and after

* Art. 3. of the Rights of Men.

† Quotations from the Abbé Syeyes. See the notice of his life, in which he has unmasked his presumptuous arrogance, and his pernicious designs.

after having introduced it under this seducing disguise, they have at length discovered its whole virulence and malignity in the following article, which states that EQUALITY DOES NOT ADMIT OF ANY DISTINCTION OF BIRTH OR HEREDITARY POWER*.

Thus the constitution of 1795, the moderation of which is so much extolled, declares to all nations, that wherever there is a nobility, the rights of men are violated; that wherever there are honorary and transmissible titles, it is an outrage to reason and to the rights of men; that wherever there is an hereditary throne, whatever be the basis on which it is consolidated, even if it has received the reverence of a long series of ages, it is an insufferable usurpation, a direct violation of the rights of men. Now, *these rights are imprescriptible and inalienable; no authority can enfeeble, no covenant can abrogate them; and to recover them by every means capable of rescuing the weak from the yoke of the powerful, is the most sacred, the most urgent of duties*†. Therefore, in every country of the world, the nobles must be proscribed, hereditary Kings dethroned, and every species of prerogative abolished.

The lesson is clear; the example at hand; the success encouraging. Nothing more is wanting but the sanction of Sovereigns; and will it not be authentically given, if they all acknowledge the Government which instils such principles? Great God! is it possible that such a treaty, such a recognition should take place?

Were we to continue the analysis of this solemn exposition of the Rights of Men, we should find many other motives for similar exclamations; particularly, were we to discuss the intentions and consequences of this tocsin of alarm, which, under the pretext

* Art. 4. of the Rights of Men.

† This is the common language of the Abbé Seyeyes, and of all the other revolutionary chiefs.

pretext of recalling mankind to the dignity of their origin, is continually ringing the dreadful peal of insurrection, and of the subversion of social order*. But it is useless to say more on the subject. If this principal trait, which we have just given, does not strike the eye, the cataract is formed; and, whatever we might add, could not remove it. But what unavailing sorrows must follow such an infatuation. The voice of wisdom has been for a long time crying—but alas! it has been in a desert; that, *if the Belligerent Powers separate from their interest the re-establishment of civil order, not one of them can escape the fate of France.—That the French revolution, once confirmed and triumphant, will become a general revolution.—That it will travel through the whole world*†. If these are but empty sounds that strike the air to no purpose, and can never be heard, we can only lament the unhappy destiny of Europe.

Let us, however, answer some of the most plausible objections. What! it will be said, because France is badly governed, and infected with pernicious principles, does it follow that an eternal war should be carried on?—Can war be waged against opinions?—Cannot a treaty be made with a Government without adopting its maxims, its systems, its pretensions?—Does the safety of England require that

* It is not without a motive that the 6th Art. of the Constitution defines the law in general, in a manner which is neither applicable to that eternal and immutable law, that *dielamen conscientiae*, which God himself has engraven on our hearts, and which Cicero calls the true law, *Vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens*.—*Cujus imperator omnium Deus inventor, disceptator, lator est*; nor to the laws common to all nations, and which constitute the rights of nations. The affected omission of those primordial laws, which all ancient and modern Legislators have taken care to introduce, is the consequence of a system which disregards all religion, all maxims of society, and all eternal truths.

† Mr. Mallet du Pan.

that the enemy should have a good constitution? Has she the right to force one upon her? Is it her interest? Is it in her power?

A distinct answer shall be given to every one of these questions.

An Answer to the principal objections of those who maintain that it is possible to treat with the present Government in France.

*Because France is badly governed, does it follow that an endless war should be carried on?—*By no means. But the present Government being of a nature not to have a durable existence, as we have already demonstrated, it follows, that no peace whatever with such a Government could be permanent. As long as it remains what it is at present, the French Government, both from inclination and necessity, will have recourse to war; it follows then, that if a peace was concluded, England would be exposed to a sudden return of hostilities; the more dangerous for her welfare, as by disarming she would be unprepared to repel the first aggressions. Because this same Government is founded on an anti-social system, it follows that, in order to be in harmony with it, the social interest itself must be abandoned, and the danger incurred of being, soon or late, buried under the ruins of the great civil edifice: from these united and incontrovertible truths it follows, that in order to terminate the war effectually, to terminate it without being exposed to a greater danger than if it were continued, to terminate it without opening a door to the contagion, it will be necessary on one side, to prosecute it with increased vigour; on the other, to pursue every measure that may tend to the establishment of another Government in France. Every other plan will only protract the war to an infinite duration, and prevent the conclusion of a solid, speedy, and honorable peace.

Can war be carried on against opinions? No: but can any compromise be made with the plague? We are far from thinking it possible to extirpate, by force

force of arms alone, the pestilential opinions of the revolutionists: we have maintained the contrary on every occasion; but we remain in the firm conviction, that it is necessary to dry up their source, if you wish to prevent their ravages. War alone cannot do it; but thus far war is necessary; because peace would be injurious to this great purpose, as it would consolidate what must be wholly extirpated.

*Cannot a treaty be made with a Government without adopting its maxims, its systems, its pretensions?—*This must depend upon circumstances: if its maxims are separable from its very existence; if its systems are concentrated within its own limits; if its pretensions are foreign to the subject of the war; it is certainly possible to treat without adopting either: but, in the present case, *its maxims* are so intimately connected with the very essence of the Government, that by acknowledging the latter, in negotiating with it, you implicitly acknowledge the former: *its systems* have been proclaimed by the constitution with so marked an intention of propagating them, that if you ratify the political existence of the French constitution, you necessarily abjure your own: *its pretensions* are inimical to public tranquillity; they must be considered as the real motive of the war; so that those Powers which thought it incumbent upon themselves to oppose them with all their force, cannot now desist, without appearing to subscribe to them.

Nothing can be more energetic on this subject than those masterly speeches, which carry such preponderance in the Parliament of Great Britain; there it has been maintained *that the existence of every nation in Europe, the internal tranquillity of every State, and the fundamental principles of all Government required that the present war should be carried on and supported with firmness:——that Europe, if it should*

be saved, will be indebted for its deliverance from the greatest evils that ever threatened mankind, to the incredible exertions of this Nation—and that England will reap the glory of being the Saviour of Europe, and of having stood forth the protectress of every thing sacred and valuable to mankind. This is expressing, in the most forcible language, both the principle and the proposed end of the war: but if this animating declaration is to be followed by contracting relations of peace and union with the enemies of the internal tranquillity of every state, with the authors of the greatest evils that ever threatened the universe, with the bold invaders of every thing sacred and valuable; will it not appear a tame retraction of the wise and generous resolution to repress their wicked attempts? will it not shew an insensibility to the calamities that threaten Europe, and a renunciation of the glory of being its deliverers?

Such a disposition can never exist in reality; but even the appearance of it would, in the eyes of the multitude, have the same effect, and draw the same fatal consequences after it. What barrier could be opposed to the torrent of opinions, which, though held in utter abhorrence, were thus virtually sanctioned? What check could then restrain the multitude, if violating every kind of property, rising against the nobility, subverting every prerogative, and applying the axe to all hereditary thrones, they were to alledge, in their justification, *what we do is inscribed as an inherent right, as the sacred duty of men, in that constitution which you have just acknowledged; it is a doctrine proclaimed by the Government with which you have treated; it is practised by that nation with which you have formed an alliance; it is the example which you have confirmed.* Then the most dreadful disorders will carry the appearance of legality; crime will be sanctioned; crime will be converted

converted into right, and the *jusque datum sceleri* will be posted up on the walls of the city, and on the trees of the country.

Does the safety of England require that her enemy should have a good constitution?——Yes, certainly, if England wishes that her enemy should cease to become an enemy, and if by a *good constitution* such a one is understood as does not tend to corrupt every people, and agitate every empire.

Has England the right to give a constitution to France?——This would be saying too much: it would perhaps not be accepted. But to suggest one that may subsist; indirectly to assist the nation in chusing it, and to give to those who are panting for it, that kind of support of which they stand in need; this ought to be the great expedient to be resorted to. It is in this sense alone that the foreign Powers can, and should influence the interior government of France.

Is it the interest of England? Most indubitably her greatest interest. Not precisely that France should have such or such a Government, but that the Government she establishes should be rational and susceptible of duration; a Government with which Europe might preserve its tranquillity. If by a fatality which all good Frenchmen must bewail, since it has confirmed the triumph of the wicked, the Counsellors of Lewis the XVIIIth have persuaded that Prince to make the return of order in France inseparable from the return of what is strictly called the ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, without any change*, which, according to the idea which

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the

* Those among the Royalists who are too great enthusiasts in their desires to be able to judge of possibilities, and too passionate to like conciliatory means, will not forgive me for not having the same veneration for what they call the *ancient Constitution*; and they will accuse me of being in contradiction with
the

the factious caused to prevail, implies nothing but the return of ancient abuses; we do not pretend that the English should be bound to wage an eternal war in order to overcome a repugnancy, which ought to have been skilfully eluded, rather than openly opposed: but we are firmly of opinion, that they must endeavour, at the risk of exposing their own happiness, to promote the speedy overthrow of the present, and the establishment of another government in France, and to make this their first, their only aim, their grand and principal interest.

But does England possess the means to do it? Yes, as soon as this is become her primary, her decided object. It has been said by an antient writer, that *Nothing is impossible to the man that wills, and greatly wills* *. If this aphorism will sometimes admit of a doubt when applied to individuals, it certainly is indubitable, applied to great Powers. To them, whatever is necessary, becomes possible: I think that I have sufficiently demonstrated an existing necessity; I am therefore authorised to suppose a possibility.

We shall endeavour to hazard a few ideas on those means most proper to be employed, with that reserve, which our prudence prescribes; and that diffidence,

the royal proclamation: but certainly the King, who has read much, who has a prodigious memory, and who is perfectly well acquainted with the history of France, did not mean that the kingdom ever had a Constitution, properly so called; that is to say, a fixed constitution, authentically defined and solemnly acknowledged. For my part I confess that, after forty years study and researches, I have not been able to discover, in what it consists, where it was fixed, and in what charter it resides.

The Constitution, answered a President to Henry the IVth, *is written on the back of the Salic Law, which has placed you on the throne.* A very happy answer to an embarrassing question: but the fact is, that nothing is to be found, either in the Salic Law, or on its back, that may be called a Constitution. See the *Appendix, No. 1.*

* Nil non ille potest, qui quod volt, magnè volt. *Ennius.*

diffidence, which we have not only of our own strength, but of our information concerning the local dispositions of the people. Who could, in the exploration of such a chaos, venture to be affirmative?

Four essential causes agitate, at present, the public mind in France; which, if an uniform tendency is given them, will infallibly influence and determine every individual.

Sentiments which at present have most influence on the French.

These four grand causes are:

1. The general discontent that prevails on the present order of things, and the necessity, universally acknowledged, of a change.

2. The uneasiness which is universally felt, about the unsafe state of private property, and the desire of seeing it secured.

3. The impression of evils resulting from the annihilation of the public finances, and the perplexity in which every one is about the means of re-establishing them.

4. The religious sentiments, which in spite of every daring attempt to stifle them, still subsist in the hearts of the people, who are panting for an established mode of worship, for spiritual succours, and for a rule of conduct founded on divine precepts.

The first relates to political order; and its mainspring is the interest every nation has to be well governed.

Relating to political order.

The second relates to civil order; and its mainspring is the interest every individual has tranquilly to enjoy what he possesses.

To civil order.

The third relates to economical order; and its mainspring is the common interest which the monied people, the farmers, merchants and artists have in the revival of all the branches that are productive of the riches of the state.

To economical order.

The

To moral order. The fourth relates to moral order ; and its main-spring is that interest, which is implanted in every man, of seeking for the inward peace of his mind.

Thus, in the aggregate, they comprize influence, and must decide every thing. They are the levers, by the help of which, provided a proper bias is given them, the whole mass may be easily moved in whatever way it is required.

Let us consider them one after another, and see how each of them might be effectually employed for the proposed object.

Political order. General discontent. I. GENERAL DISCONTENT. This first great mover is unquestionable ; it is extreme ; it is universally acknowledged ; but each party sees it in that view, which best accords with its own bias ; and draws from it those inferences which flatter its opinions and inclinations.

Different inferences drawn from it. Those who call themselves *pure Royalists*, behold in it the BOURBON PRINCES, immediately recalled to the throne of their ancestors, and the ancient government restored without any alteration.

The Constitutionalists of 1791, if there are any, behold in it the revival of their amphibious government, and the re-establishment of their dear abortive constitution.

The Monarchists, (I call such the more judicious constitutionalists, who have acknowledged the defects of the first constitution, and are not less the enemies of the Democratical Government, than the purest Royalists) behold in it the general will fixing in favour of a monarchy, limited by permanent laws.

The Belligerent Powers, behold in it the termination of the war, the abandonment of all the conquests, the correction of seditious principles, and the return of public tranquillity.

The Revolutionists, on the contrary, behold in it nothing but a necessary and momentary evil, which will

will not prevent the triumph of their Republican chimera, and the propagation of their systems of equality.

The reality, however, is very distant from all this: ^{The past} it is merely the painful anxiety of a patient, who, ^{and the} suffering much in one position, wishes to change it ^{present} for another which may bring some alleviation to his ^{are held} sufferings. If there is any thing fixed in the midst ^{in equal} of this agitation, it is an equal horror for anarchy, joined with an earnest desire of being delivered from it, and for despotism joined with the secret dread of relapsing into it. This is what the coalesced Powers ought to see in it, if they are in possession of good intelligence; and the natural conclusion to be drawn from it is, that if a plan of Government were presented to the French nation, which appeared to remedy the present disorders, without bringing back the pre-existing abuses, it is more than probable that every hand and heart would rally around it; particularly, if there was a probability, and they had certain assurances of foreign support.

The most favorable moment for fixing this rally-^{Opportu-}ing point, and entirely changing the aspect of affairs, ^{nity lost.} has been suffered to escape. What an opportunity offered itself, when the nation, wearied out by the abominable tyranny of that revolutionary Government, which the monsters themselves, who exercised it, called the *sleep of the law*; but which might have been more properly called a ferocious anarchy, forced the Convention to present it with a plan of a constitution; when this plan was submitted to the deliberation of six thousand primary assemblies, and France had to decide on the choice of its own government; when at the same moment the sections of Paris fired with indignation at the daring infringement of the freedom of election, committed by those who maintained themselves in the legislature by open force, took up arms to repel oppression, and were ready to deliver

deliver themselves up to those who should rescue them from it.

Nothing was easier at that time, than to turn to the advantage of royalty, that general disgust which the Republican system, and the unmasked despotism of its authors had inspired. A schism was effected, and the resolution taken to drive away the tyrannical demagogues. War was declared against the regicides; the means were simple and at hand; the agents numerous; and whatever was requisite to put them in sufficient force would have been attended with but little expence. In short, to convert this prevailing disaffection to the present rulers into a general concurrence, in promoting the desired end, nothing was necessary but to measure out the ground, to hold out a perspective not wholly discouraging, and to offer the basis of a mild government, which did not clash with prejudices too deeply rooted; which did not destroy hopes too fondly fostered, and which did not excite fears that might alarm and necessarily dissuade; of a government which allowed the just expectation of a rational liberty, secured by fixt and determinate laws. This is all that it was necessary to announce.

Not only this has not been done, but it seems as if great pains had been taken to adopt a contrary plan: not only the succours required have not been granted, but every measure, so carefully concerted and prepared, has even been counteracted: not only no endeavours have been used to shew the people that, provided they rejected the constitution which was forced upon their acceptance, they might receive another, more suitable to their wants, more appropriate to their customs, more congenial to their natural disposition; but it has even been solemnly notified to them, that in case they returned to Monarchy, they would find the same form of government against which they had revolted, that it should

should undergo no change or modification, and that, as a reward for renouncing the right of making their own laws, they must submit to the entire re-establishment of those of which they had shaken off the yoke with so much violence. Was not this equivalent to an actual prohibition of choice? Is it then a matter of astonishment, that the French, left to the only alternative of chusing, either what they detested, or what was to them an uncertainty, preferred to abandon themselves blindly to the new constitution, which they might, at least, consider as their own will, rather than to return tamely under the empire of the ancient government, which, for these five last years, they have been led to consider as the most odious captivity?

Every thing that has taken place on this occasion, is very singular: for, whilst on the one side, every avenue which might have brought back the people to a throne, was thus carefully shut up; whilst, having Monarchy to re-establish, the only materials at hand were contemptuously rejected; whilst, sacrificing most probably the rectitude of his own judgment to perfidious counsels, the legitimate Sovereign suffered his project to miscarry by the most fatal inconsistencies: on the other side, the Powers, for whom it was not less important to take advantage of the circumstances that presented themselves, have paid no attention to them. They have done, they have attempted nothing which might have been instrumental in effecting some of their most essential objects. Did they receive, or did they refuse information on the actual situation of affairs? Did they listen to nobody, or did they disregard whatever was communicated to them?

It is certain, that no effort has been countenanced, no movement supported, and that at a moment when the least impulse might have brought over the wavering nation; when the smallest taper might have
guided

guided their wandering steps ; when the least force might have given an useful direction to their despair ; they were entirely abandoned to themselves, to their blind deviations, and to those incessant terrors, with which CRIME, continually on the watch, took care to encompass them. What has been the result ? That the last insurrection in Paris has experienced the same fate as that of Lyons in 1793, and as many others ; that much blood has been spilt to no purpose ; that intrigue, always active and alive, has again triumphed over the public interest, always neglected ; and that the well-intentioned have been, in this case as well as in many others, either slaughtered or discouraged.

Another
opportunity to be
anticipated.

Will another conjecture offer itself, as propitious as that which has been so wantonly suffered to escape ? Nothing is more doubtful as to the individual interests of the unfortunate Princes, for whom every favorable chance seems to have successively disappeared. On reading the history of the most remarkable events, it may be observed, that in their contexture, there are certain essential joints, the want of which nothing can supply ; that there are some fugitive opportunities, which, if they are not immediately and skilfully embraced, never return again ; and that there are faults which cannot be repaired, because they leave after them impressions which cannot be erased. But as we are only treating of the general question, and of the general interest of the Courts of Europe, we may, in this respect, and as much as concerns them, more boldly affirm, that an opportunity may be still anticipated and foreseen, which, if properly seized and managed, may enable them to take advantage of the dispositions of the French nation, taken in their true sense ; and that is the moment of the downfall of the fantastical government, of which they are now making the experiment ; a government, which
they

they already begin to ridicule, and which will soon experience a total dissolution.

Were we sure of incurring the stigma of presumption, which seems to be attached to those who have a decided opinion on the future fate of this constitution; and though we have attentively perused whatever has been advanced in favor of the present, compared with its ephemeral predecessors; we shall still persist in maintaining, that it cannot be more durable than the others, and that its dissolution cannot be far distant. We maintain it, from the consideration of those essential defects in its structure, that intrinsic antipathy which subsists between its elements, and the jarring and ridiculous division of its powers: we maintain it, because the most impartial analysis of the constitution on which its organization is grounded, is radically impracticable: we maintain it, because, instead of perceiving any of the advantages which constitute the excellence of a mixt government, we see in the pretended mixture of this, nothing but a confused composition of democracy, aristocracy, and oligarchy, in such disproportioned doses, and with so many inflammatory ingredients, that nothing can result from it but a continual fermentation, and sooner or later a destructive explosion.

On reiterating this assertion, I am not afraid of being confuted upon its principles, or belied by the event. I am much more solicitous to know, whether at that eventful epoch, when this new crisis, this new political and soon expected metamorphosis will take place, this second and last opportunity will not, like the preceding others, be suffered to escape. If it is not to be equally fruitless and unavailing, if it is to be rendered truly salutary, it cannot be done by carelessness and inaction, or by the supposition, that there should be no interference in that which alone can save Europe. It is, on the contrary, by the means which the wise Cato pronounced to be infallible:

Vigilando,

How
some ad-
vantage
may be
derived
from the
general
discon-
tent.

*Vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo, prospere omnia cedunt.** On applying this maxim to the present case: *Vigilando*, is not to disdain the advice of those who have good local knowledge and information: *agendo*, is to suggest, to facilitate, secretly and mediately to operate that which cannot be attempted in a direct and immediate manner. *Bene consulendo*, is to have a determined point in view, to which every other object must invariably concur. We shall, hereafter, explain what we understand by this point in view.

2. Civil
order.
Uneasiness on
account
of private
property.

2. UNEASINESS ON ACCOUNT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.—This uneasiness, resulting from revolutionary extortions, will not cease to exist, till the establishment of a legitimate government, the only admissible guarantee of possessive right, will have preserved each individual against their return. Can France forget, that the first principle, and the first effects of the revolution have been to respect no kind of property? Has it not seen the possessions of the clergy and nobility, of the emigrants, and of the factious themselves, those of the Princes of the blood, and of the great in general through the whole kingdom, the possessions even of the husbandman, and of the owner of the smallest capital, violated, invaded, and trampled under foot? Who then will think his possessions secure as long as the principles of the same plundering system still subsist? Who will not see himself exposed to the same dreadful effects as long as he sees himself subjected to the same causes?

Can so well-grounded an uneasiness be dissipated merely because it is written in one of the pages of the new constitution, that *It guarantees the inviolability of all kind of property*, whilst its very existence protests against this pretended guarantee, whilst every thing announces, that this declaration is as nugatory and

* Sallust adds: *Ubi foecordiae te atque ignaviae tradideris, nequicquam Deos implores, irati atque infesti sunt,*

and illusive as that which professed to insure the freedom of elections; a pretended inherent right, which was most impudently violated at the very moment it was solemnly proclaimed? Have not the late requisitions in kind already signalized the first steps of the new Governors in France? Is not this a solemn warning to the nation, that she must continue to experience, that she must still suffer oppression, as long as the fatal power, and the stern necessity of employing revolutionary measures hang suspended over her head?

Who does not know, who has not read and seen that the invasion of property has always formed the principal feature of oppression: that it has always been the first resource, the favourite weapon, the common support of the usurpers, the tyrants, the factious, and the enemies of the country? Scarce had the famous Triumvirate been formed, which crowned its bloody career by the final slavery of Rome; scarce had they opened their first conferences, than they came to the resolution to proscribe and immolate the most opulent part of the citizens, that they might, with greater facility, seize on those riches of which they stood in need. There they coolly drew up the list of that horrible proscription, which included three hundred senators, and more than two thousand citizens; there each tyrant sacrificed his benefactors, his friends, his nearest relations; there Robespierre the first, under the name of Octavius, delivered the head of Cicero, of that great man, who had supported him with all his influence in the senate, and with all the force of his eloquence against Antony himself, who was then become all-powerful.* Will not this example, imitated

* The ungrateful, the perfidious, the cowardly Octavius, whom the success of his ambition has decorated with the title of Augustus, thus repaid the important services of the Latin Orator,

tated and even surpassed by the monster Robespierre, be renewed by his regicide accomplices, who still retain the sovereign power in France, since they form the great majority of the legislative body, and the four-fifths of the supreme directory? If their interest demands it, it may be expected; if they possess the power, it cannot be doubted.

The most enlightened part of the nation already perceive this, and shudder at it. Those only who are the dupes of words and appearances, can now believe, that they have a government, but will not believe so long. The eruption of the flame, which at present slumbers under the ashes, will soon undeceive them. The uneasiness which is felt on account of property, already disturbs those who are interested in its preservation. This uneasiness is spreading fast through the whole kingdom, and confirms the general disposition of embracing the first plan of government, which is likely to ensure private property, with the same ardor with which a drowning man would grasp at the first floating body he perceived on the surface of the water.

Right of
property.
Its im-
portance.

OH PROPERTY! Thou sacred right, generating principle of civil society, and necessary attribute of social order! Neither nations, nor their governors, feel with that full force which the consideration of their own safety would suggest, the importance of re-establishing THY power, on a firm and indissoluble basis. They do not feel how essential it is for the *common interest of the great Republic of Nations*,* to unite all their forces to avenge the systematical outrages which THOU hast suffered! They shut their eyes

Orator, and of his immortal Philippics. Men have always been, and always will be, the same, either dupes or egotists.

* This expression, as well as the maxim, that *the general protection of property is the duty of all Nations*, is extracted from a work intitled, *Correspondence d'un Voyageur avec un Ministre de Turin*. 1792.

eyes to this important truth, that it is not sufficient for their own repose to revere *THEE* themselves, if they suffer *THY* laws to be violated in the face of the universe, if they do not redress the injury, destroy every vestige of it, and prevent its alarming consequences. They themselves, must perish, if they suffer *THEE* to perish, and if they expect to obtain their end by terminating the war with France, without terminating that still more dreadful war, which those who possess *nothing* have declared against those who have *something*; and if they fondly flatter themselves, that a solid peace can be made with a government, whose principles are in continual warfare with the principles of every civilized state.

It is, indeed, strange; it is painful to consider, that of all the ancient and modern philosophers who have reasoned on the basis of social order; who have given their fanciful dogmas on the principles of *natural right, of the right of nations, of the civil* Right of property, *right*; or who have endeavoured to penetrate the spirit of the political laws, no one should have attempted to shew, in its true light, the great pre-eminence of the right of property as the primary cause, the essential object of all human associations: that no one should have proved that this right, which is nothing more than the right of having something of one's own, of enjoying it, and disposing of it, is the central point of all other rights, since it comprehends all kinds of lawful possessions, for the preservation of which there are laws, judges, and a public force: that no one, in short, should have drawn this important conclusion, that the care of rendering this preservation inviolable belongs to all nations, and is the interest and duty of all governments.

Our modern Solons, far from explaining these eternal truths, have substituted in their place equivocal theories and sophistical systems, the dangerous

ous consequences of which have distracted and agitated the public mind. That celebrated Genevese, to whom nature had imparted more genius than judgment; who, from too great an affectation of singularity, has often fallen into extravagancies; who would have done much better to continue the interesting romance writer, than to become a metaphysical legislator, has confounded every idea in his *social contract*; where, having erroneously established as a principle, that *the greatest happiness of all, and the end of all legislation consists in LIBERTY and EQUALITY*, he has occasioned these two words, badly defined by himself, and still worse interpreted by his disciples, to become the rallying point of all intriguers and agitators, and has been, without foreseeing it, the Coripheus of this most terrible revolution. These puerilities of a presumptuous ignorance, have served as a model to the framers of the rights of men; to those pernicious innovators, who have dethroned the right of property, and substituted in its room the chimera of equality. More sensible and wise, the English have united property to liberty. LIBERTY and PROPERTY are their watch-words: the French constitution, on the contrary, has made it secondary to equality. This is a manifest contradiction; for equality in its absolute sense, the sense in which it is used to fascinate the multitude, destroys all property; and in its limited sense, in which it is merely confined to the equal distribution of justice, it is subordinate to property, for the maintenance of which justice has been established.

Oh that we possessed that persuasive force and energy of reasoning, that we might dispel the clouds that have been formed by an abuse of words, and instil in the public mind more genuine and more reasonable notions than those that are generally entertained

tertained on these pretended *rights of man*, which, The
 having no existence in the pure state of nature, Rights
 are, if considered as being derived from social of Man
 order, nothing but civil and conventional rights! are only
 It is in vain, merely for the sake of extolling conventional
 their dignity, to qualify them with the accumu- rights.
 lated pompous titles of eternal, inalienable, im-
 prescriptible rights, anterior to all laws, and in-
 dependent of all covenants. The truth is, that be-
 fore the establishment of civil society, at that
 ideal epoch *, when insulated man was a lone wan-
 derer, without legislation, having no enjoyment
 derived from property, having no other solicitude
 than for his self-preservation, no other possessions
 than those he could obtain by force, address, or
 priority of occupation, it could not be said then
 that he was exercising any right or privilege. That
 of defending his life, his liberty, his food, as much
 as he had it in his power, was less a right than an
 instinct, common with all other animals. The
 rights of man did not exist then more than those of
 the bear, those of the wolf, or those of the frog.
 Man was distinguished from the animals of the
 brute creation by his intellectual faculties only, the
 exercise of which is no more a right than the ex-
 ercise of his physical faculties, such as eating and
 drinking, sleeping, breathing, and moving his limbs.
 These are wants rather than rights. These wants,
 the inequality of the means by which they may be
 satisfied, and the provident care employed in pro-
 curing subsistence; the desire of possessing a certain
 quantity of provisions, and of productive territory,
 K and

* Without faith, and the book of Genesis, one might be led
 to believe, that men had at all times lived in society as well as
 the bees, ants, and castors. It would be natural to suppose,
 that the most intelligent of the animal creation must have felt
 sooner than others, the necessity of associations, which might
 preserve them from violence.

and the fears of seeing them seized upon by superior force, have given birth to society. The weakest have united in order to compensate, by number, the superiority of individual strength, and to be able to preserve their persons from violence, and their property from invasion.

Every one was desirous of enjoying, with security, his natural or adventitious prerogatives: to fix the limits of the latter, and the use of the former, laws were requisite, and the general will has made them; to decide between opposite pretensions, judges were requisite, and the choice of the plurality has appointed them: to have the laws executed and the force of passions restrained, a power was requisite, and the re-union of individual strength has formed it: to administer this power, a superior authority was requisite, and the aggregate Whole entrusted it to *one* or *several*, under the reciprocal condition of protection on the one side, and submission on the other.

The
Rights
of Man
proceed,
all, from
that of
property,
the only
positive
right.

This is the manner in which we may conceive social order was first established; and here begin the rights of man. These rights lead to the enjoyment of what belongs to each individual; and this is *property*. Life is a *property*, honour is a *property*, the products of industry are a *property*, lawful acquisitions become a *property*; the preservation of these advantages is the right of property taken in its most extensive *sense*, it is the *jus suum cuique*; and in this point of view, which those who are fond of recurring to the source of every institution ought to have well considered, are found the only positive rights of man.

Liberty is but a negative right, since it is the absence of restraint in the exercise of the faculties of mind or body; I do not see why it should be called the *rights of man*, more than *respiration* in the physical, and *will* in the moral order. The one and the
other

other are free if nothing restrains them : if respiration is obstructed, recourse is had to a physician ; if the will meets with unjust impediments, recourse is had to the law. This may be called the *rights of man* ; it is at best but an incorrect way of speaking ; but it is madness to take advantage of it in order to shake and confound all civil rights.

As much might be said of *equality*, which, according to its new definition, is nothing but the absence of unjust preferences ; and of *security* which is the absence of danger. All these negative privileges are benefits resulting from social order, which originates itself in the right of property, the only positive right.

Therefore, whenever, in the name of either of these rights of man, the right of property is attacked, and together with it civil and social order, of which it is the principal basis, the rights of man themselves rebel against their very origin, against their first prop and best support.

By this explanation, which perhaps will be found too diffuse and prolix, but which I have unguardedly fallen into from the extreme impatience I feel, in beholding that fatal delirium and enthusiasm, which these false and chimerical notions have produced, I hope to have sufficiently proved that the right of property is the principle of all societies, and that they must all perish if they do not exert their united efforts to protect it wherever it is publicly violated.

The application is self-apparent and direct, not only with respect to the general cause of the French nation, whose uneasiness on the score of property it is necessary to quiet, but likewise with respect to the individual cause of one hundred thousand emigrants, whom Europe beholds shamefully stripped of all their possessions by revolutionary decrees. We do not consider, at this moment, how sensibly in-

It is the interest of all nations to oppose the public violation of the right of property.

The application with respect to the Emigrants.

interested all sovereigns must be, not to suffer those men who have shewn themselves faithful to legitimate authority, to be the eternal victims of sedition. Neither do we wish to dwell on the interest the French Government itself, however constituted, must feel to put a stop to this horrible injustice, which will eternally protest against its existence, and to open a gate to their return into the kingdom, which would derive the most important advantages from that happy event: but, supporting a more general position, we maintain, that the interest of all men of property in the world, the common and reciprocal rights of all nations demand an universal resistance, to prevent so daring a violation of the right of property from passing into a law in any constitution whatever *; to prevent any nation from establishing its power on arbitrary confiscations; and any one of the co-states of the European Republic from mortgaging its finances on theft and plunder §.

It would be objected in vain, that it is the right of every sovereignty to be directed solely by its own absolute will in the administration of its government, and in the exercise of its own power, and that no other has a right to interfere, or to obstruct its operations. For government exceeds the limits of its power, when it extends to those who, at the epoch of a change in the constitution, have preferred emigration to an acquiescence in that change †. 2dly. The principle of this objection is true in as much

* See Art. 373 of the Constitution of 1795.

§ Correspondance d'un Voyageur avec un Ministre à Turin en 1792.

† Grotius and Rousseau acknowledge that every one may quit the State of which he is Member, and by leaving the country, resume his liberty and property. The American constitution, which the French have pretended to imitate, contains an express clause to this purpose.

much only as the general right of all is not violated by the proceeding of one nation. For the general maxim of doing no injury to others is as obligatory from nation to nation, as it is from individual to individual: and unjust attacks on private property, sanctioned as a law in the constitutional code of a great empire, is a mortal blow to the law of nations, an infringement *on the constitution of the whole world*. In such a case, says the judicious traveller, whose correspondence we have already quoted, *the egotism of nations is a crime, which rapidly draws after it its own punishment*.

3. GENERAL PERPLEXITY ABOUT THE PUBLIC FINANCES. If there be a necessary affinity and connection between public prosperity and private fortunes, where is the man in France, who will not feel some alarm for his property, when he considers the dreadful state of the finances of his country, the entire destruction of public revenues, the unparalleled enormity of its expences, the continually increasing confusion of its administration, and the total exhaustion of its public wealth? No commerce, no industry, no exportation, no credit, no circulation of specie; and so enormous a mass of paper-money, so much discredited, and so fatal in its influence on the price of provisions, that there are few who do not foresee its approaching annihilation. In the midst of such misery, every one asks himself, what must be his fate? On what he can rely, and what he has to expect in such a situation? There is not one man of property in France who does not find himself in this dreadful perplexity.

3. Economical order. Perplexity about the public finances.

The actual ruined state of the French finances.

In the midst of this general confusion of ideas and expectations, let a plan be offered, which presents some glimmering hope of the re-establishment of a true and regular system of finances; can the smallest doubt be entertained of its being received with

eagerness, and of obtaining the approbation of the majority? It will be unanimously received, if it embraces four essential qualities which all France desires, and which for the sake of France, and for their own, ought to meet with the united wishes of all the Powers of Europe. Namely,

General
plan of
finance.

To remove all fears of a bankruptcy;

To limit the power of imposing taxes;

To bring back and to promote the circulation of specie;

To regulate the œconomical order of the public expences.

No bank-
ruptcy.

TO REMOVE ALL FEARS OF A BANKRUPTCY, is to ensure the religious fulfilment of all engagements lawfully contracted, by a lawful government; and the sacred performance of all those which repose on the public faith. In this sense, to announce that there will be no bankruptcy, is wisdom; to think bankruptcy necessary, is ignorance; to suppose it advantageous, is an illusion; not to take into consideration the number of families it would drive to despair, would be barbarity; and to attempt it would be rashness. If this were the place to demonstrate every one of these propositions, we would, without the least difficulty, undertake it *; and

* It is to be noticed, that whatever we say against a bankruptcy, does not include the assignats, which must not be confounded with the former engagements of the state. It is not derogating from our principles, not to apply them to what is entirely out of the common course of things; and what, we think, can never be done with respect to the assignats, will be a measure of equity rather than justice. Certainly, when in the course of one year, a quantity of paper-money has been issued, exceeding twelve times the totality of the species that commonly was in circulation, and that the extravagant denomination of thirty thousand millions will represent, at most, but the hundredth part of it in real value, according to the course of exchange; it cannot occur to any impartial mind, that the government, which is to succeed this inter-regnum of anarchy, should be

and yet, how frequently do we hear it maintained, not only that a bankruptcy is inevitable in France, but that the disaster of its public finances would even be repaired by it. It is not at this present time only, nor from the present extraordinary situation to which the French nation is reduced, that speculators and empirics, who boldly advise what they are not charged to execute, have taken upon themselves to propose this grand expedient of restoring every thing, by destroying every thing, and that they have succeeded in bringing over to their opinion all those who have never taken the trouble to examine, to what extent the bankruptcy of an empire, particularly of a great empire, would be iniquitous in its principle, dangerous in its execution, and pernicious in its effects.

They tell you, that far from destroying public credit, bankruptcy would revive it, because a release from the past would be a security for the future; and that he who is free from former debts, has the means of paying what he borrows.—Vain and abominable sophism, belied by common experience, and which tends to prove, that engagements may acquire credit by being violated! If that be the case, why do not all political bodies, whose finances are deranged, make use of that sure remedy? Have they

be obliged to give, to that denomination, the reality it has never had; or that it should take as a legitimate engagement, a mortgage founded on plunder, which, as it is evident from the discredit of its paper, had never obtained any confidence. But is it necessary to pronounce at all upon their spurious existence? May they not be abandoned to their natural course? May they not be left to undergo the fate which was anticipated by the seal of reprobation that was stamped on them from their birth; and without giving them a value which they have not, and cannot have, may they not keep that value to which they have been reduced?—These few words sufficiently prove, that there is no contradiction between what we have laid down as a principle, respecting bankruptcy, and the conjectures we offered concerning the fall of assignats.

they not all the same right to use it? This principle once admitted, what will become of public faith? But supposing even that smaller states, whose means and wants are concentrated within their own narrow limits, could compensate their inability to fulfil their engagements by the open violation of them, and enrich, by dishonouring themselves; yet the same would not hold good with greater empires, to whom credit is more valuable than gold; to whom political consideration is as necessary as it is precious; who cannot, without infinite detriment, renounce the advantage of foreign relations; and whose vast spreading branches attract and inhale all their nutritive substance, from without by their immense foliage.

For this important reason, England will never deprive herself of this inestimable resource of her credit. She knows too well of what advantage public faith is to her bank, and her bank to public interest, not to hold the word *bankruptcy* in the deepest horror. It remains to know, whether this prudent horror will induce her to take such measures as will prevent the establishment of any Government amongst her neighbours, whose policy may boldly defy the consequences of such a breach of faith, and thus overthrow what a small pamphlet of great good sense emphatically calls *the finance of Europe, the universal bank, the reciprocal credit of the Republic of Nations**.

The national consent for imposing taxes requisite.

TO LIMIT THE POWER OF IMPOSING TAXES is likewise an essential point in a plan of Government, which is to be conformable to the general wish of the French, and to the common principles of civilization. As it is just and necessary that the people should contribute to the expences which their safety requires, so is it that they should be guarded

* See *Correspondance d'un Voyageur*.

guarded against the danger of seeing their contributions swell to an indefinite amount, beyond the necessary urgency of the state. The real method of guarding against this, and of preventing every abuse in public charges, is to maintain this fundamental maxim, that *no tax is to be imposed or continued without the consent of the nation*; a maxim constantly insisted upon by the States General; a maxim which the unfortunate Lewis the XVIth had expressly acknowledged, even before the sitting of the last assembly, when he was in the full exercise of his power and liberty; a maxim which, if well understood and well regulated, does in no way obstruct the operations of a wise government; a maxim in short which not one of those who have lately written in favour of the rights of royalty, ought to have called into question, since it will be the first duty of him who is called to the throne of France, to pay a public homage to this fundamental truth.

Nothing affects the people more than the object of impositions; it is on this point therefore, that it is of such material importance to instruct and to tranquilize them.

To give them useful information on this subject, The most it will be necessary to make them understand, in a sensible manner, as it may easily be done, that those who promised to free them from their galling yoke, have in reality crushed them; that the revolution, far from relieving them, has loaded them with burdens till then unknown; that if it has exonerated them from several grievous charges, it has at the same time deprived them of all means of subsisting; that it has most completely devoured all their natural and artificial resources; that since they have become sovereigns, they have been most miserable; that they have infinitely more trouble in getting their livelihood, and less money; more labour exacted from them, and their labour less profitable; that they

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they pay much dearer for their subsistence, and are much less secure against want; that the requisitions in kind, and all personal requisitions, to which they are continually exposed, are much more burthensome to them than all the former taxes; and lastly, that democracy, the advantages of which had been so industriously extolled, has in reality, produced nothing but a deluge of evils, of sufferings, and of anarchy.

It would be necessary to quiet their minds, and to shew them, by comparing the security that this new proffered plan would afford them, with that false security with which they have been hitherto so grossly deluded, that this *preservative* against an excessive and unlimited taxation, which they could not meet with in those phantoms of governments of which they have experienced such a rapid succession, would be rendered inviolable by a permanent constitution, which would proscribe all arbitrary systems, and according to which, all active authority, invested with sufficient power to govern a great empire, would be, at the same time, moderated and checked by a permanent code of laws, the pure administration of which would be watched over, and guarded by the whole nation, represented as much as it ought to be, that is, as much as the preservation of its rights require that it should be.

It will not be difficult to make the French people sensible, that they can never be happy and contented, unless they reduce to this sole check and super-intendance the absurd pretensions of governing themselves; and to convince them, that by giving to their representative legislators an unlimited extent of authority, together with a continuance in their functions, by no means warranted by the object; they have conferred on them a power of oppression, when they ought to have had only a power of preservation; and thus have multiplied
their

their own chains by multiplying their despots. On one side, what counterpoise has the new constitution established to balance and to moderate the absolute power entrusted to seven hundred and fifty popular tyrants, who compose the unity of the legislative body? On the other how could they find employment enough, if they were to confine themselves to the sole object of their institution, which is that of framing laws? Strange infatuation, to imagine that to insure the happiness of a state, it must have a legislative manufactory, continually at work; and that the stability of the laws, which is the foundation of public tranquillity, and the touchstone of all good government, can be compatible with the profession of seven hundred and fifty sovereign-artists, incessantly revising and reforming ancient laws, or manufacturing new ones!

On dwelling merely upon the pecuniary laws, what a mirror can we hold out to the view of the French nation? How easily can we dispel that mist which has so long obscured and blinded its understanding, by representing to the people what exorbitant authority in imposing taxes they have given to the legislative body *, and the alarming use it has already made of it.

By right the legislative body may, according to Accord-
the constitution, *impose such taxes as it shall think* ^{ing to the}
necessary ^{new Con-}stitution,

* The example of the Parliament of England cannot be alledged here as a proof in favor of this authority. It resembles in nothing the legislative body of France; it has not that despotic authority, being composed of three powers that counterbalance each other. The House of Commons is not the only one intitled to make laws; and if it has, like the others, the right of imposing taxes, this right cannot be exercised but with the consent of the King, of the House of Lords, and of all the great proprietors of the kingdom who compose the two Houses: besides it receives the representations of the people, whose voice in France cannot be heard, since all collective petitions are forbidden by the 36th Art. of the Constitution.

the power necessary, renew them at pleasure, regulate the amount, the quality and assessment, without any controul whatever*.

on unlimited.
The fact proved.

They have, indeed, just decreed one of the most formidable contributions, under the appellation of a *forced loan* of six hundred millions, payable in the space of six weeks, either in metallic specie, reduced assignats, or corn, by one-fourth of citizens who have borne or may bear the highest rate, and who, after having been marked out by the administrators, shall be ranged into different classes, and taxed, more or less, according to the will of the legislative body.

Was there ever an impost more excessive than this, which alone surpasses infinitely the whole bulk of all the imposts, duties, taxes, and tributes whatever that were annually levied in France?

Was there ever any one more iniquitous, and more illegal than that which subjects one-fourth only of the citizens to a contribution designed for the wants of the whole state; whilst the constitutional law requires, that *all contributions, of whatever kind, should be levied among all the citizens capable of being taxed*†?

Was there ever any one more unjust and vexatious than that which directs an enormous sum to be raised in specie, when there is almost no specie in the circulation; and which allows but the short space of six weeks, enacting an unexampled punishment against those who do not pay within this assigned period?

Was there ever any one more contradictory and more open to the multiplied vexations of stock-jobbing, than that which admits in competition with gold and silver a discredited paper-money, and re-

* Art. 302 and 303 of the Constitution.

† Art. 306 of the Constitution.

ceives it for the hundredth part of its nominal value, whilst, according to the course of exchange, it may be had at the two hundredth part ?

Lastly, was there ever any tax more arbitrary in its assessment, more susceptible of corrupt practices in collecting it, than that which is imposed, in a vague manner, on the fourth part of an unknown number of citizens*, which leaves to the choice of the administrators the completion of this undetermined fourth part, the individual contribution of which may be extended at will by those who are to regulate the respective classes, and fix each quota, since they will have it in their power to encrease or limit, at will, the number of the forced lenders, and the amount of their assessment, without the possibility of its being prevented, or even perceived.

What clamours would such an extortion have excited, when Monarchy still existed ; if a Minister of the Finances had had the impudence to propose, and the power to execute such a project !

Infatuated and unhappy people, so wantonly deluded, and the sport of so many factions ; will you never open your eyes to conviction ? You have been taught to believe, that you were under a yoke of iron, while you were governed by the most humane of Kings, and the mildest administration. You have been exasperated by vehement declamations on the insupportable weight of taxes, at the very moment when they had been diminished by the suppression of one *vingtieme* and of several burthensome imposts. It has been artfully inculcated, that arbi-

* The Directory had proposed to fix the amount of the tax to six hundred millions, and the number of those to be assessed to one million : but the decree of the Legislative Body has not fixed any number. As it is presumed that the number of men, having the title of citizens, is four millions, the fourth of it would make one million ; but this is only a conjecture.

trary and unlimited impositions were laid on you, whilst it was notorious, that the necessity of the consent of the Pays d'Etats, and of the registering of the twelve Parliaments of the kingdom, having the right of reiterated remonstrances, were so many checks, which rendered the faculty of levying taxes both circumspect and difficult ; and more than one suspensive delay precluded every danger of precipitation. And now, that there is no restraint on the power of *creating taxes of every kind*, no rule of assessment, no means of remonstrating in your favor, or of stopping any precipitate violence of execution ; now, the passive slave of an Assembly, the two-thirds of which have been re-elected by force, you see them decree, in one moment, a most enormous tax, enforcing it within six weeks, on whom they please ; assessing every one as they please ; having it in their power, if they please, to appropriate to themselves a part of it ; and yet you will suffer it, you will hug your chains, and stifle your groans and your resentment. But acknowledge, at least, the miserable state to which you are reduced ; read, in what you now experience, what you have still to expect, and say, O infatuated people ! say whether you have gained by the change ; whether it was necessary to plunge into so many enormities, into so many crimes, in order to arrive at that point at which you now are ? . . . Ah ! without doubt, you are panting for a change ; and if a government were presented to you, which, by a regular system of finance, would preserve you from the evils of despotism, you would rise in a mass to embrace it.

The return of specie in circulation.

It would still be necessary TO BRING BACK THE CIRCULATION OF SPECIE, which the forced paper-money has banished ; for as long as there are assignats, and an unlimited power of fabricating them, so long will oppression exist. The reign of the latter has produced the reign of the former. They exist together,

ther, and must perish together. It is equally true, that it is the assignats that have made, and are still making war against all Europe; that they are the enemies of all social order; and that the return of public tranquillity indispensably requires the expulsion of this *fraudulent* and inexhaustible system of finance, which is indeed a fathomless abyss: such a system cannot be destroyed but by a *real system* of finance, and this cannot be established without a good Government. Money attracts money. In this consists all the secret of reviving the circulation of specie. To recall the money which has been exported, you must give new life and activity to commerce: to recall the money which has been concealed, you must re-establish confidence. And nothing but a wise and legitimate Government can impart new life to commerce, and restore confidence: this object, therefore, as well as all the others, renders the return of a solid Government a most desirable event for France.

Lastly, to complete the restoration of the finances, Oeconomy in the public expences. it would be requisite TO REGULATE THE OECONOMICAL ORDER OF THE PUBLIC EXPENCES. This is a principle, so very much hackneyed, though so often misunderstood, that by insisting on it, we should be fearful of wearying out the patience of the readers. But to shew them, that in this respect also, the wish of the nation must lead it to have another government; we beg to refer them to the periodical work of Mr. Peltier, where, from the calculations which he makes, they may judge what idea must be entertained in France of the excessive expences occasioned by the new administration. They are incredible, and what has been said with so much exaggeration respecting the profusions of the Court of France, and the pretended dilapidations of its ministers, is nothing in comparison. It will

will certainly not be very difficult to present a more oeconomic plan to the nation.

4. Moral
order.
Religious
senti-
ments not
extinct.

4. RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS.—Yes certainly it still burns in the hearts of the French, that sentiment which has been implanted by nature, fortified by reason, and consolidated by habit: this sacred sentiment, the support of public safety, and the solace of human woe, could neither be destroyed by five-years of public commotions, by the nefarious and wanton overthrow of the objects of its veneration, nor by the systematic efforts of a faction, whose impiety was founded on interest rather than opinion; of a faction which desires no worship, because it desires no religion; which desires no religion, because it desires no morality; which will admit neither worship, religion, nor morality, because it is determined to remove every obstacle that may oppose its unbounded desire of ruling; and because, with a determination to destroy every thing, that it might raise itself on the ruins of every thing sacred and valuable, it has found it necessary to use its utmost efforts to dissolve the sacred ties which detained the people within the bounds of their duty.

The best method of combating the pretended atheism of this faction, is to unmask its true motives. To render the seduction less powerful, the seducers must be discredited. The nation must know whose interest it has consulted in favouring the sacrilege; and whose interests it has sacrificed in abandoning the rites and the ministers of its religion.

Expedi-
ents used
to attack
Religion.

But what can have so powerfully operated upon the people to bring them to this blind compliance! How has it been possible, without exciting their utmost indignation, to overthrow their altars, shut up their temples, to persecute and martyr their pastors, to bring the faith, in which they had been educated, into ridicule; to forbid them their common exercise of piety, and finally to trample under
foot

foot what they had ever held sacred and venerable ? This will always remain an inexplicable phenomenon. But if any thing tends to throw some partial light upon it, it is the artful address which these modern philosophers and revolutionists have constantly shewn, in disguising their incredulity under the outside of sound reason and humanity, and in appearing to direct their attacks on the absurdities of superstition only, and the cruelty of intolerance.

They did not say to the people—cease to be Christians : but, become brothers, re-assume the right of liberty of conscience, and be no longer the dupes of your own credulity. To detach them from divine faith, they affected to confound it with fabulous traditions. To villify the most august ceremonies, they turned into ridicule some ceremonial customs, foreign to the essential part of worship. To bring the public odium upon the clergy, they made the people lose sight of their virtues and services, and only spoke of their riches, their extravagance and prodigality ; of the general prejudice entertained against their privileges, and of the seasonable relief it would procure to the nation to apply to its wants those immense riches which the clergy had for ages appropriated to themselves.

Such are the artifices and delusions, with which the innovators have fascinated the multitude ; and that to such a degree, as to induce them to support solemn demonstrations of idolatry.* It would be only countenancing these men, to appear to confute maxims which they have so scandalously abused. They will, on the contrary, be disconcerted themselves, if the same unwillingness is evinced by others, to think that a religion, which bids us pay

How the respect for religion may be re-established.

* The Convention has been observed leading the people to the feet of the goddess of Reason, represented by an actress, taking her in procession through the streets, and erecting an altar to her in one of the first churches of the capital.

our adoration to God, in spirit and in truth, consists in vain pageantry and the number of images; that a religion which inculcates gentleness, meekness, and the love of our neighbour, lays a positive injunction on its professors, to persecute those who do not profess it; that a religion, which recommends the spirit of poverty and humility, should have rich and ambitious ministers.

Public
Profession, which
every
Government has
a right to
require.

But, at the same time, the grand fundamental dogmas of religion, on which a wise government should not suffer any schism or public dissension to arise, must be rendered permanent and irrefragable. The more disinterested they are, the more will they be revered. The degree of conviction will be proportionate to the limits of their number. The existence of a Supreme Being who governs the world, the distinction of good and evil, a sentiment that so closely adheres to us; the immortality of the soul, and that essential doctrine of a future distribution of rewards and punishments in another life, which is the necessary consequence of the two first truths; these are immutable principles, with respect to which, the law may require that the public profession of all the citizens be one and the same; since they are principles engraven in the hearts of all; principles, which reason prescribes to all, and are of such importance to the maintenance of social order, *that if they were not real, it would be necessary to invent them.* This is the creed of the universe.

It may not be the province of civil government, which is the only object of our present enquiry, to enter into more minute particulars respecting the doctrines of religion. Whatever belongs to revelation is not in its jurisdiction; and this is the motive which induces us to keep a respectful silence on whatever relates to Christianity. But even in confining our observations merely to the political and social interest of France, we are warranted in maintaining,

maintaining, that it should preserve the religion of its fathers; that the sublime morality it teaches is useful, nay, essentially necessary to restrain the authority of the sovereign, to insure the obedience of the people, to support the observance of all duties, to govern all passions, and to cement, in the most effectual manner, the tranquillity of the Empire.

The same interest of true policy likewise requires, ^{Necessity of wor-ship.} that particular attention should be paid to exterior worship, and that the government should see it countenanced and respected. Men in general require sensible images; they must have symbols and visible rites to bind them to their spiritual duties. The sentiments of adoration, of gratitude and submission, which they owe to the Eternal, would not make on their minds a lively and durable impression, if they were not excited and mutually communicated by external signs.

The necessity of a religion, therefore, includes ^{How far toleration should be extended.} the necessity of a worship. The most savage nations have one. To tolerate a difference of worship is not repugnant to the wisdom of a constitution, nor to the happiness of a state; there are several examples of it: but to adopt none, to favor none in particular, to look upon every kind and form with the same indifference, is an absurdity and want of political sagacity, of which it was reserved for the authors of the new French constitution to give so glaring an instance. They have declared that the expence of any worship whatever could not be the object of a public contribution; consequently there can be no temples, for where is the individual who would build them at his private expence? They have added, that no worship is to be paid by the Republic*, consequently no clergy, for on what could they subsist? L 2 Does

* See Art. 354 of the Constitution, whose outline is taken from a law of some of the States of America, but which is not the better for it. Besides, no conclusion can be drawn from the law to the greater; from Quakers to Frenchmen.

Does not this indifference to public worship, expressed in a manner which denotes a contempt for the object itself, this decree which condemns to indigence the ministers of the altars, in order to make them fall into contempt, this singular affectation of omitting every mention of religion in the chapter on the *duties of man*, manifest an open intention to abolish every principle of religion? But if it were not evident that this was their intention, it would be at least the excess of political ignorance not to admit, nor to defray, a national worship.

The national worship should be predominant, without being exclusive.

I understand by national worship, that of the religion generally practised and revered by the nation. This worship should be protected by government, and provided with every requisite; it is in this sense that it should be rendered predominant, without being exclusive. It would be against the holiness of religion to suppose it intolerant; it would be perverting its celestial origin to think that it required compulsion in order to establish its spiritual empire: but let those who govern a nation do every thing in their power, without command and constraint, to rally every homage around the same worship; let them favor it by all preferences compatible with the right every one has to justice; let them excite others to submit themselves to it; not by their authority, but by their example. Such expedients will be both wise and just.

The multiplicity of religions, when government gives no preference to one more than to another, when it treats them all indistinctly, and abandons them to their reciprocal rivalries, must naturally produce a continual source of endless dissensions and animosities; whilst, on the contrary, a public worship, whose uniformity should be fixed, not by the law, but in consequence of the general wish of the whole state, is a sacred bond of society, which unites the citizens at the foot of the altar; excites them

them to fraternity by the performance of the same duties, and contributes more than any other worldly expedients,, to enforce public order and civilization, by every means which the identity of sentiments, and the harmony in religious practices may produce in co-operating to the general welfare.

A wise and well-organized government will not suffer any of these precious advantages to be lost ; it will know how to bend the will of all towards a sound morality, without restraining the liberty of conscience ; and without proscribing any other religion, to procure a just pre-eminence to the *national* established worship. To this religion it will erect temples, spacious enough not to require too great a multiplicity ; it will not display any ostentatious luxury ; but it will have them of a noble architecture, of pure decorations, of a majestic simplicity, that may inspire the idea of the Supreme Being*. It will, likewise, contribute to the pomp and splendor of religious ceremonies, which, without the show of an useless magnificence, and free from every species of superstition, should be truly imposing and magnificent.

Far from adopting the absurd idea, that the existence and character of the pastors of the people are of no consequence to the state, it will think it a capital point of legislation to see, that the ministers of

Majesty
of temples and
ceremonies.

The subsistence of the ministers of the altars should be secured.

* I am far from presuming to place the heathen temples above the Catholic churches, nor even to compare them, with respect to their different destinations : but are we then not allowed to judge from what remains of the temples of Greece and ancient Rome, and to maintain that they were better constructed and more convenient for their object than the greatest part of modern churches ? I except the incomparable Basilic of St. Peter at Rome, St. Paul's in London, St. Geneva and Notre-Dame at Paris, St. Amand in Flanders, and some others of the same kind. But how many others are there not, the childish decorations of which are more adapted to remove than to recall the idea of the Divinity ?

the

the established church, destined to instruct the people in the most essential part of their duties, be men of abilities, and decent in their deportment; men, in short, whose attention be solely applied to their august functions; which implies the necessity of providing, and insuring to them, an easy and honorable subsistence; it would likewise be unjust and unbecoming that this subsistence should merely be precarious.

Lastly, every thing that may contribute to raise and consolidate the empire of a religion, whose precepts and duties are entirely founded on charity*; every thing that may preserve it from human alterations, and render it inaccessible to the attacks of open impiety, or to the irreverence of the frivolous and profane; every thing that may bring back the French to that respect and veneration for the name of *God*, which the English philosopher, the glory of his age, and who best knew the laws of nature†, had for the Divinity, should enter into the plan of a government capable of consigning to eternal oblivion the wicked attempts of the modern legislators.

IF WHAT I have mentioned concerning the four principal causes, which agitate the public mind in France,

* Charity signifies the love of God, and the love of our neighbour. It is according to the scriptures, *All the law and the prophets*. A new government, therefore, should endeavour to render the French, *brothers in charity*. The government they now have renders them *brothers in barbarity*.

† NEWTON. Voltaire relates, that in several conferences he had in 1726 with Dr. Clarke, the disciple of Newton, he remarked that that philosopher never pronounced the name of God without the greatest awe and reverence. Voltaire confessed that it made a most forcible impression on his mind; and Dr. Clarke told him, that he had acquired this habit from Newton: a custom which ought to be observed by all men.

France, was announced to the nation: if such a perspective was held out to the French as might insure to them a mild Government, the security of private property, the restoration of order in the finances, and the return of religion; if it was proved to them, that it depended on themselves to obtain these dear advantages, which they cannot but heartily desire, and to free themselves from the evils with which they are oppressed; it is more than probable, that such a plan would tend to re-unite the general will, and thus combine and satisfy the different wishes of all; and that the general interest, combined with justice and reason, would soon annihilate that which owes its existence and only support to violence.

It would be necessary, therefore, that enlightened and suitable writings should present a reasonable plan founded on those four points; that they should fully explain what I have only intimated; that the fervour of prejudices should be allayed by lenient measures, rather than irritated by opposition; and that with as much perspicuity as is requisite in order to be fully understood by all the classes of the people, a new order of things should be pointed out which insured the reformation of antient abuses, the cessation of the present calamities, and promised for the future every relief, every improvement, every pledge of security, liberty and tranquillity that may naturally be expected.

Political writings on the state of public affairs have been hitherto so effectually employed to bad purposes, that they have produced in France the most pernicious consequences. Why should they not be employed now for the good cause? Why not employ, for the beneficial purpose of restoration, the same method that has proved so useful in the baneful system of destruction?

It

It would be in vain to object that all the writings published in favor of the good cause, has made so little impression, that it cannot be expected they will be of any more advantage for the future.

For first, those writings could not circulate in the kingdom, but it would be very possible to introduce some of that kind I have in view.

Secondly. It is not surprizing that writings, chiefly published from party views, and that went into opposite extremes, could make no impression and produce no utility: But those which the present circumstances require, should be moderate, impartial and disinterested; they should endeavour to balance the opposite questions, expose general truths, and leave the application of them to the reader, who at the same time should be induced, by persuasion, to make his own choice, rather than compelled by force to chuse what is desired.

Thirdly. Different prejudices and prepossessions have hitherto been too strong and too presumptuous, to render it possible to act efficaciously. A vessel beaten by contrary waves, and assaulted in every direction, could not keep a steady and regular course. The roaring of the waves and the whistling of the winds have hitherto drowned the voice of the pilot: but at present, the storm seems to have subsided, the commotion is less tumultuous. This is the time when it may be said: Let a wise and prudent man appear, and all parties will be silent and listen to him.

— Si fortè virum quem
Conspexere, silent.

This is therefore the moment to employ a moderate and persuasive pen, a free and *dispassionate* writer, who without bewildering himself in Platonic reveries, or in the definitions, divisions and theories

theories of Aristotle, so much hackneyed by our modern politicians; who without even regarding the decisions of a celebrated author, whose learned reflections often degenerate into witty jests; and particularly without losing himself among the metaphysical abstractions of the present legislators, so little applicable and so dangerously illusive, may be able to exhibit clear and plain notions on Governments in general, as free from artifice as simple practical truths ought always to be; to point out, in a forcible manner, the plan which, considering times and places, is the best adapted to the present circumstances; and to treat this important question as a statesman, rather than a philosopher or a man of letters.

The Combined Powers have not sufficiently considered the effects which a work, uniting whatever was requisite to instruct and persuade, would produce at this moment upon the French nation; at a time, when the whole people, even the labourer and the mechanic, are accustomed to discourse on public concerns; at a time when every one reads, when every one is eager for information, when every one judges for himself; at a time when the whole nation, wearied out with revolutionary convulsions and continual sufferings, pants after the return of order and tranquillity. No care has been taken to influence the public opinion, when it ought to be considered, that it is the public opinion alone that has done, and that can undo every thing. The only means of taking advantage of the general discontent is to suggest a plan which may put a stop to it.

In the mean while, I do not pretend that it will be sufficient, in order to insure success, to publish good writings, and to lay before the nation the plan of a wise Government. It is in my opinion a necessary step towards it; but it is not in itself a decisive

Utility of
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decisive expedient; it must prepare, but it cannot alone operate the salutary change which should be the object of every effort; a change which it would be very impolitic to particularize by the name of *counter-revolution*. If this expression served formerly as a rallying point to the well-intentioned, it is become in the present situation very improper and misplaced. I shall endeavour to prove it, because it is very important that such expressions should be avoided, and that a project, which is no longer possible, should be no longer announced.

Observations on the word counter-revolution.

When a whole people are in a state of revolution; when they have been led to believe, that they will become happier by the revolution; when they are persuaded that there is no medium left for them between supporting the revolution or relapsing into slavery; they are firmly convinced that all those who declare themselves counter-revolutionists, declare themselves likewise their enemies, the enemies of their rights and happiness. It is saying to them: Do not listen to me; it is renouncing all means of recalling them to reason by the voice of persuasion; it is wishing to effect every thing by open force; that is to say, to effect more than the present physical and political order of things can promise.

Ancient epoch.

There was a time when it might have been supposed that the several forces of the European states, sincerely united for the grand interest, which was common to them all, would not have been retarded by any obstacle, nor weakened by any deviation from the plain tract that lay before them. Every thing seemed to promise, that their confederate troops, led on by a General of experienced military knowledge and abilities, would soon have come up with this hideous hydra; that they would have struck it to the heart, and severed by repeated blows the innumerable heads of that horrible monster, which

which was produced from the dreadful union of philosophical fanaticism and lawless ambition, but which at that time yet mistrusted its own strength. It had not then acquired, by successful combats, the presumption of deeming itself invincible; it had not then glutted itself with carnage, and saturated itself with royal blood: it was not then, as all enemies are who are reduced to the last extremity, irritated by numerous, but too feeble wounds, and obstinately bent on conquering or perishing.

It was then justifiable, nay essential, to have no other object in view but to triumph, to conquer and to subdue. The most unfortunate of Kings was yet alive; he was a captive; he was in imminent danger; the voice of honor called to his assistance those faithful subjects, who left their country with no other view but to assemble under the banners of his illustrious brothers, and to fly with them to his defence. Could any one hesitate then? Was that a moment to listen to cold circumspection and tardy prudence, a suggestion which was pronounced necessary only after the event? I have felt as much, and perhaps much more than others, this enthusiasm of zeal and generosity of sentiments which armed the faithful against the revolted part of the nation. I am far from reproaching myself or being sorry for it. To be an anti-revolutionist at that epoch, was to endeavour to prevent the revolution from consolidating itself, to stop its progress or prevent its consequences. What they have been, those execrable consequences, has but too well justified this opposition; But however just this loyalty was, however deserving of success and of support, from all the Sovereigns of Europe, *Diis aliter visum*, Heaven has willed it otherwise.

But now that every thing is changed; now that the revolution is finished; I do not say by right and justice, but in reality so; now that a new generation

Difference of
circumstances.
of

of men, formed for these last eight years among the most active part of the nation, know no other principles than those they have imbibed from that very revolution; now that whatever all faithful Frenchmen have to expect from the Belligerent Powers can no longer lull them into security; may I be permitted to ask, whether it would be judicious openly to attack what is defended by a million of bayonets; whether it is possible not to notice what has passed for these four last years, and to act as if we were in 1791? May I be permitted to ask, whether, making a compromise with necessity, and changing the plans of operations when the circumstances are changed, should be called changing one's sentiments? Lastly, may I be permitted to ask whether, instead of being obstinately bent on an entire counter-revolution at the very moment that it appears impossible, which is as much as to wish to be buried under the ruins of the ancient Government, it would not be more useful and prudent to confine oneself to possibilities, and consequently only to aim at the amelioration of the revolution, and to announce, as I had already done in 1790, *that it might be strengthened and ameliorated by being rendered reasonable* *.

Other
means to
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to writ-
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This sufficiently shews the necessity of being cautious in expressions as well as in actions. But let us return to the means which might be joined to instructive writings in order to remove every difficulty; and let us endeavour to give a glimpse, at least, of those measures that might be pursued, in order to lend some indirect assistance to the nation in the adoption of a good Government, after having presented a plan to that purpose and inspired the desire of it, which must be a principal point towards the main object.

I am

* See *l'Etat de la France*, published in October, 1790, page 331, 4to edition, 14th line. An extract of it will be given in a note at the end of the work.

I am come to the most critical part of my undertaking; reduced to the necessity either of not being understood for want of being sufficiently explicit, or of being detrimental to the cause, by saying too much. The last inconvenience being by far the worst, I prefer to be accused of sterility rather than of indiscretion; and without entering into any of the particulars which should not be made public, I shall confine myself to indicate what may lead to them.

It is very notorious, that there are at present two different and distinct parties in the French nation, and two in the Legislative Body. These two differences, however, are not of the same kind at present.

In the nation, one party, and it is the most considerable, manifest a wish for the return of Monarchy; the other seems still afraid of it, and is, for this reason, provisionally for the Republic, which perhaps it loads with maledictions in private; both are groaning under their present sufferings; both are desirous of a change, on the nature of which, however, they have formed no fixed idea; both are principally fighting after tranquillity; and both would easily agree in the adoption of a moderate government, founded upon determinate and immutable laws: a government which would proscribe all arbitrary power, and which would not be what the past was, much less what the present is. But the nation, collectively taken, is so pressed down by its sufferings, that it is very unlikely it will retrieve itself by its own exertions. Wearied out by its internal convulsions, plunged in such an abyss of calamities, discouraged by the bad success of all its attempts at resistance, terrified by the murderous executions which have followed every insurrection in the provinces, overawed by the bloody consequences which followed that of Paris after the 5th of

Necessity
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There
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of October, pressed down by the weight of the numerous chains with which they are continually loaded by their merciless rulers, this unhappy people find themselves in that lethargic apathy which commonly follows the most violent paroxysms of madness. They will not rouse themselves until a new agitation produces a new crisis, and then their rage, stifled for the moment, will burst forth with all the vehemence of a spring, which, being compressed for a while, is the more violent when disengaged from the ties by which it was detained.

There exist also two parties in the Legislative Body.

In the Legislative Body, the two parties are very distinct: the one which at this moment prevails, is nearly what the majority in the Convention was; it is composed of the greatest number of the re-elected members: (which are, as it is well known, the two-thirds of the seven hundred and fifty Legislators) and of all those among them, who, being the former accomplices of the bloody Robespierre, have indeed professed to feel the greatest abhorrence for his execrable system, but have not abandoned the intention to imitate his example; who inveigh against his ferocious tyranny, but who have preserved its chief essence and spirit, and already begin to renew its direful effects: the secret allies and constant protectors of Jacobinism, which they appear to prosecute, they have preserved to themselves the power of re-animating this monster, as soon as it will answer their views, and have already prepared, by re-opening the clubs, the horrible engines and instruments which are to give it life and activity. They are, and always will be united by one common tie, which perhaps has been hitherto too much contracted: the interest of their own safety, which places on the same footing all those who have been concerned in the same crimes. The other party consists of undeceived Republicans, and of more or less determined Royalists; it is composed of the whole

whole new third, and of several of the re-elected members; it is that of the true moderates; of the real enemies of all the atrocities that have stained the reign of the Convention, and generally of all those who sincerely wish for a new order of things, and for a government susceptible of permanency. This party seems to have the majority in the Council of the Ancients, and a strong minority in that of the five hundred; it may flatter itself with the supposition of having the voice of the people; and yet they run the risk of being soon crushed by the other party, who unite to the audacity of villainy all the power with which the Members of the Directory, with whom they are joined in one common league, are invested, and all the extension of that power which they are daily endeavouring to bestow upon the executive power.

These two parties, which are known to exist in the Legislative Body, differ so widely in their sentiments, origin, interests, and private views, that they must necessarily be irreconcilable enemies. They have not yet declared an open war; they have hitherto confined themselves to indirect attacks: it even appears, that there has been between them a kind of momentary compromise: but this is only a short delay of hostilities, because on one side the ruling party, wishing to make use of the Jacobins, without being subservient to them, has discovered that these were still more violent than themselves, that they were too precipitate, betrayed too soon their deep connivance and dark designs, and that they assumed perhaps too great an ascendancy over them: on the other side, the moderate party does not feel itself possessed with sufficient power to prevent, by a vigorous aggression, the general attack with which it is threatened. However, the schism is not the less notorious; its effects, which have already been predicted, and announced by all the French

Irrecon-
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Party
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French papers, are only suspended for the moment. What has passed with regard to J. J. Aymé, is generally looked upon as the first signal of their purification system, projected by re-elected Roberspierists, in order to rid themselves of their adversaries; and every thing prefigures a new revolutionary movement, which will occasion the extermination of one of the two parties.

The victory of the one or the other will, at the same time, be decisive of the preponderancy of either of the opinions which divide the nation; it will determine the choice between a Republic and a Monarchy; between war and peace: for these different causes and effects are correlative, and closely connected together.

The result of the crisis which is now preparing, is therefore of the most serious consequence of the Powers of Europe, and to England particularly; the British Government cannot see these portentous forebodings of an approaching rupture between the two parties with a passive indifference; and its solicitude on the probable issue of this contest between two armies, now in sight of each other, cannot be doubted; since the success of the one will naturally produce the establishment of a Government which would lead to a general pacification; whilst the fatal triumph of the other would be inseparable from the prolongation of the war, and the return of terror*.

I conclude,

* This return is but too probable; it has lately manifested itself by several unlawful requisitions, by accusations which the Members of the Directory have already drawn up, by threats and violence, the necessary concomitants of the forced loan, by the oath of hatred to Kings required of the Members, the injunction of celebrating the anniversary of the murder of their King, and several other acts of that kind, which are fully detailed in Mr. Peltier's periodical work, who collects and makes observations, with as much judgment as accuracy, on whatever is done and written at Paris: yet Mr. d'Ivernois still denies,

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cification.

I conclude, therefore, that one of the principal means most conducive to operate that change, on which the return of public tranquillity depends, would be to concur in procuring a substantial and lasting predominance to those, who, if once they had the advantage, would overthrow the tyrannical agents of the actual government, shake off the yoke by which the national energy is so totally depressed, and cause the anti-republican party to prevail in France.

Besides, I leave others to judge what should be done in this case, and what instruments are to be employed to strengthen a party which has already in its favor the goodness of its views, and whatever can be expected from the resentment which the forced re-elections and massacres of the 5th and 6th October last have produced; a party, however, which has no money at its disposal, no influence whatever over the executive Power, nor any of the resources that would be requisite to put this general disposition into activity, and particularly to conciliate the concurrence of the armed force.

To obtain fuller knowledge on the subject, it would be necessary to consult those who have the necessary information; those who have the capacity, and from their situation have better opportunities, to be useful, and whom it is necessary to distinguish from those who are solely actuated by private views, and private pretensions. The means would soon shew themselves, if a real intention to embrace *those means* manifested itself.

Other means to be employed.

denies, in his last pamphlet, the possibility of the return of terror. "I dare affirm, *he says*, that the sceptre of terror is broken. . . . The French have in the fall of the assignats, precisely the same guarantee against the effective return of the reign of terror, as the continental Powers have for the recovery of the conquered countries." *Mr. d'Ivernois' pamphlet, Jan. 25, 1796, page 24 and 25.*

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It would certainly not produce any salutary consequences, to have a second time recourse to that which would only tend to exasperate the minds of the people ; to announce views which could only inflame patriotism, and harden obstinacy ; to appear to adopt the language of an author, who declares, that England is compelled by the most imperious motives of necessity *to tear from the French all the conquests they have made, and that moreover she cannot lay down her arms with any degree of confidence till she has seized upon, and destroyed every point from which the infection may be communicated to her own dominions**.

Much less would it be adviseable to shew any dispositions which would give encouragement and consistency to that party, from which nothing can be expected, and consequently to depress the other, by the help of which alone success is attainable. Is it not palpable, that if, instead of testifying a willingness to treat with the actual Government of France, it was given out that the Allied Powers would wait till the whole nation and the armies had pronounced their unalterable will in a more clear and unequivocal manner, and that they would found upon this declaration their whole security for the attainment of a general pacification, which is the desirable object of all ; is it not evident, that the inferences to be drawn from this step would give new vigour to those whom it would be necessary to favor, whilst at the same time the appearance of contrary intentions must add to the energy, already too powerful, of those whose preponderance it is of such consequence to destroy ?

Lastly, as there was unfortunately too much room for suspecting, that a greater desire was evinced, to

* Page 132 and 133 of the before-mentioned pamphlet.

dismember the French Empire, than to restore legitimate order; it would be expedient to disown an interpretation which some appearances may have justified, and to do away such an unfavourable impression by a new proclamation; the great principle of which, more important than what it appears to be at first sight, would be, to declare in the most solemn manner, the real motives, and the final object of the war;* a consideration this, which has been hitherto quite overlooked, and from this circumstance, the coalition of foreign confederate invaders has produced nothing but the coalition of all parties to repel them.

The moment will come, when the constitutional edifice will perish with its architects, and when the nation must again deliberate on the choice of a new government. This moment is perhaps not very distant: at latest, it will arrive at the expiration of that period, which in seven or eight months, restores to the primary assemblies the power of election. A crisis may indeed accelerate it; a decisive battle between the legislative factions would probably determine the epoch, and this is the epoch which should be had constantly in view; this is the opportunity that should be seized, and which should not be suffered a secondtime to escape.

It is in this view, and for that important epoch, that independent of all other means which I have endeavoured to indicate, it would be of some utility, to publish a proclamation, nearly couched in the following manner:

* Though Mr. d'Ivernois has thought my arguments *fantastical and inconclusive*, because, after having mentioned that some appearances had rendered the real intention of the combined Powers at least doubtful, I have proposed to do away this disagreeable impression, occasioned by these very appearances; yet it seems to me, that, in the eyes of those who have some understanding, and some reasoning faculties, nothing is less contradictory.

Sketch of
a Procla-
mation.

“ Frenchmen ! Be no longer deceived as to the
“ motives which induced us to arm against you.
“ Do not believe, that it is our intention, either to
“ invade or to dismember your country : Our only
“ wish is to put an end to the reign of your op-
“ pressors, who are, at the same time, the oppres-
“ sors of all social order, and the disturbers of the
“ general repose of Europe.* After having openly
“ declared themselves the enemies of all religion, of
“ every form of monarchical government, of all pa-
“ trimonial distinctions, and of all property what-
“ ever ; they have adopted a more secret and less
“ revolting system, which, however, proceeding from
“ the same source, is the more dangerous, because
“ the more insidious.—How can the nations, that
“ are your immediate neighbours rest in any degree
“ of security, while they see at the head of your
“ affairs, and disposing of all your forces, those
“ very men, who but a short time since, preached
“ up the assassination of Kings as a duty ; who
“ squandered away your treasures in exciting the
“ subjects of other countries to revolt ; who reduced
“ seditions to a certain price, and who kept a legion
“ of propagandists in pay, for the sole purpose of
“ disseminating their turbulent doctrines through the
“ Universe ? They do not, at present, make a
“ public profession of the same open and daring
“ policy ; but what security have we, that they
“ will not persevere, with a sly and subtle circum-
“ spection, in those very measures which they be-
“ fore practised, without shame and without dis-
“ guise ? Consider only what dreadful effects you
“ have experienced yourselves from this pernicious
“ system, and then judge, whether others can
“ tamely submit to it ; whether there ever was a
“ more just, a more necessary war, than that which
“ has for its object the preservation of other nations
“ from

* Declaration of his Britannic Majesty, dated October 29th,
1793.

" from so deplorable a fate. To what terrible
 " lengths have they not gone, in sacrificing you to
 " their views? They have shed whole torrents of
 " your noblest blood, and depopulated your most
 " fertile fields; they have swallowed up your whole
 " wealth, and substituted in its place a vain paper-
 " currency, multiplied to an infinite amount, and
 " now reduced to nothing; they have ruined your
 " commerce, your marine and your manufactures;
 " they have destroyed your cattle, exhausted every
 " source from which you drew your provisions,
 " raised all the necessaries of life to a most exorbi-
 " tant price; and still lulling you with the soothing
 " hopes of a perfect happiness, they have in reality
 " rendered you more miserable than you ever had
 " been before. What measures have they since
 " taken to remedy these complicated evils? What
 " have they done to repair the outrages committed
 " against the rights of property, the rights of society,
 " and the rights of nations? Can any real good be
 " expected to arise where all is faction and discord;
 " when their only aim is to undermine each others
 " power, to effect each others destruction; when
 " the elements of their new government are found
 " to be incompatible with each other; when, in
 " short, they have no other resource left, but to pro-
 " long your calamities by prolonging the war, the
 " only support of their usurped power, the only
 " pretext for their tyrannical exactions? But why
 " should you continue the war?—To make new
 " conquests? That intention you have repeatedly
 " disclaimed.—To defend your homes and families?
 " We do not attack them. To maintain your
 " Government? We are far from opposing the es-
 " tablishment of one, provided it is of your own
 " free choice, and such as you yourselves can con-
 " sider as permanent; this, on the contrary, is our
 " principal object; in expectation of this desirable
 " event it is, that the conclusion of peace is still
 " suspended.

“ suspended. But how could we enter into any
“ treaty with your present rulers, whose whole con-
“ duct, and above all, whose personal interests do
“ not permit us to believe that they sincerely wish
“ for peace? Besides, how can we consider those
“ as your legal representatives who, to the know-
“ ledge of all Europe, have only secured the conti-
“ nuation of their functions by violence, and in
“ open defiance of your declared will? We have
“ seen the bold manœuvres they practised to perpe-
“ tuate their own power; we know that, at a time
“ when you should have freely deliberated on your
“ constitution, the accomplices of the tyrant whom
“ you had just brought to the scaffold, employed
“ the armed force to extort your suffrages from
“ you; that your primary assemblies, reduced by
“ terror to the fourth part of what they should have
“ been, were surrounded with bayonets; that the
“ different protests and remonstrances of the sections
“ of Paris produced no other effect than the indis-
“ criminate massacre of 2000 citizens; in short, that
“ the re-election of the two thirds of your pretended
“ legislators has been made without your concur-
“ rence, and in open defiance of your will; that
“ the constitution which they have forced upon you
“ neither has, nor can have been examined, fully
“ discussed, or submitted to the least reflection in
“ your assemblies, convoked and hurried away by
“ precipitancy, and influenced by fear; so that it
“ cannot be said that you have, at present, either
“ real representatives, a constitution of your own
“ choice, or a government susceptible of duration.
“ Now that the defects of this falsely supposed
“ adoption of your free choice have been mani-
“ fested, by more than one sufficient and decisive
“ proof, it is incumbent upon you to meet again in
“ your assemblies, that you may deliberate more
“ maturely, with greater order and a greater degree
“ of

“ of liberty upon those great and essential points, in
 “ which your dearest interests are so materially in-
 “ volved. Let the four millions of individuals
 “ among you who, it is said, are entitled to the
 “ rights of citizenship, make it their sacred duty
 “ to assist at your primary assemblies, and endeavour
 “ to repair that which, through precipitancy and
 “ the want of free agency, has been decreed by
 “ ninety-six thousand only. Let your armies, those
 “ armies who so generously refused to execute that
 “ inhuman decree of the sanguinary Robespierre,
 “ which allowed no quarter to prisoners taken in
 “ battle, join, on this important occasion, the ex-
 “ pression of their will to your resolutions; that
 “ they may no longer be the tame instruments of
 “ the oppression exercised by your tyrants.

“ Two principal questions offer themselves at
 “ present to your consideration. First, among the
 “ different forms of governments, is it the Repub-
 “ lican or the Monarchical which is best adapted to
 “ France? Secondly, among the different modifica-
 “ tions of Monarchy, should the latter be ap-
 “ proved, which of them appears most consonant
 “ to your wishes and most conducive to your hap-
 “ piness?—In order to satisfy your minds more ef-
 “ fectually upon these two questions, endeavour to
 “ procure impartial treatises on the subject; read
 “ them with attention; weigh well the different
 “ arguments that are adduced for and against each
 “ question; deliberate and choose. Your choice
 “ being once made, your resolution taken, and the
 “ basis of your constitution founded upon princi-
 “ ples, compatible with those of the social world,
 “ you will then have a government capable of
 “ being treated with; you will re-enter into the
 “ general association of nations; your interests
 “ will no longer be contrary to their common in-
 “ terests; every nation will then eagerly press for-
 “ ward

“ward to be re-united with you in the social bond
“ of amity, peace and concord.”

Such, or nearly similar, might be the substance of a proclamation, which the present extraordinary state of Europe seems to demand from the Belligerent Powers. I do not pretend to prescribe the mode of it, but I firmly believe, that a proclamation conceived in this spirit, but drawn up in much stronger language, and issued at a favourable moment, preceded by writings explanatory of the questions to be proposed, and backed by every accessory and local advantage which may insure success by skilfully counteracting all attempts of corruption and intrigue, would have a more decided effect, and would lead in a more direct and surer manner, and with less expence, to a solid pacification, than even victory itself.

Why not make the experiment? Why should not a new plan of measures be resorted to, since unlooked for occasions present themselves, and the political order of things is totally new and unprecedented? Should it not be the natural consequence of having hitherto failed in the prosecution of all our measures, that we should now have recourse to a different mode of operations!

Alternative of re-organizing, or destroying the French Empire. I fear not the imputation of advancing a position apparently absurd in saying, that England should force her rival to establish a better sort of government. I have already proved that her interest was inseparable from the general interest; and that every state being most materially concerned in the event of this war, she was more sensibly affected by it than any other nation. Besides, there is now no medium left; France must either be re-organised or annihilated. Having departed from the great law of nations, she must, either subscribe to it again, or be effaced from the map of Europe, as has lately been

been the case with Poland; order must either be re-established, or her entire ruin completed.

The latter expedient, exclusive of its being repugnant to humanity, would be pregnant with much danger, and its success more than doubtful. From the past we are by no means warranted to judge favourably of the future.

But let us, for a moment, suppose, that henceforward fortune should favour the efforts of the Combined Powers; let us suppose a series of victories uninterrupted by a single check; let us suppose Germany entirely evacuated, the Netherlands retaken, Holland restored to her former condition, all the colonies subdued; even the strong frontier of France broken, by the loss of some of its principal fortresses; in a word, let us suppose all those advantages which perhaps the Combined Powers secretly flatter themselves to obtain; which even the approaching campaign, attended with the most brilliant uninterrupted successes might possibly procure; what would be the result? That France would be compelled to accept such terms of peace as her conquerors might please to dictate; that the Emperor would not only regain possession of the Netherlands, but even obtain the cession of some of the strongest towns in French Flanders, as a greater security to himself, and to replace that line of defence which Joseph the Second thought proper to abandon; that England would retain all the Antilles as an *indemnity* for her expences, and as a security for her own colonies, which she is bound to preserve from contagion.

Well! what would be the final issue of all this? —that England would have terminated the war with glory; that her's would be the praise of giving peace to Europe; that France, then abandoned to herself, a prey to internal factions, would with her own hands complete the work of her destruction,
till

till at last worn out and tired of these endless convulsions, sobered through excess of misery, weakened and exhausted by its total inaction, she must be forced to have recourse to the ancient order of things, to throw herself again into the arms of monarchy, and to recall the Bourbon Princes, who, in the expectation of that moment, would patiently drag on their unhappy existence in some obscure corner of the world, and till then derive their sole subsistence from the precarious pittance, which the charity of European States thought proper to bestow on the most ancient, and the most august family of Crowned Heads?

The project of dismembering France, and abandoning it afterwards to its own dissensions, examined.

Is this the plan? Is this the ultimate point of view to which the Belligerent Powers, animated with increased confidence by the late successes of Clairfayt, have directed their attention? We shall not examine how far such a plan would be reconcileable with honour, justice and generosity; how far it would accord with the professions made at the commencement of the war. On this point, respect must seal our lips. We shall only enquire whether such a plan would be consistent with sound policy; whether it would be possible to execute it; and if possible, whether in the end any solid and lasting advantages might be gained from it? We answer to each of these questions decidedly in the *negative*.

With regard to its policy.

I. SUCH A PLAN WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH SOUND POLICY; for every dismemberment of France must be an inexhaustible source of wars, and the most powerful interest of England is to preserve the peace of Europe. A solid pacification without conquests is much more advantageous to her, than the most brilliant conquests without a solid pacification. The internal troubles of France would become a volcano of disorders, scattering its flames far and wide; and England, as being more immediately its neighbour, is of course the most interested

interested in extinguishing them. Even the destruction of France would be a misfortune, rather than an advantage to England; not only because such an event would destroy all equilibrium between the Continental Powers, and leave no longer any fence against the aggrandisement of the House of Austria; but also, because it would deprive England of her principal market for her manufactures, and consequently weaken her commerce; and the energy of her patriotism would soon relax when deprived of its principal stimulus and support. The *delenda Carthago* was a political absurdity from the mouth of the wise Cato, by listening to which Rome was at first brought to the very brink of ruin, and afterwards found in the fall of her rival the principles of her own decline. The *delenda Gallia* would not prove a more judicious project for England, nor less destructive in its consequences.

2. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO EXECUTE IT. With regard to its execution. The mere force of arms cannot destroy, or even subjugate a nation of twenty-eight millions of individuals, inhabiting a fertile soil of twenty-eight thousand square leagues, who have every resource within themselves; a nation of warriors, who fight in a cause which every one considers as his own. Whatever temporary reverse of fortune such a people might experience sooner or later would they amply repay their invaders, who had had the cruelty to take advantage of their misfortunes, instead of generously holding out to them a saving and protecting hand. Besides, is it deemed so easy a matter to take, by force, the bulwarks of French Flanders, the voluntary surrender of which must not be looked for? Can any instance be produced of the Austrians having succeeded in the siege of fortresses like those of Lille and Doway? On the other hand, is an island so extensive and populous as St. Domingo, likely to be taken by a body of eighteen thousand men,

men, should France and Spain have time to send sufficient reinforcements of troops; particularly if the former should be assisted by vast bodies of armed negroes; and the latter, by the inhabitants of that part of the island where she still commands, if she cannot cede it according to treaty? But if even all those obstacles which oppose themselves to these different conquests were surmountable; if the elements were to be henceforward as constantly favourable as they have been contrary; still, a considerable time must elapse before such extensive designs can be accomplished: and would they not receive a decisive check from those difficulties, which a long continuance of the war must occasion, on the part of the English nation, should France propose any satisfactory terms of peace, offering to restore her conquests, and even to give up some of the less important islands? Would it be an easy task to persuade the English nation to the continuance of so expensive a war, when she might terminate it without any prejudice to her Allies, and even with some advantage to herself; were it no other than that of having crippled the French marine for a considerable time to come? It remains for the consideration of those who hold the reins of Government, whether, admitting the above premises to be true, it can be the wish of the English nation, to which her King, so deservedly beloved, never shewed himself insensible, to continue a war that has been productive of so much injury to her commerce, for the sole purpose of giving Lisle to the Emperor, or in the hope of conquering St. Domingo, at the risk of what she herself may suffer from the despair of so formidable an enemy.

With re- 3. ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT WOULD NOT BE USE-
gard to its FUL IN THE END, as it must be attended with two
consequences. dangerous consequences, for which no possible advantage could compensate.

The

The one would be the danger for England of losing her present possessions, whilst endeavouring to grasp more than she can keep. Is it forgotten, that a Power is rising fast on the new Continent, to whom nature seems to have destined the dominion of those islands that are immediately contiguous to its territory? Is it expected that England, when she will have withdrawn herself from the association of other European nations, that are equally interested in the defence of these islands, can alone with troops, transported in small numbers to a distance of fifteen hundred leagues, and not seasoned to the climate, resist forces that may be easily conveyed to so short a distance, superior in numbers, and original inhabitants of the same hemisphere? This is a question which we wish also to submit to the wisdom of an enlightened administration.

The other danger to which we must be allowed so repeatedly to call the public attention, since it is not considered with the seriousness it deserves, would be the certainty of being exposed to a war as often as it became the interest of the ruling faction in France to renew it; and the constant necessity of guarding against her moral attacks, that is to say, the contagion of her pernicious systems. Whatever success may attend the military operations, if they only terminate in the terrible, but unavailing destruction of as many men as the preceding campaigns have swept off, the French opinions will remain the same, social order will not be preserved, and *the revolution*, as has been observed by a very energetic writer, *will retain its footing amidst a sea of blood**; and as long as this is the case, it will continue to menace the whole world†.

The

* Mallet du Pan. One of the men who has best foreseen the consequences, and calculated the effects of the revolution. But no greater attention has been paid to him than to many others. There have been many Cassandras, and but few consulted.

† A very weighty, no doubt, and serious answer has been made

The attempt therefore to subjugate France, to dismember it, and to destroy its whole power, would neither be consistent with sound policy, nor with the hope of producing any real good. We do not, however, contend that victories and conquests would be of no use; they would, without doubt, facilitate the means of treating upon more reasonable terms, and by increasing the discontents of the people, would have a greater tendency to induce them to change their present government: but if they were not to produce this effect; if, in short, the Republic should still subsist, the most brilliant successes would not strike at the root of the evil, nor secure Europe from a general combustion. This evil could not be avoided, even if a peace were concluded on the basis of the *status quo*, under the idea that France left wholly to herself, and to her intestine troubles, might soon be recalled to reason, by the excess of her sufferings, and the total loss of her strength. No, never: France will not be exhausted before she has extended her ravages to other countries; she will not, from her own impulse, re-assume the empire of reason; and though at length her excessive calamities may undeceive her, and she might withdraw herself from the mazes in which she has been so long bewildered by the most artful and seductive lures, yet she would not wholly escape the chains of the most terrific oppression. It is just to suppose, that her troubles would increase at home,

made to what is alledged in this and the following paragraph, as indeed in the whole work, concerning the danger of revolutionary contagion. I shall transcribe it here.—“I have the “happiness (Mr. d’Ivernois speaks) not to be of the number of “those who feel this kind of alarm, and I make myself perfectly easy on the danger to be apprehended from the infection of French principles, when I contemplate the calamities “which this fatal doctrine has brought in France, and the number of enemies which its apostles have raised wherever they “have preached it.”

home, when her vigorous exertions were no longer necessary abroad; but it is drawing a false conclusion to suppose, that the internal commotions in France, would secure a state of tranquillity to the rest of Europe.

I think I have sufficiently obviated every possible objection; I have successively examined every hypothesis; I have passed in review every plan that could be produced; and the whole tends to prove the necessity of obliging France to adopt another Government; a Government with which it may be reasonable, it may be possible, it may become safe to conclude a treaty. We may be accused of too much repetition; but we cannot help repeating what we think of so much consequence. To bring this to a conclusion, I shall resume, in a few words, the means which appear to me most likely to conduce to that end; and I sincerely wish, that in presenting this conclusion, I may not have occasion to apply the saying of the Latin Poet:

———Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

C H A P. IV.

*Recapitulation of the means necessary to be used towards
the attainment of a solid Peace.*

I HAVE already observed, that in order to arrive at a real and permanent peace, it was necessary to promote the establishment of another government in France, of a government susceptible of permanency; that in order to determine the nation to adopt such a government the most salutary information concerning her present state and her great political concerns, should be communicated to her; and to effect this important purpose, it would be proper to induce men of the first experience in matters of government, the best informed with respect to the affairs of France, and totally independent of all parties, to give such publications as should have these two objects in view.

The first, to shew, in treating of the different forms of government, that a limited Monarchy is the best adapted to a large empire.

The second, to present a plan of that Monarchy which would be particularly adapted to France, and analogous to the genius of the people; a consideration, which, whatever might be alledged to the contrary, should not be neglected.

I have successively considered the four great springs, which seem to give motion to the general will; and I have said, that in order to concentrate their action to one point, it would be necessary:

1. To

1. To turn the actual discontent of the nation to the speedy adoption of a government, which should not be precisely the ancient government, against which the French seem to be too much prejudiced, nor the Constitution of 1791, which they have acknowledged to be impracticable; nor the Republican form, with which they cannot fail of being soon thoroughly disgusted; but a constitution wisely appropriated to their character, as well as to the situation and extent of France; according to which, the Chief of the State should have sufficient power to rule over so extensive an empire, and the laws should have sufficient strength and stability to moderate, in all possible cases, the exercise of that power.

2. To remove all uneasiness respecting private property, by fixing its inviolability on a firm and stable foundation, and by repairing the injuries it has sustained.

3. To restore order in the finances, and public credit to the state.

By removing every idea of bankruptcy,

By disclaiming all arbitrary impositions,

By restoring and facilitating the circulation of specie,

By fixing a well-regulated œconomy in the public expenditure.

4. To re-animate religion, to exact an unanimous respect for the great principles of our belief, so necessary in every well-regulated civil society; to provide for the established form of worship without excluding others, and to secure a decent maintenance to the ministers of the altar.

We have afterwards stated the principal means which should be used in order to take a seasonable advantage of the present conjuncture, and of the schism that prevails in the Legislative Body; and to secure the victory to that party which is secretly aiming at the establishment of another government.

We have succinctly indicated, how it is possible to strengthen that of the legislature and of the country, which is well-intentioned and well-affected to the common cause of social order, and thus to counter-balance, in the most effectual manner, the intrigues of the ruling faction. Lastly, after having slightly mentioned what should be observed or avoided, in order to obtain an efficacious and indirect influence, we have proposed, as an accessory expedient, a proclamation to be sent forth by the Belligerent Powers, in the most favorable moment, which might serve to undeceive the French nation, with respect to the object of the war, and to induce them to deliberate once more on their form of government.

It is in a proper combination of such measures, proposed and managed by skilful agents, who will not be sparing of their labours whenever a readiness to employ them manifests itself, that, in my opinion, consists the whole secret of bringing about, without any appearance of interfering in her internal concerns, a change so essential to the public tranquillity of France; and I have proved, that this method of giving peace to Europe, by the re-establishment of order, was not only the most expeditious, but the only one that was possible, and the most salutary.

Would to Heaven my feeble voice possessed the accents and the power of persuasion! that it might attract the attention of the Confederate Courts* to what I have proposed! May those who are the most interested in promoting the object of this work, not endeavour to defeat its purpose by ill-timed criticism, or by a false interpretation of its intentions! No selfish motives have influenced my wishes; my heart

* What we have here mentioned relating only to the conduct of the Confederate Powers, rather than to the Prince to whom the Crown of France devolves, we have said nothing of a GENERAL AMNESTY, but we are well convinced that, as a great political consideration, it is wholly indispensable.

beats with nobler and purer sentiments. Whoever reads this work, undertaken by mere chance and without any pretensions to excellence, will easily perceive, that it is designed to convince rather than to please; that the author has neither courted praise, nor dreaded censure; neither studied to gain approbation, nor shrunk from his purpose to avoid the murmurs of discontent. Is not this the characteristic of a man to whom the favor of the great is become indifferent; a man detached from all interest, from all prejudice, from all party; a man who has no object but the public good, no motive but truth? If, with this disposition, I should sometimes have appeared too acrimonious in discussing what I thought most objectionable, it would be very unjust to infer from it, that I have been at all wanting in shewing a proper respect and delicacy where they were justly due. When I have contradicted, it was with a design to convince, and if I have done it with too great warmth, it must be imputed to an earnest desire of making the stronger impression.

If I have sometimes appeared to give too high a colouring to the representation of those incontrovertible truths which I have brought forward, in opposition to mistakes much more flagrant and excessive, I beg to observe, that in attacking what is exaggerated, we sometimes exaggerate ourselves, in order to impress the firmer conviction, that we do not wield less powerful weapons. But the meaning of the thing itself soon reduces the expressions to their real import. Thus, in refuting those who pronounce it to be certain and *infallible* that France, from the exhausted state in which she finds herself, will be reduced to the necessity of suing for peace on any conditions; when I maintain, as a *certainty*, that there will never be a peace as long as the power resides in the hands of the present rulers of France: the word *certainty*, only means that it is exceedingly probable: but as what is most improbable may,

however, happen from one moment to another, I may be thought too positive by those who strictly confine themselves to the word. But I am far from saying too much when I maintain, that, at all events, a peace that should be concluded with such a government, would neither be a safe nor a solid peace.

Conclu-
sion.

Besides, it is of little consequence what opinion is entertained of the writer, provided the great cause which he has undertaken to defend, does not suffer by it. He is steadily attached to his own idea; because he firmly believes, that if once approved, adopted, and followed up with every measure requisite in the execution; so beneficial must be its effects, that things will soon return into their natural order; France will regain its internal peace and safety, and the other nations their tranquillity.

Expecta-
tions.

Then will torrents of human blood cease to flow; then will a solid and lasting peace heal every wound, and restore every violated right: then will the Emperor be re-instated in that part of his possessions which are now wrested from him, and the whole empire recover its ancient limits: then, from the rich artificial plains of Holland to the smiling fields of Italy, the order of ancient possessions will be re-established; then will the Kings of Prussia and Spain be justified in their eagerness to conclude a peace, by the beneficial and powerful influence they have derived from it: then will the descendants of the most illustrious House in Europe, after having convinced the nation over which they have reigned for so many centuries, that the power of promoting the welfare of their subjects is the privilege they most value, be recalled, by the general will of the people, to the throne of their great ancestors: then all party dissension will disappear, and the Emigrants, so long deprived of their all, will no longer be the victims of their courageous fidelity: then will England find, in the general pacification, a new source of prosperity, the well
deserved

deserved and honorable meed of her generous exertions in the cause and maintenance of social order: and the Heroine of the North will enjoy the satisfaction of seeing those great objects accomplished, which her penetrating eye had foreseen from the very first shock of this great commotion.

Must all this, at last, prove but an empty and a pleasing dream? Alas! I fear it; but in the state in which we are, can we do aught but indulge these pleasing dreams? For these, at least, present soft images, an agreeable perspective, and a sky calm and serene; on these, the imagination rests with satisfaction, and we find ourselves relieved by the healing balm which they infuse into our bleeding bosoms. They are neither obscured by the gloomy shades of animosity, nor agitated by the piercing cries of vengeance: they must be pleasing to all the friends of concord and humanity. Whereas the contrary visions hold out no relief to our wearied imagination but at the end of a chain of innumerable evils; they afford no other prospect to our affrighted view but heaps of ruins, the serpents of discord, the daggers of avenging furies; nothing, but spectres of famine, inextinguishable flames of war, the shocks of contending parties, worked up to an excess of madness, and all the monstrous effects of blind despair.

Monstrum horrendum, immane, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.

Too long, and much too long, have these horrible phantoms harrowed up our souls. Let us turn to a prospect less disgusting; let us hope that it will still brighten and repay us for all the horrors of the past. Why not cherish the pleasing idea that France, having at length emerged from the abyss in which she has plunged herself, may be able to effect an advantageous reform, give new springs of encouragement to every class of her citizens, and
plant

plant fresh seeds of a general amelioration? Why not admit the cheering supposition, that when every species of calamity is at length exhausted, every kind of restoration may become practicable? If the scourge of the Revolution has destroyed every existing good, has it not likewise destroyed every obstacle to perfection? By levelling the edifice to the ground, has it not afforded the means of rebuilding it on a more regular plan? And however destructive its effects may have been to the morals of the nation, may not the energy and firmness it has given the French character, too much softened before by luxury, be attended with the most beneficial consequences? Man would be too wretched, if no good was to arise from so many calamities, which afflict the globe he inhabits.

It has been observed by naturalists that in America, where the most terrible hurricanes prevail, *the more impetuous and violent they are, the more abundant are the crops of every kind which succeed, and that they hasten the re-productions of the earth; as if these terrible agitations were necessary to increase her fecundity, thus following the order of nature, which provides for generation by means of destruction*.*

May the GOD OF MERCY, who guides the moral as well as the physical world, grant that those happy effects, which often follow phenomena that seemed to portend a total annihilation of nature itself, may likewise result from those political phenomena with which it has pleased him, in his wrath, to afflict a great Nation! Let us not oppose his mysterious designs, always wise, always beneficent, by our limited conceptions, our lawless desires and eternal animosities!

* Valmont de Bomare, in his Dictionary of Natural History, vol. 4. word, Hurricane.



